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PREFACE
Anglia Ruskin University has a growing number of students – both
undergraduate and postgraduate – from the African continent, and UK
students of African descent, and is proud to promote research that may aid
African development. Professor Home has long experience of research on
land issues in Africa. Since joining the University in 2002 he has managed
a research project for DFID on land titling, which resulted in the book
Demystifying the Mystery of Capital (2004), and undertaken research and
professional consultancies in several African countries. He was invited by
the University of Pretoria to edit these two books on African land law, as
part of a publishing project on the rule of law sponsored by the World
Bank, and the University is pleased to be associated with the undertaking. 
Professor Alan Sibbald
Deputy Vice-Chancellorv 
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EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
The importance of land law for the rule of law in Africa can hardly be
questioned. Population pressures and competition over access to land and
resources generate much conflict, complicated by the historical legacy of
colonial laws and land-grabbing, and by post-independence land law
reforms. The international development agencies increasingly fund
projects related to land law, policy and administration, with the Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and Habitat each maintaining specialist
land tenure units, and the AU and SADC formulating land policy
frameworks. 
This book on themes in African land law is one of a pair, the other
presenting local case studies. It is not so easy to achieve an overview, nor
to find specialist writers in the field. Land law has traditionally been
regarded as a difficult subject to teach, and specialists are fewer in the law
departments of African universities than one might expect. A quick scan of
the index to fifty years of the Journal of African Law reveals less than one
article a year with ‘land’ in the title, the most popular topics being the
Nigerian Land Use Decree and tribal tenure in Botswana. Africa is less
well served than other continents by specialist property law networks, and
less represented at international academic conferences in the field. While
Stellenbosch University in South Africa has a programme training
academic land law specialists, that is an isolated initiative. The search for
contributors to these books produced more non-Africans and those of the
African diaspora than Africans working in their home country. Nor is
African land law the exclusive preserve of lawyers, so other professions
have represented, such as land surveyors, land economists and planners, as
well as those working in NGOs. The list of authors thus includes a
Cameroonian based in the USA, two Ghanaians and a Zimbabwean in
UK academia, and within Africa a Tanzanian in Botswana and a Zambian
in Namibia. With much research coming from outside the continent, non-
African authors include three British, one French (geographer), one
French-Canadian, one Texan (geographer), and one Dutch (land
surveyor).
The two books attempt a balanced regional and thematic coverage. The
table below presents basic statistics on the countries discussed, giving some
pointers to their diversity, in population size, land area and population
density, but a dozen countries from a continent that has over fifty
inevitably means omissions. xi 
Table 1: Basic statistics by country 
Source: 2008-2010 official statistics
Chapter one (by John Donaldson) addresses the legal basis for national
boundaries in Africa. The Cairo Declaration of the OAU in 1964
confirmed the existing colonially drawn boundaries, interpreted through
the uti possidetis and intangibility principles. The limitations of treaty
wording and survey methods meant that many boundaries were unclear,
and took not much account of local environmental and social realities.
Terms such as ‘thereabouts’ in boundary treaties had freed the colonising
powers to interpret the territorial extent of African political entities as best
suited their interests, and few boundaries were a tangible reality on the
ground. The presence of mineral concession areas and white settler estates
affected the methodology used to define boundaries, with the DRC/
Northern Rhodesia boundary an example of costly and precise
delimitation because of the valuable mineral assets at stake. Donaldson
argues for greater geographical clarity to avoid future disputes, as
population density rises and pressure on land grows. Neighbouring states,
however, may be understandably reluctant to embark upon boundary
definition programmes that may provoke the very disputes they are
intended to avoid – under what one might call the ‘let sleeping dogs lie’
principle.
Chapter two (by Jeremie Gilbert and Valerie Couillard) brings the
viewpoints of a geographer and lawyer respectively, and their experience
with the Forest Peoples Programme, to the topic of indigenous peoples’
land rights, which have emerged as a significant human rights issue with
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. The
ACHPR has instituted a working party on the subject, with a somewhat
different approach from the ‘first inhabitants’ approach followed in other
parts of the world, and the historical context shows how international legal
rules were designed by colonial powers, linking their self-defined civilising
mission with the later doctrine of trusteeship. The authors explore the
impact of the Endorois case, where the ACHPR in 2009 upheld local
community rights against displacement by the government of Kenya for a
nature reserve. At present few African countries recognise even the
Country Area (000 sq.km.) Population 
(million)
Density per 
sq.km
GDP per 
capita per 
annum 
US$000
Botswana 581.7 1.9 3.4 14.1
Cameroon 475.4 18.9 39.7 2.1
Ghana 238.5 23.8 99.9 1.6
Kenya 580.4 39.0 67.2 1.7
Liberia 111.4 3.9 35.5 0.4
Namibia 825.4 2.1 2.5 6.6
Nigeria 923.8 154.7 167.5 2.3
Rwanda 26.3 10.7 401.4 1.1
Senegal 196.7 13.7 69.7 1.8
Somalia 637.7 9.4 6.7 0.6
Tanzania 945.2 43.8 46.3 1.4
Zimbabwe 390.8 12.5 26 0.4xii 
existence of indigenous peoples on their territories, a situation that creates
much potential for future disputes and human rights challenges. 
Chapter three (by Ambe Njoh) presents a narrative of one such dispute,
the long-running Bakweri land rights case in Cameroon, which was unique
in having three different colonial masters – the Germans, British and
French. The Bakweri were displaced from their ancestral lands for German
plantation estates, which were taken over after the Second World War by
the Cameroons Development Corporation, and successive governments
have maintained their control. A committee to pursue the return of the
Bakweri lands, encouraged by the Mabo case in Australia and others in the
1990s, took their claim successfully to the ACHPR in 2002. While less
publicised than other indigenous minority land claims, the Bakweri case
has implications beyond national frontiers. Postcolonial states have
proved even less tolerant of customary entitlements that their colonial
predecessors, and the Government of Cameroon has not complied with
the judgment, showing a disregard for the rule of law in the form of the
treaty which it had itself signed. One can, however, understand its
reluctance to embark upon sorting out the unholy mess: one can turn fish
into fish soup, but it is harder to turn the fish soup back into fish. 
Chapter four (by Siraj Sait) explores how the ‘grand narrative’ of
African land law generally overlooks Islamic land law, a developed land
tenure framework which potentially applies to over a third of the
continent. No country with significant Muslim populations is without the
influence of Islamic land laws or principles, official or informal, however
varied or mutated. As Islamic land law evolved in Africa, it often
interlocked with customary, colonial and statutory systems, applying
distinctive concepts that are still discernible today. He discusses country
case studies of Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria and Senegal.
Chapter five (by Ben Chigara) explores the possibility of a jurisprudence
in Africa that actually draws upon indigenous African principles.
Comparative law, and the theory of legal transplants, can be seen at work
in the jurisprudence of the European Courts of Justice and Human Rights,
where different legal traditions have to be interpreted together - so why not
in African regional courts? He examines the Mike Campbell case, where
the SADC court supported a narrow protection of private property rights
(specifically the rights of white commercial farmers) against confiscation
by the Zimbabwean state without compensation, but failed to
acknowledge the longer historical perspective, in that the land had
originally been confiscated without compensation from the indigenous
population by white settler interests. Chigara argues that the principle of
humwe (a Shona word but with equivalents in many African languages)
should be accorded recognition in the jurisprudence of the AU and
regional courts of justice. 
Chapter six (by Oludayo Amokaye) explores the important relationship
between land and mineral resources, both of which Africa has in
abundance. In oil-rich Nigeria, the colonial government’s control of land
in Northern Nigeria was extended to the whole country by the Land Use
Decree of 1978, and facilitated compulsory acquisition of land from
communal or individual owners for re-allocation to licensed mineral
prospecting companies. After discussing the relevance of theories ofxiii 
economic efficiency and distributive justice, he argues that the 1999
constitution does not guarantee fair and adequate compensation, and that
the compensatory regimes are complex, inefficient and unsatisfactory.
Chapter seven (by Robert Home) explores the idea of a pro-poor land
law from a historian’s perspective, locating African land law within the
context of colonial intervention. A situation of legal pluralism was created
through the ideology of the dual mandate, which distinguished between
individual property rights for settler interests and urban areas, and
customary tenure in the so-called African reserves in the rural areas with
poorer soils. He examines who are the stake-holders in land law, the
postcolonial rise of human rights law, and Hernando de Soto’s advocacy
of property rights as a route to the legal empowerment of the poor.
The next two chapters, eight (by three women lawyers – Leah Onyango,
Anne Omollo and Elizabeth Were) and nine (by three NGO workers –
George Anang’a, Awuor Oluoch and Colleta Otieno), deal with property
rights as they affect two vulnerable groups – women and orphans. Kenya’s
colonial history established two sets of laws: one for land occupied by
‘natives’ under largely unwritten customary and communal rules, the other
for land occupied by settlers, borrowed heavily from British law, and
emphasising individual rights. Women’s access to property under
customary law often relegates them to a subordinate position to men, and
makes unmarried women and widows especially vulnerable. For those
children orphaned by HIV/AIDS and other causes, one of the biggest
challenges are laws that disempower them in inheriting their parents’
properties, as family members may exploit their guardian role. xiv 
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1CHAPTE
R PERCEPTIONS OF LEGAL AND
GEOGRAPHIC CLARITY:
DEFINING INTERNATIONAL
LAND BOUNDARIES IN AFRICA
John W Donaldson
1 Introduction
In 1905 King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy was approached by the British
and Portuguese governments to arbitrate their disputed boundary between
the British claimed territory of North-West Rhodesia (now western
Zambia) and Portuguese West Africa (Angola). The boundary had been
originally defined in an 1891 Anglo-Portuguese treaty as the western limit
of Barotseland (Lozi) kingdom, since the Lozi Litunga (or king),
Lewanika, had agreed to be under the British sphere of influence.1 In
preparation for the case, British officials undertook research in areas west
of the upper Zambezi river, interviewing local leaders and taking evidence
concerning the influence of local chiefs who paid tribute to Litunga
Lewanika, or recognised him as their paramount chief. After reviewing the
evidence presented by both sides and assessing the respective territorial
claims, King Emmanuel simply placed the boundary between the British
and Portuguese territories north of the Kwando river along three lines of
latitude and longitude, admitting:
Concerning delimitation of the territory over which King Lewanika reigned
as paramount chief, all precise delimitation is impossible due to the lack of
separating geographic features, the imperfect knowledge of the area, because
of the notorious instability of tribes and their frequent intermingling
(circumstances that were admitted also by the Marquis of Salisbury and the
Marquis of Lansdowne), it is necessary, where natural lines are lacking, to
have recourse to lines of geographic convention.2
The Barotseland arbitration encapsulates the abrupt clash of politico-
territorial models that marked European imperialism in Africa. 
1 For overview of the case, see Royal Geographical Society ‘The Barotse Boundary
Award’ (1905) 26 Geographical Journal 201 - 204.
2 UN ‘Award of 30 May 1905: The Barotseland Boundary Case (Great Britain, Portugal)’
(1905) XI Reports of International Arbitral Awards 69.1
2    Chapter 1Kopytoff explains that precolonial African political entities were
usually separated by frontier zones of varying widths. This spatial
arrangement was an essential characteristic of political organisation across
much of precolonial Africa, as those individuals or groups that were cast
out of core areas were then able to form new political organisations within
the frontier zones.3 A fixed linear boundary separating equal political
entities would have eliminated such frontier zones, and were not required
on the less densely populated African landscape. In the case of large
expansionist empires both in Africa and elsewhere, the limits of imperial
territory would not have been viewed in a modern sense as the division of
two legally equal states, but rather as the limit of the empire’s influence,
beyond which was simply people and territory that had not yet been
brought under imperial influence. The division of land at the village and
familial scale was certainly nothing new in precolonial Africa where space
within homesteads was strictly ordered. Ancient Egyptians even
developed sophisticated techniques for land survey and registration. But
while the division of political territory was not new to precolonial Africa,
Mbembe suggests that this division was facilitated by ‘boundaries capable
of infinite extension and abrupt contraction.’4
Despite popularised notions of European diplomats drawing lines
across small scale maps of Africa, the intersection between nineteenth
century imperialism and precolonial African political geography was more
complex and nuanced particularly in relation to boundary-making. While
imperial interests certainly took precedent over those of the precolonial
African states, as the Barotseland arbitration reveals there were some
attempts by colonial powers to determine boundaries based on the
indigenous political states. Shaw challenges the idea that the European
imperial powers considered the African continent to be terra nullius (land
without sovereign) since the predominate method for acquiring title to
territory was through acquisition agreements made with local rulers,
indicating that European agents must have recognised some degree of legal
sovereignty.5 
In the cases of African territory acquired by European imperial powers
through treaties with indigenous political leaders (rather than through
conquest), it is overly simplistic to assert that those African leaders had no
concept of what their agreements with the imperial powers implied. Many
saw it as an opportunity to increase their own power over neighbouring
groups, securing political allegiance to a powerful ally or beneficial
commercial arrangement.6 However, most pre-imperial African leaders
would have had little idea what the treaties they agreed with European
3 I Kopytoff The African frontier (1987) 10.
4 A Mbembe ‘At the edge of the world (2000) 12 Public Culture 263 - 264.
5 MN Shaw Title to territory in Africa (1986) 36 - 38.
6 GN Uzoigwe ‘European partition and conquest in Africa’ in AA Boahen (ed) General
history of Africa VII (1985) 31 - 33.
  Defining international land boundaries in Africa    3representatives might mean in the longer term. This is not to mention the
serious legal questions that would be raised concerning the validity of
those agreements, the legal capacity of European officials presenting the
agreements, any coercive activity, ambivalent wording of documents and
inherent prejudice towards written documentation, all of which have been
exposed by McEwen.7 
Aside from their dubious legality, the so-called treaties agreed with
local African political leaders were (often deliberately) vague on the
geographic extent of those political entities.8 This gave the European
colonial powers carte blanche (quite literally) to interpret the geographic
extent of territory ceded by local political leaders as they saw fit. In some
cases, the extent of territory controlled by local leaders mentioned in these
treaties was left vague or was simply dictated by the European agent
concluding the agreement. For example, the extent of Chief Kawinga’s
territory in part of what is now Malawi as defined in a 15 June 1891
agreement, was determined by John Buchanan of the British South Africa
Company, acting as vice consul of Nyassaland.9 Take this remarkable
statement opening the 3 December 1886 agreement between Great Britain
and Zanzibar that defined the limits of the Sultan’s dominions:
I am instructed by Her Majesty’s Government to communicate to your
Highness the particulars of an Agreement which has been entered into
between the Governments of Great Britain and Germany for the purposes of
delimitating the extent of the territory which they are prepared to recognise as
under your Highness’ sovereignty.10
Another example, from an area of north-eastern Zambia, is the 30
September 1890 definition of Kasembe’s territory, in an agreement with a
representative of the British South Africa Company:
Boundaries thus defined: ‘Bounded on the west by Lake Moero and the
Luapula River; on the south by latitude 10° 30’ (or thereabouts); on the north
by the Kalongwizi River and by latitude 9° 20’ (or thereabouts); on the east by
east longitude 30° (or thereabouts).’11
Left deliberately vague, with terms such as ‘thereabouts’ or using
geographical terms unlikely to have been familiar to African leaders, the
European imperial powers gave themselves the privilege of interpreting the
territorial extent of African political entities as best suited their interests.
7 AC McEwen International boundaries of East Africa (1971) 12 - 16. See also A Allott,
‘Boundaries and the law in Africa’ in CG Widstrand (ed) African Boundary Problems
(1969).
8 McEwen (n 7 above) 16.
9 E Hertslet The Map of Africa by Treaty (1909) 189.
10 Hertslet (n 9 above) 754.
11 Hertslet (n 9 above) 189.
4    Chapter 1Just as the definition of land provides the constitutive aspect of a title
deed, so an international boundary provides the definition of territory as
the foundation of state sovereignty, from which subsequent land rights
flow.12 Colonial administrations tended to hold that precolonial African
conceptions of communal land rights ‘implied a lack of advancement; an
“early” stage’ and were therefore more easily expropriated,13 just as the
division of territorial polities by zonal frontiers was considered at the time
of the initial territorial division of Africa to indicate more primitive
political development.14 Chanock reviews the recommendations of the
British colonial administrator Lord Hailey who in 1938 encouraged
demarcation of communal land and ‘knew that some form of survey was
the essential pre-condition to the definition of any form of title.’15 Chanock
notes that ‘the administrative resources of the colonial regimes in Africa
were generally not up to the kind of survey required to give indefeasible
title.’16 
While purporting to bring stability to the political landscape of Africa
through the imposition of fixed boundaries,17 the legacy of boundary
definition across Africa is filled with geographic ambiguities, since
colonial administrations never provided any consistency in the definition
of inter or intra-colonial boundaries. Instead of inheriting clearly defined
territorial spaces at independence, post-independent African governments
were left with international boundaries subject to wide range of definitions.
African governments have been slow to address the clarity of boundary
definition, sometimes leaving the difficult task of interpreting the
ambiguous definitions left by colonial administrations to the International
Court of Justice. The problems of geographic interpretation are, however,
just as relevant for land rights below the state level, where boundary
disputes are just as prevalent, and often just as violent, as those between
neighbouring states. According to Unruth:
12 Shaw indicates that ‘sovereignty itself, with its retinue of legal rights and duties, is
founded upon the fact of territory. Without territory a legal person cannot be a state.’
MN Shaw International law, fourth edition (1997) 331.
13 M Chanock ‘A peculiar sharpness’ (1991) 32 The Journal of African History 70.
14 See especially: AP Brigham ‘Principles in the determination of boundaries’ (1919) 7
Geographical Review 201 - 219. The historical distillation from frontier zones to linear
boundaries has also been reviewed by numerous international lawyers and political
geographers in a variety of contexts outside Africa. See especially JW Donaldson
Marking territory (PhD thesis, Durham University, 2010) 47 - 57; SB Jones ‘Boundary
concepts in the setting of place and time’ (1959) 49 Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 241 - 255; LKD Kristof ‘The nature of frontiers and boundaries’ (1959) 49
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 269 - 282; JG Ruggie ‘Territoriality and
beyond’ (1993) 47 International Organization 139 - 174.
15 Chanock (n 13 above) 74.
16 Chanock (n 13 above) 74.
17 Although focusing on the Hausa in northern Nigeria and Niger as distinct cultural and
political entities, Miles did find, contrary to the general assertion that the division of
West Africa by colonial boundaries was an ‘unmitigated evil,’ that ‘Among the people
most directly affected – the borderline Hausa – there is rather a continued appreciation
that the partition heralded an end to the incessant warfare waged between surrounding
and encroaching kingdoms.’ WFS Miles Hausaland divided (1994) 75.
  Defining international land boundaries in Africa    5Effective boundary demarcation is a large and confusing problem, not only
for countries (and subunits), but also for concessions, individual deed holders,
tribal lands, and state and public lands. In a number of cases how much land
exists in the various countries and concessions is unknown. In others,
mistaken numbers are used to calculate such areas ... The overall situation is
that sub-national boundaries exist in severe disarray.18
The primary role of any land boundary is to prevent conflict, but this
depends upon the respect given to it by the neighbouring parties (whoever
they might be). In order to be respected, a boundary requires both
recognised legal validity and clearly identifiable geographic position. Clear
definition of international boundaries, just like the clear definition of a land
plot, does not lead inevitably to the physical isolation of that geographic
area (through fencing, barriers or walls), or the termination of existing
cross-border administrative regimes.19 Nor does it presume a homogeneity
of rights within each neighbouring geographic area, as rights may be
shared or managed cooperatively.20 These are subsequent political
decisions concerned with how the boundary operates after it has been
established. 
This chapter will suggest that, given the constitutive role played by
boundaries in land and territorial rights, a lack of geographic clarity in their
definition actually undermines the legal validity of that title, by leaving
areas open to overlapping claims and creating the opportunity for dispute.
The chapter will first explore that relationship between the legal continuity
of inherited title to territory and its geographic definition in relation to
international boundaries in Africa, by critically assessing the geographic
assumptions imbedded in the uti possidetis doctrine and in the often
misinterpreted ‘intangibility’ principle most famously expressed in the
1964 Cairo Declaration of the OAU. It will then examine some of the
inconsistencies in colonial boundary-making practices that continue to
cause disputes at a variety of social, political and geographic levels across
Africa’s international boundaries, disputes that frequently expose other
underlying tensions between neighbouring states. The inconsistent
boundary-making methodology used by colonial administrations was
often linked to issues of land use and economic value. In this regard,
geographic clarity of title through well-defined boundaries has often been
used as a tool by powerful actors for securing more durable land rights that
18 JD Unruth ‘Land rights in post-war Liberia’ (2009) 26 Land Use Policy 428.
19 Ratner recalls that the Burkina Faso-Mali judgment called for cross-border authority to
be discounted if in conflict with the ‘clear line of title but suggests that the ICJ ‘does not
make clear how to handle such de jure cross-border authority.’ SR Ratner ‘Drawing a
better line’ (1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 607.
20 Witness the sharing of managerial responsibilities in the transboundary parks across
southern Africa or the unitisation agreement between Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria
over the Ekanga/Zafiro oil field that straddles their maritime boundary. Less well-
known (and less transparent) are the informal arrangements dealing with mineral
deposits that straddle international land boundaries, such as the copper concession
areas along the DRC-Zambia boundary.
6    Chapter 1are less likely to be disputed. While land survey and boundary demarcation
may be considered ‘technical’ exercises,21 the lesson to be drawn from
international boundary practice is that geographic clarity should be seen as
functionally equivalent to legal validity in order for boundaries to fulfil
their primary role in the prevention of disputes.
2 Uti possidetis and the intangibility principle
Since 1957, the beginning of formal de-colonisation in Africa, the ICJ has
adjudged eight international land boundary disputes (excluding maritime
boundary and island sovereignty disputes), of which no less than five have
been located in Africa.22 These are as follows: Burkina Faso/Mali 1983 -
1986,23 Libya/Chad 1990 - 1994,24 Cameroon v Nigeria 1994 - 2002,25
Botswana/Namibia 1996 - 199926 and Benin/Niger 2002 - 2005.27 Three
international arbitrations since 1957 dealing directly with questions of land
boundary definition have involved at least one African state: Egypt-Israel
1988,28 Eritrea-Ethiopia 2002 - 200829 and the Abyei arbitration (Sudan)
2009.30
Since the 1986 judgment in the Burkina Faso/Mali case, the resolution
of international boundary disputes in Africa has been dominated by one
overriding international legal principle, originally known by the Latin
maxim, uti possidetis ita possidetis.31 The short-hand term ‘uti possidetis’ is
now used in international law as reference to a very specific interpretation
of that original Latin maxim. Lalonde explains that two differing
interpretations were debated by early jurists: uti possidetis de facto and uti
possidetis juris.32 The former refers to recognition of the de facto possession
21 JW Donaldson & A Williams ‘Delimitation and demarcation’ (2008) 13 Geopolitics 687
- 690.
22 A ninth case (also from Africa) concerning a land boundary dispute between Burkina
Faso and Niger was submitted to the ICJ in July 2010.
23 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) ICJ (22 December 1986) (1986) ICJ Reports 1986.
24 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) ICJ (4 February 1994) (1994) ICJ
Reports 1994.
25 Land and Maritime Boundary Between (Cameroon v Nigeria with Equatorial Guinea
intervening) ICJ (10 October 2002) (2002) ICJ Reports 2002.
26 Dispute over Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) ICJ (13 December 1999) (1999)
ICJ Reports 1999.
27 Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) ICJ (12 July 2005) (2005) ICJ Reports 2005.
28 Award in the Dispute Concerning Certain Boundary Pillars between the Arab Republic of Egypt
and the State of Israel Arbitral Tribunal (29 September 1988) (1988).
29 Decision on the delimitation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission (EEBC) (13 April 2002) (2002).
30 Final Award of Abyei Arbitration (Government of Sudan/Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-
Army) Arbitral Tribunal (22 July 2009) (2009).
31 The term is loosely translated ‘as you possess so you shall possess’. Indicating that the
merits of boundary cases are often over-shadowed by the confirmation or non-
confirmation of international legal norms, Ratner suggests that ‘the ICJ’s
pronouncement on the contours of uti possidetis in the Burkina Faso/Mali case are now
the primary source for that rule ...’. SR Ratner ‘Land feuds and their solutions’ (2006)
100 American Journal of International Law 814.
32 S Lalonde Determining boundaries in a conflicted world (2002) 30 - 32.
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title (juris). International law has developed to give deference to the later
over the former so that the term uti possidetis now refers to uti possidetis juris.
In its judgment in the Burkina Faso-Mali Frontier case, the ICJ asserted
that uti possidetis was a general principle of international law, characterised
by the ‘pre-eminence accorded to legal title over effective possession as a
basis of sovereignty.’33 Uti possidetis was described by the Chamber as
follows:
It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of
the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to
prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by
fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the
withdrawal of the administering power.34
The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the
territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. Such
territorial boundaries might be no more than delimitation between different
administrative divisions or colonies of the same sovereign.35
The Chamber admitted that uti possidetis could be in tension with another
general principle of international law, that of self determination.36 It was
adamant that uti possidetis provided the most stable territorial platform for
the peaceful succession of sovereignty to post-independence governments
in Africa.
... the maintenance of the territorial status quo in Africa is often seen as the
wisest course, to preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have
struggled for their independence, and to avoid a disruption which would
deprive the continent of the gains achieved by so much sacrifice.37
The subject of uti possidetis as a legal principle in post-independence Africa
has generated much discussion among international legal scholars, in
debates about the macro-geography of post-independence Africa, role of
pre-colonial polities/identities and legitimacy of colonial territorial title.38
This chapter does not repeat the analyses, nor does it purport to address the
tension between uti possidetis and self determination. Instead, it will explore
how the nature of uti possidetis is imbued with geographic assumptions
about the definition of territorial title relating to localised/micro-territorial
boundary definition.
33 Burkina Faso/Mali (n 23 above) para 23.
34 Burkina Faso/Mali (n 23 above) para 20.
35 Burkina Faso/Mali (n 23 above) para 23.
36 See Burkina Faso/Mali (n 23 above) para 25. 
37 Burkina Faso/Mali (n 23 above) para 26.
38 Wa Mutua, M ‘Why redraw the map of Africa’ (1994-95) 16 Michigan Journal of
International Law 1113 - 1176; B Davidson Black Man’s Burden (1992); I Griffiths The
African inheritance (1995); A Asiwaju (ed) Partitioned Africans 1884-1984 (1985); J Klabber
& R Lefeber ‘Africa possidetis’ in C Brolmann et al (eds) Peoples and minorities in
international law (1993).
8    Chapter 1With its emphasis on continuity and stability, uti possidetis observes
the legal consistency of inherited boundary agreements, but in doing so it
presumes that all inter and intra-colonial boundaries had reached a single
common degree of geographic clarity at independence. The reality of that
territorial inheritance was however much more haphazard. Some inter and
intra-colonial boundaries in Africa were clearly marked on the ground and
accurately documented, while others were left more geographically
ambiguous, unmarked on the ground and poorly described. Independent
African governments have been slow to address such ambiguities. Over
forty years after the 1964 Cairo Assembly, where the post-independence
African leaders pledged to respect their inherited colonial boundary
agreements, the African Union constituted a Border Programme (AUBP)
with the express aim of encouraging African governments to clearly
delimit and demarcate their boundaries by 2012.39 In its constitutive
document, the AUBP estimated that (subject to a thorough inventory) less
than a quarter of African boundaries ‘have been delimited and
demarcated.’40 Various issues have been cited by African governments for
the lack of attention to international boundary definition, most commonly
lack of financial resources, and lack of attention from what the
neighbouring state. These are reasonable problems, but not
insurmountable, given adequate political will on both sides to reach an
amicable and mutually beneficial boundary definition that is free of
ambiguities.
At the second assembly of the OAU in Cairo in July 1964, all but two
heads of state of independent African states agreed what has been
subsequently referred to as the Cairo Declaration.41 Perhaps its most
famous and controversial clause was Resolution 16/1, cited widely in the
Burkina Faso-Mali judgment and referred to as the definitive ‘border
arrangement for Africa.’42 It is often used to describe the functional impact
of uti possidetis, even though the term itself is notably absent from the text. 
AHG/Res. 16(1) 
Considering that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of
dissention;
Conscious of the existence of extra-African manoeuvres aimed at dividing
African States;
39 Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and its Implementation Modalities as
Adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues held in Addis Ababa, 7
June 2007 African Union (AU) (2007).
40 As above art 2(a).
41 The Cairo Assembly of Heads of State was boycotted by King Hassan of Morocco as a
result of a boundary dispute with Algeria, and by the leader of Somalia as a result of
Somalia’s continuing claims to ethnic Somali areas in Ethiopia and Kenya. See
especially S Touval ‘The Organization of African Unity and African borders’ (1967) 21
International Organization 102 - 127.
42 Ratner (n 31 above) 824.
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independence, constitute a tangible reality;
Recalling the establishment in the course of the Second Ordinary Session of
the Council of the Committee of Eleven charged with studying further
measures for strengthening African Unity;
Recognising the imperious necessity of settling, by peaceful means and within
a strictly African framework, all disputes between African States;
Recalling further that all member states have pledged, under article IV of the
Charter of African Unity, to respect scrupulously all principles laid down in
paragraph 3 of article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity:
(1) SOLEMNLY REAFFIRMS the strict respect by all member states of the
Organization for the principles laid down in paragraph 3 of article III of the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity;
(2) SOLEMNLY DECLARES that all member states pledge themselves to
respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.43
The second operative paragraph, whereby the members of the OAU agree
to respect the borders inherited at independence, was used by the ICJ to
describe the acceptance of uti possidetis as a legal principle by post-
independence African states. Often overlooked is the very specific wording
used in the third sentence of the preamble which indicates that ‘the borders
of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible
reality.’ A powerfully explicit phrase, but did all of the boundaries between
the newly independent African states really ‘constitute a tangible reality’ at
their respective dates of independence? 
Lalonde’s major study of uti possidetis in relation to boundary
determination, makes an interesting comparison between the de-
colonisation processes in Latin American and Africa. She suggests that, at
de-colonisation in Latin America, the first question was which former
colonial administrative units would become independent states, followed
by ‘how would those boundaries be determined?’44 In other words: ‘For
Latin American republics, it was not simply a question of maintaining the
territorial status quo but of actually creating the territorial status quo.’45 The
ambiguity of both political and territorial distinctions at the moment of de-
colonisation led to many years of conflict between the emerging Latin
American states during the early to mid 19th century. 
In the African context, Lalonde suggests the process was different
since the political distinction between colonial administrations was
clearer. ‘Devolution occurred within the territorial limits as defined by the
metropolitan powers, which were at liberty to adjust boundaries and
43 Resolutions adopted by the first ordinary session of the assembly of heads of state and government
held in Cairo 17-21 July 1964 (Cairo Declaration) Organization of African Unity (1964)
AHG/Res 16(1).
44 Lalonde (n 44 above) 121 - 22.
45 n 44 above, 122.
10    Chapter 1transfer territory right up to the date of independence.’46 Lalonde believes
that the colonial boundaries across Africa were ‘defined with much greater
precision than the Spanish administrative lines.’47 She concludes that the
concept of uti possidetis for Latin American states provided entitlement to
boundaries of the former Spanish administrative divisions ‘at law’ while
‘the newly independent African states, for their part, merely agreed to
accept those boundaries, in fact, that existed at the date of
independence.’48 This may explain why the Cairo declaration specifically
avoids the term uti possidetis. Lalonde hints at the variety of boundary
definitions existing across Africa at the moment of de-colonisation, by
suggesting that: 
Those boundaries that had been established and clearly demarcated were,
following independence, protected according to general principles of
international law. Those boundaries that had been unsettled during the
colonial period remained unsettled.49
While most boundaries inherited by African states at independence were
defined arguably with greater geographic precision than the vague limits of
Spanish colonial administration in Latin America before 1810, it should
not be concluded that all African boundaries constituted a ‘tangible reality’
at independence. The only distinction Lalonde makes between settled and
unsettled boundaries does not begin to indicate the many ways that
boundaries were defined in colonial boundary agreements and inherited at
independence. The term ‘tangible reality’ suggests that a boundary can be
recognised on the physical landscape. Implying that one knows precisely
when he/she passing across the static, fixed and linear limit of one state
jurisdiction into another. This could take the form of a river, or a series of
boundary pillars, but the importance is that the extent of legal title is clearly
known to those within the border landscape. 
A boundary may be depicted on a map but that does not that make it
a ‘tangible reality.’ A boundary may be defined in a legally binding text
with greater or lesser precision, but that also does not make it a ‘tangible
reality.’ Did the African leaders at the 1964 Cairo assembly believe or
assume that their state boundaries constituted tangible realities? Was this
phrase used consciously to deflect attention away from inadequate
boundary definition that may have led to more disputes? Whatever the
case, the statement in the Cairo declaration belies consistent definition of
boundaries across the continent, and the reality was a much more
haphazard territorial inheritance. 
46 n 44 above, 122.
47 n 44 above, 123.
48 n 44 above, 122.
49 n 44 above, 122.
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Lalonde, while distinguishing between ‘settled’ and ‘unsettled’
boundaries, admits that some African boundary sections were not ‘settled’
at the time of independence, but does not make clear if ‘settled’ refers to a
verbal, cartographical or tangible boundary definition. Taking the phrase
‘tangible reality’ as a measure, few boundary sections across Africa would
have been a reality on the border landscapes at the time of independence.
Some boundary sections were accurately surveyed and/or relatively clear
on the ground. The section of the DRC-Zambia boundary along the
Congo-Zambezi watershed had been demarcated with painstaking
precision between 1927 and 1933, and an irregular maintenance regime
ensured that much of this section was clearly visible at Congolese and
Zambia independence in 1960 and 1964 respectively.50 The Kenya-
Ethiopia boundary was also demarcated clearly and documented with
geographic precision in the 1950s and 1960s, although the agreement itself
was not ratified until 1970 after long negotiations over transboundary
grazing rights.51
Those international boundary sections that follow large rivers (such as
the Zambezi, Ruvumu, Congo, Ubangi) also would have been readily
apparent on the border landscape at independence.52 However, much of
Africa’s international boundary sections are defined along small rivers and
streams, many of which may not contain water for parts of the year and
may move dramatically from year to year.53 For some imperial
governments, rivers and streams made a sound, cost-effective substitute for
expensive boundary pillars.54 For example, the 1912-15 Anglo-Portuguese
boundary commission revised the northern section of the Angola-
Northern Rhodesia boundary from the 24° E meridian to follow a complex
series of local streams as a substitute for more expensive overland
50 Donaldson (n 14 above) 184 - 187.
51 9 June 1970 Ethiopia-Kenya border treaty in I Brownlie African Boundaries (1979) 791 -
822.
52 Along several of these river sections, the colonial agreements did not specify where the
boundary line ran within the rivers themselves, as was the case along the lengthy
sections of DRC-Congo boundary section along the Congo and Ubangi rivers on either
side of Stanley Pool. However, as an unmistakable landmark such large rivers form a
visible division between neighbouring jurisdictions on the ground. 
53 See the International River Boundaries Database, International Boundaries Research
Unit, Durham University. http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/irbd (accessed 30
July 2010).
54 JW Donaldson ‘Pillars and perspective: demarcation of the Belgian Congo-Northern
Rhodesia boundary’ (2008) 34 Journal of Historical Geography 485. When suggesting to
the German government in 1908 that portions of the Nigeria-Kamerun boundary
should be adjusted to follow natural features, Sir WE Goschen argued: ‘The selection
of natural features such as streams and rivers has many advantages, not the least of
which is that far fewer boundary pillars are required.’ National Archives (Kew) file FO
404/403B Letter from WE Goschen to von Schoen 2 December 1908 9.
12    Chapter 1demarcation.55 Although depicted as distinct blue lines on boundary
mapping, many of these small streams may not be as distinct on the
ground, being subject to seasonal rainfall.56
The devolved nature of British colonial administration meant that
some of the intra-colonial boundaries were described with a degree of
clarity in administrative records and maps, such as the 1926 Order in
Council defining much of the Kenya-Uganda boundary57 or the 1930
provisional administrative line between Sudan and Uganda. However, in
many cases the British intra-colonial boundaries were never, or perhaps
only crudely, demarcated on the ground. Due to the changing nature of
French colonial administrative ‘cercles’ most intra-French colonial
boundaries had no clear description either in administrative texts or maps,
and most were never demarcated on the ground. There were some
initiatives by the colonial governments to finalise agreements over
disputed boundary sections as de-colonisation gained momentum in the
late 1950s. British and Belgian officials hastened negotiations over the long
disputed section of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary
between Lakes Mweru and Tanganyika in an ultimately unsuccessful
attempt to resolve the dispute before Congolese independence in 1960.58
For the most part, however, huge lengths of colonial boundaries across
Africa were not even close to being ‘tangible realities’ on the physical
landscapes at the respective dates of independence. Many were simply
roughly surveyed, with the understanding that they would be marked on
the ground with greater precision at a later date. This was the case along
the watershed between the Congo and Nile rivers that forms much of
Sudan’s boundaries with neighbouring Central Africa Republic and the
DRC, partially surveyed in the early 1920s but never marked on the
ground.59 The quality and accuracy of the mapping used to define
boundaries in the early colonial period was sometimes poor, even though
it may have been attached to a treaty as the legally binding definition.60 In
addition, the coverage of large scale, accurate topographic mapping
undertaken under late colonial administrations varied widely across Africa
at independence.
55 See Instructions for the boundary commission National Archives of Zambia file NRA
1/1/7 6004 Memorandum from War Office to Secretary of State (Colonial Office) 14 November
1912 (1912). See also Office of the Geographer, United States Department of State ‘No
119 Angola-Zambia Boundary’ (1972) International Boundary Study 4.
56 JW Donaldson ‘Where rivers and boundaries meet’ (2009) 11 Water Policy 629 - 644.
57 Brownlie (n 51 above) 943 - 945.
58 See especially the correspondence related to negotiations over the Pedicle Road treaty
in the NA (Kew) files CO 1015/1396, CO 1015/1397, CO 1015/2180 and CO 1015/
2181.
59 Brownlie (n 51 above) 628 - 636.
60 The 1900 Abyssinian-Italian agreement that defined much of the Eritrea-Ethiopia
boundary included a map that was referred to as the valid depiction of the boundary.
This map was little more than a crude sketch map only roughly showing the courses of
rivers and stream, as well as the positions of a handful of towns and villages. EEBC
(n 29 above) map 5 32.
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and early 20th centuries, but the fairly crude and impermanent marks were
unlikely to still be visible at the time of independence. The lengthy
overland section of the Ethiopia Sudan boundary between what is now the
tripoint with Eritrea and the Baro River was marked on the ground in 1903
with just 36 pillars, many of which disappeared soon after they were
erected.61 From blazed trees and iron telegraph poles to concrete pyramids
and cleared tracks, there was no consistency in the methodology of
demarcation used by colonial officials The OAU heads of state could
hardly have addressed every possible boundary situation in the Cairo
declaration, but used a phrase as explicit as ‘tangible reality’, when the
reality was much less clear.
One explanation for the wide disparity in boundary definition is the
influence of economic resources on colonial boundary policy. Research
into the history of colonial boundary practices in southern Africa reveals
that the presence of mineral concession areas and white-owned farming
had a dramatic impact on the methodology used to define inter and intra-
colonial boundaries.62 The most egregious example was the boundary
between Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia, first delimited by an
Anglo-Congolese agreement in 1894. The lengthy section of the boundary
along the Congo-Zambezi watershed was first marked on the ground by an
Anglo-Belgian boundary commission (1911 - 14), defining 800 km of the
boundary with just 46 pillars, an average of 15 miles between boundary
marks.63 Located in a plateau region, much of the watershed itself is
indistinct on the ground and the rudimentary demarcation left large
sections of the boundary unclear between the boundary pillars. When huge
copper deposits in the Katanga/Copperbelt regions became commercially
exploited in the 1920s, mining companies demanded that the boundary
along the watershed be accurately marked so that there would be a clear
division between Belgian and Rhodesian concession areas.64 A second
Anglo-Belgian boundary commission (1927 - 1933) established auxiliary
boundary pillars along the watershed section every 500 metres and dug a
half metre deep ditch that quite literally etched the boundary on the
ground, in the most expensive colonial boundary programme in Africa,
leaving no ambiguities as to the course of the boundary in these areas of
valuable mining concessions.
There are other examples such as the current Mozambique –
Zimbabwe boundary (formerly Portuguese East Africa-Rhodesia), where
61 TH Al-Nur ‘The Sudan-Ethiopia boundary’ unpublished PhD thesis, University of
Durham, 1971 116. As of late 2009, this boundary is currently being reviewed and
possibly demarcated jointly by Ethiopia and Sudan.
62 This is only hinted in JRV Prescott & G Triggs International Frontiers and Boundaries
(2008), but is explored in more depth in Donaldson (n 54 above).
63 NA of (Zambia) file RC 609 Memorandum by Fairweather 30 September 1924 (1924) 2.
64 Donaldson (n 14 above) 143 - 150.
14    Chapter 1mining and white farming interests prompted clear definition.65 However,
for the majority of border areas where there was nothing of economic
interest to the colonial governments, boundary definition was left in
varying degrees of ambiguity. The influence of economic resources on
boundary definition reflects many postcolonial critiques of colonial policy
that was focused exclusively on the resources of the land rather than
administration of populations. According to Mbembe: ‘The colonial space
had its space, its shape, its borders. It had its geological make up and its
climates. It had its resources, its soils, its minerals, its animal and plant
species, its empty lands. In short, it had its qualities.’66 Early definitions
left over from the initial round of territorial delimitation during the so
called ‘scramble’ of the late 19th century were retained, including
imprecise textual descriptions and inaccurate – often wildly inaccurate –
mapping. Although under uti possidetis the inter and intra-colonial
agreements and administrative records were considered legally valid in
defining the territory of independent African states, in no way could many
of these early boundary definitions be considered to be ‘tangible realities’
in the landscape. The approach by the colonial administrations, linking
boundary definition with land use, left inconsistencies imbedded in the
boundary treaties which in turn became the ‘root of title’ for post-
independence African states.67 The vague language, and in many cases
poor cartographic depiction of many boundaries, left open to
interpretation on the human and physical landscape ambiguities that
continue to cause conflict and confusion across the continent. 
4 Consequences of poor definition
On 6 May 1998 in the village of Badme located in the border region
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, an argument between local troops from both
sides led to shots being fired. Although the exact sequence of events on that
day is disputed, the lack of an agreed and defined limit to the neighbouring
jurisdictions created confusion and overlapping claims, eventually
precipitating a full scale conflict lasting two years and claiming some
70,000 lives.68 There have been numerous conflicts in post-independence
Africa related to secessionist movements and large-scale geopolitical
tensions between neighbouring states, often involving large territorial
claims, such as the attempted secessions of Katanga in DRC and Biafra in
Nigeria during the mid-1960s, or Somalia’s long-standing claims to areas
of eastern Ethiopia. These conflicts have concerned boundary definition
on a macro-geographical level. Many other minor disputes continue to
65 P Warhurst ‘A troubled frontier 1898 - 1906’ (1978) 77 African Affairs 214. See also
Donaldson (n 14 above) 175 - 177.
66 A Mbembe On the Postcolony (2001) 32.
67 Prescott & Triggs (n 62 above) 170.
68 M Plaut ‘The conflict and its aftermath’ in D Jacquin-Berdal & M Plaut (eds) Unfinished
Business (2004) 87 - 89.
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situations, the neighbouring states agree that a boundary does exist
between them and may even agree on the actual instrument that defines
the boundary, but dispute the position of the boundary on the ground. The
Eritrea-Ethiopia example indicates that such seemingly minor disputes can
quickly escalate into large-scale conflict.
Minor disputes continue to arise as a direct result of unclear boundary
definition. Although not reaching the intensity of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war,
some have resulted in direct conflict. In 2008, Eritrean forces entrenched
positions on the Doumeriah peninsula, along the eastern terminus of their
land boundary with Djibouti disputing the definition of the undemarcated
boundary.69 Guinean troops still occupy the village of Yenga on the Sierra
Leonean bank of the Makona river. Although an Anglo-French treaty
placed the boundary in this section along the Sierra Leone bank of the
river, Guinea and its French advisors claim that the term bank referred to
a series of hills several kilometres away from the normal bank of the
Makona.70 Confusion over the status of Migingo island in Lake Victoria
led to a diplomatic row between Kenya and Uganda, with rioters in Kenya
attempting to sabotage the railway line to Uganda.
Imprecise and poorly defined international boundaries can create
overlapping claims, both by neighbouring authorities, and by local
populations. In addition to their dispute over the southern half of their
boundary in Lake Albert and the status of Rukwanzi island, the DRC and
Uganda also contest an overland section of their boundary in the Nebbi
district where Uganda claims that Congolese police are building a post
within Ugandan territory near the Goli crossing point.71 The installation
of a mobile phone mast along a section of the boundary between southern
Sudan and Uganda has prompted local claims and counter-claims to lands
either side of the undemarcated boundary.72
Not only does the imprecise definition of international boundaries
leave open the possibility of conflict due to overlapping territorial claims,
other aspects of border management may be affected. Those who have
69 Eritrean troops were withdrawn in June 2010 and the two states agreed to have the
prime minister of Qatar act as mediator for further negotiations on settlement of the
boundary dispute. ‘Djibouti and Eritrea agree to boundary mediation with Qatar’
International Boundaries Research Unit, Boundary News, 10 June 2010. http://
www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news (accessed 28 June 2010).
70 ‘The Fate of Yenga Still Indecisive’ AllAfrica 6 February 2006; ‘Sierra Leone, Guinean
delegations meet, agree on disputed border territory’ BBC Monitoring Africa 15
November 2002. Personal discussion with Sierra Leone appointed expert, Martin Pratt.
71 ‘Uganda: Tension said high along border with DR Congo over police post’ BBC
Monitoring Africa 8 June 2009; ‘Uganda, DRC in new border dispute’ Xinhua News
Agency 8 June 2009.
72 ‘Uganda-Sudan border dispute – is there still room for customary boundaries?’
Dradenya Amazia, AFNWS (AllAfrica) 5 January 2010; ‘Museveni, Kiir inspect
disputed border area’ D Amazia and C Ocowun, AFNWS (AllAfrica) 25 November
2009.
16    Chapter 1travelled across many of Africa’s international boundaries will know that
border crossing points are sometimes separated by several kilometres. If
the boundary is not clearly identifiable between these checkpoints, a ‘no
man’s land’ may exist, an area of indistinct jurisdiction. Local
arrangements may address the administration of infrastructure and activity
within these ‘no man’s lands,’ but unless formalised and respected create
the possibility for confusion and potential dispute. The AUBP recognised
the risks posed by such poorly defined border areas:
(2) We underscore the relevance of the African Union Border Programme,
based on the need:
(a) to address the persistence of the border delimitation and demarcation
issue: Subject to an inventory to be undertaken, it is estimated that less than a
quarter of African borders have been delimited and demarcated. This
situation is fraught with risks, as the lack of delimitation and demarcation
gives rise to ‘undefined zones’, within which the application of national
sovereignty poses problems, and constitutes a real obstacle to the deepening
of the integration process.
The wide separation of border checkpoints poses more practical challenge
for trans-border flows such as long delays for hauliers and travellers having
to pass through two uncoordinated sets of regulations. In March 2010,
Rwanda opened its first one-stop border checkpoint with neighbouring
Tanzania at the Rusumo border post, in an effort to speed up cross-border
traffic and to reduce costs by sharing infrastructure.73 The EAC has
promoted the establishment of one-stop border checkpoints among its
member states to encourage and facilitate cross border trade, particularly
important for a regional organisation with three land-locked states.74
Although a one-stop checkpoint may be situated entirely within the
territory of one state, it is unlikely that such bilateral cooperation could be
formalised where a boundary is unclear or poorly defined.
5 Is the ‘intangibility’ principle working?
Although the ICJ in the Burkina Faso/Mali case drew important
conclusions about uti possidetis, the two parties did not use the term when
submitting their dispute, but asked the Chamber to adjudge the dispute
based on the ‘principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from
colonisation.’75 In English, this term ‘intangibility’ literally means that
73 ‘Rwanda-Tanzania border passing eased’ afrol News.com 26 March 2010.
74 The EAC has even drawn up a proposed bill comprehensively outlining the
recommended regulations and codes of practice for one-stop border posts. The EAC
Proposed One Stop Border Posts Bill, 27 May 2010. PDF version available at http://
www.eac.int (accessed 29 June 2010).
75 Special Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Upper Volta and the Government
of the Republic of Mali for the submission to a Chamber of the International Court of Justice of the
Frontier Dispute between the Two States ICJ (20 October 1983) (1983) General List No 69
Introduction.
  Defining international land boundaries in Africa    17something is imperceptible, vague, ethereal or without materiality. In
practical terms, given the unclear nature of many international boundaries
inherited by African states at independence, its use in a legal sense (in
relation to uti possidetis) is intended to convey that the definition of
boundaries cannot be ‘touched’ unilaterally by one neighbouring state or
another.76 Although the principles of intangibility and uti possidetis are
often used interchangeably, Lalonde distinguishes between the two,
suggesting that, unlike uti possidetis, ‘the intangibility principle is limited to
the juridical consequences flowing from a situation already in existence
and does not formulate any presuppositions as to the title at the root of
delimitation.’77 In other words, boundary treaties must presume that the
two authors of the treaty hold valid sovereignty over the territory being
delimited, and acceptance of the intangibility does not directly indicate
acceptance of the original acquisition of territorial title. 
Although acceptance of boundary treaties implies that the original
authors did hold recognised title to territory, use of the term ‘intangibility’
is symbolic for African states in not directly recognising the validity of the
original title, while at the same time ensuring states’ territorial integrity.
Application of the term is intended to ensure that more powerful states do
not take advantage of the ambiguity of boundary treaties by claiming
territory through ‘effective’ occupation. This was the core legal reasoning
behind the Burkina Faso-Mali boundary decision and has been reiterated
in subsequent boundary judgments78 whereby legal title trumps effective
occupation.
As the number of African land boundary cases suggests, third party
adjudication has proved a popular route for African states unwilling to
interpret the ambiguities of their inherited boundary instruments
bilaterally. The decisions of the ICJ and international tribunals in
boundary cases have had to negotiate this tension between the legality of a
boundary treaty and the relative geographic clarity of the line described.79 
On the one hand, the courts and tribunals must respect the legal
validity of the original boundary treaties, which are usually accepted
explicitly by the parties when a dispute is submitted to adjudication/
arbitration. From a legal perspective, to suggest that a boundary treaty did
not completely define the course of a boundary challenges the very stability
of the title, suggesting that there are areas open to appropriation and
76 Boundary may be legally changed under international law without the express consent
of a neighbour state through acquiescence and estoppel, but this is difficult to prove in
an international boundary dispute.
77 Lalonde (n 32 above) 152.
78 Including the Cameroon-Nigeria decision, see: Cameroon v Nigeria (n 25 above) para
223.
79 EEBC (n 29 above) is a prime example: http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EEBC-
3.pdf (accessed 29 June 2010). See also Opinion of Judge Mohammed Shahabudeen’ in
Libya/Chad (n 24 above) 44 - 50.
18    Chapter 1possibly even encouraging a ‘land rush’ to occupy border areas. In its 1925
advisory opinion in the request for Interpretation of the Treaty of
Lausanne, the Permanent Court of Justice decided: ‘It is natural that any
article designed to fix a frontier should, if possible, be so interpreted that
the result of the application of its provisions in their entirety should be the
establishment of a precise, complete and definitive frontier.’80
On the other hand, the vagueness of these boundary treaties requires
interpretation, which has often formed the crux of disputes submitted to
third party adjudication and arbitration.81 In all African boundary cases
and arbitrations, the parties have asked that this interpretation be confined
to a specific date (the so-called ‘critical date’), usually either the date of
independence or the date of the applicable boundary treaties.82 The key
verdict in the Cameroon v Nigeria case was that subsequent acts of
administration, particularly in relation to the Bakassi peninsula, failed to
supplant the original title delimited by the colonial instruments. This was
also made explicit in the 2005 Benin/Niger decision:
since the effect of the uti possidetis principle is to freeze the territorial title, the
examination of documents posterior to independence cannot lead to any
modification of the ‘photograph of territory’ at the critical date unless, of
course, such documents clearly express the Parties’ agreement to such a
change.83 
Although two states could submit a boundary dispute to an international
court or tribunal and request that an older boundary definition be modified
to recognise the current administrative situation on the ground,84 African
states have so far been reluctant to grant a third party that kind of
flexibility.85
80 Interpretation of article 3, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne Permanent Court of
International Justice 21 November 1925 Series B12 20.
81 See especially EEBC (n 29 above) para 3.4. In summarising Nigeria’s counter-claims
concerning the central sectors of the land boundary with Cameroon, the ICJ noted that
Nigeria had argued that both parties agreed the four colonial agreements legally
delimited the central sector of their boundary. However, Nigeria argued ‘that
uncertainties as to the interpretation and application of these instruments, and
established local agreements in certain areas, mean that the actual course of the
boundary cannot be definitively specified merely by reference to those instruments.’
Cameroon v Nigeria (n 25 above) 23.
82 EEBC (n 29 above) para 3.5.
83 Benin/Niger (n 27 above) para 26.
84 One notable example was the special arbitral tribunal in the Guatemala-Honduras
boundary case that was directly allowed to modify the boundary line of 1821 ‘as
deemed advisable’ and fix any compensation. FC Fischer ‘The Arbitration of the
Guatemala-Honduran boundary dispute’ (1933) 27 The American Journal of International
Law 414 - 415.
In the Burkina Faso/Mali case as to whether or not equity should be involved in the
interpretation of the boundary agreements, the Chamber of the ICJ stated categorically:
‘It is clear that the Chamber cannot decide ex aequo et bono in this case. Since the Parties
have not entrusted it with the task of carrying out an adjustment of their respective
85
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2002 decision of the EEBC was how much variation of the line could be
made to address practicalities in the landscape during the demarcation
process. Eritrea argued that the decision had to be marked on the ground
in strict accordance with the 2002 decision, while Ethiopia argued that
there were bound to be some problems implementing the decision on the
ground that would require minor revisions.86 Reflecting on his experience
with the 2000 Iraq-Kuwait boundary demarcation commission, Klabbers
notes candidly that: 
It is repeatedly stated that the Commission was called on to perform a
technical and not a political task, and that it was not supposed to reallocate
territory; indeed, repetitions of this statement are so abundant that one cannot
help but form the impression that what is actually occurring is some kind of
exorcism: if we claim often enough that we are not reallocating territory, then
perhaps we will not be seen to be reallocating territory. Although the
Commission repeatedly claimed to be performing a mere technical task, it
could not escape the necessity of relying heavily on considerations of
equity ...87
6 Changing the starting point
The reliance on third party settlement suggests that continued reference to
the ‘intangibility principle’ may be dissuading African governments from
clarifying their international boundaries through bilateral dialogue. The
lack of attention to defining more clearly the ambiguous and inconsistent
boundaries inherited at independence suggests that this term has been
taken far too literally, and may be providing African governments with
political coverage for choosing not to engage with neighbouring states.88
Simply because two neighbouring states accept that a hundred year-old
colonial instrument delimits their boundary does not ensure that disputes
will not arise over interpretation of that agreement. As Anthony Allott
states succinctly: ‘It is one thing, however, to declare respect for the border;
85 interests, it must also dismiss any possibility of resorting to equity contra legem. Nor will
the Chamber apply equity praeter legem. On the other hand, it will have regard to equity
infra legem, that is, that form of equity which constitutes a method of interpretation of
the law in force, and is one of its attributes.’ Burkina Faso/Mali (n 23 above) para 28.
86 Although not explicitly stated, the possible political motivation for Ethiopia’s position
was that the line could be altered around Badme at the demarcation phase. See the
Request for Interpretation, Correction and Consultation’ Submitted by the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, 13 May 2002 and the subsequent Decision of the EEBC regarding
this request on 24 June 2002. http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Decision
24June2002.pdf (accessed 29 June 2010).
87 J Klabbers ‘No more shifting lines?’ (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 908 - 910.
88 The lack of commitment to boundary definition may also indicate of deeper problems
of lack of adequate governance, as Jackson and Rosberg have argued that for post-
colonial African governments ‘their sovereignty derives more from right than from fact’
indicating a prioritisation of juridical over empirical statehood. RH Jackson and C
Rosberg ‘Sovereignty and underdevelopment’ (1986) 24 Journal of Modern African Studies
2 - 4.
20    Chapter 1it is another thing to determine where it runs.’89 Nor does the principle of
intangibility prevent states from further clarifying, or even changing the
position of their boundary, as long as they do so by agreement. If a colonial
boundary is vague or unclear, it is not simply the right but surely the
responsibility of neighbouring states to address that lack of clarity,
otherwise the stability of their respective territorial titles is undermined by
the possibility of overlapping territorial claims.
With international courts and tribunals usually handicapped by the
application submitted to them by neighbouring states for resolution, and
with African governments reluctant (until recently)90 to make a concerted
effort to address the geographic clarity of their international boundaries, it
is perhaps time to reconsider the underlying legal tenets. In his masterful
review of uti possidetis, Ratner suggests that perhaps post-independence
governments should return to the original meaning of uti possidetis which
he describes as the exercise:
to preserve the status quo only until states can resolve their competing claims,
rather than apply the gloss from decolonisation whereby states effectively
presumed independence-day lines to be permanent.91
Uti possidetis certainly does not prevent states from modifying their
boundaries by agreement, but the popular use of the term ‘intangibility’
with regards to African boundaries may have encouraged governments to
take an overly literal interpretation of the concept, reinforcing the
geographic assumptions imbedded in the 1964 Cairo Declaration. Taking
this original meaning of uti possidetis as a starting point, rather than a more
restrictive sense of ‘intangibility,’ Ratner suggests:
The most immediate consequence of this starting point is an admittedly heavy
burden on decision makers, whether national diplomats or international
commissions or courts: to deal directly with the location of international
borders, rather than retreat behind the simple, but anachronistic,
decolonisation form of uti possidetis. To date, states, courts and scholars have
agreed on the unexceptionable proposition that there is no universal rule for
arriving at an ideal line to divide territory – whether by adopting linguistic
boundaries, natural frontiers or uti possidetis. But rather than looking for the
ideal line, we must set more modest goals.92
Ratner’s key point is that uti possidetis should be seen as the starting point
89 A Allott ‘Boundaries and the law in Africa’ in WG Widstrand (ed) African Boundary
Problems (1969) 17.
90 A number of declarations and initiatives law legal proposed to the OAU and the
African Union to promote clarification of African boundaries dating back to 1981. See
‘Summary Note on the African Union Border Programme and its Implementation
Modalities’ Conference of African ministries in charge of border issues, 4 - 7 June 2007 (2007)
African Union BP/EXP/2 (II), paras 6 - 11. 
91 Ratner (n 19 above) 617.
92 Ratner (n 19 above) 618.
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independence African governments have simply stated that their
international boundaries are defined by unclear and outdated colonial
instruments, rather than undertake the difficult political and technical
work of addressing the many ambiguities embedded in those boundary
definitions. This may result in modifying the line, but, given the deep
ambiguities of many original colonial instruments, it may be impossible for
either side to discern exactly how much is ‘gained’ or ‘lost.’ Removing the
ambiguities would provide greater stability to the respective titles by
removing the possibility of overlapping territorial claims and resultant
disputes. 
7 Conclusion
As the history of the DRC-Zambia boundary indicates, colonial
administrations in Africa tended to clarify boundaries with precision when
the land involved was of demonstrable economic ‘value.’ Colonial
administrations in Africa had different procedures for land registry within
their territories, dependent on the nature of the activity taking place on a
specific area of land. The inconsistency of inter-colonial boundary
practices illustrates that land in colonial Africa was often viewed
subjectively by colonial administrations according to its relative economic
value. In this respect, defining boundaries with geographic clarity was a
subjective tool, used largely when it suited the interests (often economic)
of the colonial administrations.
Although several current international land boundary disputes in
Africa involve an economic element (such as oil practices in Lake Albert),
many others have arisen in areas with no significant ‘economic’ interests.
There were no disputed mineral or oil resources involved along the
disputed sections of the Burkina Faso/Mali boundary. Although it does
attract a modest amount of tourist interest, Kasikili-Sedudu Island is
submerged by the Chobe river throughout the flooding season. There are
no known valuable resources around the village of Badme or on the
Doumerah peninsula.94 With such a variety of tensions channelled into
boundary disputes, it seems important that African governments should
define their international boundaries objectively, along the full course, in
order to eliminate any ambiguities that could provoke a dispute.
93 It is worthwhile noting that the Canada-USA International Boundary Commission
updates information about the boundary on an annual basis. It is subject to numerous
treaties and depicted on 256 official boundary maps http://www.international
boundarycommission.org/products.html (accessed 29 June 2010) Compare this with
the single map attached to the 1900 Abyssinian-Italian boundary agreement that
defined much of the central section of the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary. EEBC (n 29
above) paras 4.8 - 4.9.
94 The position of the land boundary terminus on Ras Doumeirah may change after
sovereignty claims over Doumeirah Island and the subsequent maritime boundary, but
it is unclear if any mineral or hydrocarbon deposits are involved in the maritime area.
22    Chapter 1In a recent article an experienced official from the British Land
Registry, Charlie Beeden, provided some informal thoughts about private
land boundary disputes which are remarkably applicable to international
boundaries. Drawing on his years dealing with private boundary disputes
in the UK, Beeden concludes that: ‘Boundary disputes are about territory,
ownership, principle and saving face – to many people more precious than
money.’95 He suggests that boundary disputes are often the result of
underlying personal issues between two neighbours ‘until a boundary
irregularity provides a convenient outlet.’96 As with the ambiguities in
colonial boundary treaties, Beeden notes that these irregularities are often
created when in reviewing the private land deeds, ‘the title deed provides
the definitive extent, but the interpretation of this on the ground all too
often fails.’ Beeden suggests that the resolution of a private property
boundary dispute should involve a coordinated approach, with both
solicitors (lawyers) and surveyors assessing the boundary situation on-site:
If a solicitor who has never been on site cannot be fully knowledgeable about
it, it is also true that a surveyor who knows the site is unlikely to have all the
legal expertise the dispute requires. Consequently, I believe that a site visit by
a team of lawyer and surveyor (representing the crucial ingredients of
resolution), preferably acting in a joint capacity, offers the best chance of a
speedy and lasting solution.97
Although focused on private land registration, Beeden’s recognition that
law and geography are the ‘crucial ingredients’ to resolving a boundary
dispute also applies to international boundaries. Unfortunately, a literal
interpretation of the intangibility principle by diplomats and international
lawyers often discounts the geographical element in boundary definition as
simply technical matters of survey and demarcation. 
The interpretation of the negotiated location on the ground and laying down
the infrastructure for the administration of the boundary are often too readily
relegated in importance as mere technical matters, only to re-emerge as issues
of major political importance, the settlement of which is essential to avoiding
conflict.98
Ratner’s suggestion for reinterpreting uti possidetis can be interpreted as
encouraging a de-mystification of boundaries, to encourage states to see
boundaries as an administrative responsibility rather than a diplomatic
contest. Once engaged in an international boundary dispute, there is an
almost instinctive Hegelian response from neighbouring governments,
whereby territory becomes a contest with a zero-sum result. Although
certainly preferable to conflict, the resolution of African international
95 C Beeden ‘War or Peace?’ The Land Journal (2010) 18.
96 Beeden (n 95 above) 18.
97 Beeden (n 95 above) 19.
98 R Adler ‘Geographic information in delimitation, demarcation and management of
international land boundaries’ (2001) 3 IBRU Boundary and Territory Briefing 3.
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tended to reinforce a confrontational approach that Gathii described in the
context of the 1999 Botswana-Namibia judgment of the ICJ as
‘geographical Hegelianism.’99 This in turn tends to encourage
governments to view boundaries from a small-scale perspective, where all
the nuances of the line on the ground become generalised and local border
issues become absorbed into national discourses.
The division of land by fixed and linear boundaries was linked with the
commodification of property and developed in a densely-populated
Europe as a replacement for the multiplicity of land tenure rights that had
marked the feudal system. The European positivism of the nineteenth
century,100 which formed the basis of modern international law, is rooted
in the notion of exclusive sovereign equality, which prima facie suggests
that boundaries divide neighbouring states who hold homogeneity of legal
rights and responsibilities. Exclusive sovereignty now appears as more of
a myth that has never existed, even in Europe, indicating that states/
political entities had always been restrained to some extent by political
alliances or other agreements. In addition, boundaries themselves do not
necessarily dictate a total exclusivity of rights on either side, as there are
numerous ways of sharing specific territorial rights, the importance being
that they are undertaken by agreement.
While certainly linked with the commodification of land, the drawing
of boundaries is primarily an administrative exercise in the resolution and
prevention of disputes. Whether dividing adjacent private property plots, a
private property plot from a communal area, a nature reserve from a
mining concession, one administrative district from another or the
territorial sovereignty of two neighbouring states, legal boundaries are
inherently an attempt to eliminate the potential for overlapping claims and
confusion over the spatial extent of rights that could give rise to dispute and
conflict. Neighbouring states or land holders are unlikely to share rights in
an area of overlapping claims until a boundary is determined. The frontier
zones that divided precolonial Africa states may have been misunderstood
and abruptly severed by the modernist boundaries imposed by the
European colonial powers, but as population density rises and the
pressures on land increases, peripheral zones of ill-defined jurisdiction
cause confusion and dispute in post-independence Africa. 
This chapter has tried to emphasise that the clear geographic definition
of boundaries must accompany the legal validity of territorial title in order
99 JT Gathii ‘Geographical Hegelianism in territorial disputes involving non-European
land relations’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 581.
100 Shaw asserts that the imperial division of the African continent occurred at ‘the high
point of the exclusivity concept of the State in international law as fostered by
nineteenth century positivism’ dominated by ‘the view that the organised tribes of
peoples of non-European lands had no sovereign right over their territories and thus no
sovereign title by means of effective occupation’, Shaw (n 5 above) 32.
24    Chapter 1for a boundary to fulfil its primary function in preventing disputes. The
colonial period saw the inconsistent imposition of modern boundaries in a
subjective manner, whereby geographic clarity was wielded as a tool only
to be used by and for more powerful actors. The key lesson is that
geographic clarity should no longer be considered simply a technical
exercise reserved for specific land use. Instead clear geographic definition
of land, on the ground at local scale, should be considered an integral
aspect of defining boundaries objectively to provide more secure titles that
are less likely to cause future disputes.
2CHAPTE
R TOWARDS A PRO-POOR LAND
LAW IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Robert Home
 
1 Introduction: The paradox of a ‘pro-poor land 
law’
‘Buy land, they aren’t making it any more.’1 Land is essential for shelter
and for getting a living, and claims to land can generate violent conflict and
power struggles within and between states. Private property rights,
particularly the right to exclude others, create a form of monopoly over this
basic and finite resource, and people derive much of their sense of
personal, communal and even religious identity from the land.2 
Unlike laws of persons and economic relations, land law is tied to a
physical reality on the ground – immovable property. It regulates social
relations, and the relation between the state and its citizens, in matters of
land. In recent years the pre-fix ‘pro-poor’ has frequently appeared in the
strategies and policies of major development agencies, which desire to
make their policies more inclusive, and also reflects the expansion of
human rights law from individual to collective responsibilities. 
What might a pro-poor land law comprise? If poverty means not being
able to meet one’s basic human needs, which include land for shelter and
a livelihood, then a pro-poor land law would seek especially to guarantee
legal access to land for the poor. Where would such land come from? If one
can discount making it (‘they aren’t making it any more’), then it will either
have to be redistributed from the ‘haves’ (either the state or private
individuals) to the ‘have-nots’, or allocated from the shrinking category of
land unclaimed by anyone (because it is unusable, ‘waste’ or ‘dead’ land).
The ‘haves’ can be expected to resist such a redistribution, and they are
1 Attributed to the American humorist Mark Twain.
2 A Abramson & D Theodossopoulos (eds) Land, law and environment (2000); E Kallipein
& P Zeleza Sacred spaces and public quarrels (1999); B Derman et al (2007) (eds) Conflicts
over land and water in Africa. 25
26    Chapter 2generally those who control the law-making process. So, who will
champion pro-poor land law? This is the paradox inherent in the very idea
of a pro-poor land law, which makes it highly political, complex and
difficult.3 
When it is plentiful relative to population, land (or the lack of it)
should not be a cause of poverty, although power relations may create that
lack. John Iliffe’s history of the African poor identifies a ‘great transition
which has dominated the history of the poor in every continent’: from
land-rich poverty, where labour is scarce and the poor are generally those
who lack access to labour, to land-scarce poverty, where the poor lack
viable land-holdings, cannot sell their labour, and increasingly have to
migrate to where they hope to obtain a livelihood, usually in towns.4 Sub-
Saharan Africa would not seem to have any absolute land shortage (it has
a fifth of the world’s population, and a fifth of its land area), but its colonial
history has created land shortage in various ways: the confiscation of much
of the good land and mineral resources by white settler immigrants and
foreign capital (especially in eastern and southern Africa); state control of
urban and unused land; and the creation of illegality and exclusion for
most of the African population by segregatory regulations over land tenure
and land use. 
Against this historical context, Africa’s recent and unprecedented
demographic surge poses great challenges to land law and management for
national and local jurisdictions that are ill-equipped to meet them. Over the
20th century the continent’s population rose nearly ten-fold, and now
approaches a billion, as a result of falling mortality and rising birth rates,
medical advances and improved food production. The population of
Kenya, for example, has grown by five times since independence in 1965,
and added a million people a year in the first decade of the 21st century,
placing great strains on the environment, economy and society. 
Rapid population growth carries with it risks of destabilisation and
civil conflict, which have been measured by the US-based NGO,
Population Action International. Of the regions of the world it places
much of sub-Saharan Africa at particularly high risk, and identifies certain
key demographic stress factors.5 First is the so-called ‘youth bulge’, when
young adults (particularly young adult males) comprise 40% or more of the
adult population; this predictably leads to social unrest, war and terrorism
when linked to poverty, corruption and mass unemployment. A second
stress factor is rapid urban growth, defined as more than 4% urban
population growth per annum. A third is a decline in available cropland
3 B Davy ‘The poor and the land’ (2009) 80 Town Planning Review 227.
4 J Iliffe The African poor (1987) 4. His final chapter (‘The transformation of poverty in
southern Africa’) relates this new pattern of poverty to apartheid policy, and the
consequent forced evictions.
5 R Cincotta et al The security demographic (2003). See www.populationaction.org.
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fresh water in cubic metres per person. A final stress factor is HIV-AIDS,
measured by the proportion of reproductive-age population living with the
condition; this is particularly severe in sub-Saharan Africa, which has an
estimated 11 million AIDS orphans. 
The importance of the legal regulatory framework for the interaction
of people, land and the state is now recognised in most sub-Saharan
African countries, as well as by regional bodies such as SADC and the
AU.6 Many government commissions have considered the problems, and
many new land laws been passed, some seeking land nationalisation, but
more usually state registration of individual and communal land titles. Yet
the problems of the landless poor and unplanned urban growth get worse.
How a pro-poor law and management of land might develop is the theme
of this chapter, explored through an examination of the sources of land law
and law-making, the key players or stake-holders, and what such a law
might comprise.
2 Legal pluralism and the sources of land law in 
Africa 
Law textbooks usually start by summarising the sources of the law, but for
a book on African land law this is no straight-forward matter. Not only are
there over fifty different nation states in sub-Saharan Africa, but they are
typically jurisdictions where more than one legal order can be said to exist.
Legal centralism asserts that there should be but one legal order: the law of
the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and
administered by a single set of state institutions. Legal pluralism, however,
is the reality: ‘a fixture of the colonial experience ... characterising at the
present day the larger part of all of the world’s national legal systems’.7
Legal pluralism complicates the continuing struggle of state and society
over their respective roles and entitlements.
Every legal system embraces a mixture of elements, which may be
more or less integrated or merely co-exist. The so-called ‘mixed’ legal
system of the Republic of South Africa (RSA), for example, combines the
legal orders of two successive colonial powers, the Roman-Dutch tradition
from the Dutch, and the common law tradition from the British (who
succeeded them after 1796), in addition to the so-called African customary
6 SADC Establishing the SADC Land Reform Support Facility and inception activities (2007);
AU Draft Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa (2009).
7 J Griffiths ‘What is legal pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law
6. HP Glenn Legal traditions of the world (2000); B de Sousa Santos ‘The law of the
oppressed’ 12 Law and Society Review (1977) 5; P Karsten Between law and custom (2002).
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modern cultures (as recognised in the concept of transculturality),9 and
legal systems reflect this wider reality.
Pluralism exists not only within national jurisdictions, but also within
the legal academy. Traditional legal scholarship (‘black letter law’) co-
exists alongside other discourses such as socio-legal studies, critical legal
studies, and empirical legal studies.10 African law and legal pluralism have
each emerged as distinctive areas which can sustain their own separate
academic journals, and the Law Department in London’s School of
Oriental and African Studies has existed for over fifty years with a
commitment to comparative legal studies.11 The cross-disciplinary
perspective engendered by including law within the social sciences in
universities has stimulated new areas of academic investigation, such as
comparative legal cultures, critical legal geography, legal history, legal
anthropology, and laws of the postcolonial, all of which will figure at some
point in this chapter. Thus the various sources of land law come with
distinctive legal cultures and traditions. It is of course European
colonialism in Africa that casts the longest shadow, and indeed African
land law can be regarded as its creature. 
2.1 The legacy of the colonial dual system
The contradictory and self-serving nature of British colonialism in Africa,
which lawyers sought to regulate, was encapsulated a century ago by
Lugard, the principal ideologue of indirect rule and the dual mandate:
The British role here is to bring to the country the gains of civilisation by
applied science (whether in the development of material resources, or the
eradication of disease, etc.), with as little interference as possible with Native
customs and modes of thought.12
Utilitarianism provided much of the ideological underpinning, and legal
codes devised by the British for their Indian ‘empire’ were later
transplanted into Africa, since the ‘authoritarian and transformative
character of law in the utilitarian rendition was perfectly suited to colonial
8 MJ Chanock The making of South African legal culture 1902-1936 (2001); R Zimmermann
& D Visser (eds) Southern cross (1996).
9 W Welsch ‘Transculturality’ in M Featherstone & S Lash (eds) Spaces of culture (1999)
194.
10 T Becher & PR Trowler Academic tribes and territories (2001); R Cotterrell Law's
communities (1995); W Mansell et al A critical introduction to law (1999).
11 Journal of African Law and Journal of Legal Pluralism; I Edge (ed) Comparative Law in
Global Perspective (2000).
12 FD Lugard Revision of instructions to political officers (1919) 9. He was writing on Nigeria
(Britain’s largest African colony), where he was Governor-General until 1918. He
developed his thinking in The dual mandate in tropical Africa (reprint 1965), which
influenced the League of Nations trusteeship approach in the 1920s. 
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their control, and the land laws and regulations which they devised came
to define the respective realms of colonisers and colonised. 
The dual mandate, as summarised above by Lugard, required a
strategy of separate development, most famously articulated in apartheid
South Africa.14 The European colonisers separated the legal order
applying to their towns and estates from the wider territory where
customary land tenure was maintained. African ‘native reserves’ or ‘tribal
trust land’ were demarcated, managed by colonial officials and local
leaders with little of the involvement of lawyers or judiciary that a doctrine
of legal centralism might lead one to expect. This dual system for whites
and Africans was complicated by further intermediate social categories
such as Lugard’s distinction between ‘native foreigners’ and ‘non-native
foreigners’, and the immigrant racial groups (notably Indians to East and
South Africa, and the Cape Coloureds in South Africa), whose aspirations
the colonial powers sometimes encouraged, yet at other times discouraged
in the interests of protecting the ‘natives’.15 
Recent theories of colonialism and postcolonialism have provided a
basis for interrogating these themes of duality and exclusion and the
tensions between coloniser and colonised (the ‘subaltern’ other).16
Academic geographers, and historians have critically examined the place
of differentiated territorial jurisdictions in regulating social relationships,
and how colonial legal regulatory systems shaped landscapes through
spatial boundary-marking and discriminating between the land claims of
different social groups.17 
2.2 The protection of private property rights
The new nation-states of sub-Saharan Africa after decolonisation inherited
land law through constitutions and statute law, sometimes framed as a
unified land code, with a complex web of secondary laws and regulations.
The Privy Council sitting in London held that a single common law
applied to all jurisdictions in the Commonwealth, except where
13 P Fitzpatrick Modernism and the grounds of law (2001) 147; E Stokes The english utilitarians
and India (1959).
14 S Dubow Racial segregation and the origins of apartheid in South Africa 1919-36 (1989); M
Robertson ‘Dividing the Land’ in C Murray & C O’Regan (eds) No place to rest (1990)
122. As many as a hundred different laws were enforced apartheid in South Africa.
15 A Chua World on fire (2003) explores the conflicts around the world created by the
economic dominance of immigrant communities. 
16 E Darian-Smith & P Fitzpatrick (eds) Laws of the postcolonial (1999); MA Hasian
Colonial legacies in postcolonial contexts (2004); P Williams & L Chrisman (eds) Colonial
discourse and postcolonial theory (1994). 
17 ND Blomley et al (eds) The legal geographies reader (2001); RK Home Of planting and
planning (1997); S Kedar ‘On the legal geography of ethnocratic settler states’ 5 Current
Legal Issues (2002) 401; B Yeoh (2000) ‘Historical geographies of the colonised world’ in
B Graham & C Nash Modern historical geographies (2000) 146.
30    Chapter 2specifically varied, and English common law was the so-called ‘received’
law in Africa, although it has been jokingly called appropriate for Africa
only in the sense that one might say ‘he received a blow on the head’.18
The colonial legal order, as far as the colonisers themselves were
concerned, was imbued with the concept of more or less absolute and
exclusive private property rights, with its philosophical basis deriving from
John Locke.19 Land rights (the so-called ‘bundle of rights’ beloved of land
lawyers) could be either freehold ownership (not time-limited, although
sometimes conferred for 999 years, effectively the same thing), or leasehold
(a fixed-period right). Most colonial legislatures had the power to
expropriate and regulate property, subject to review under the principle of
repugnancy (ie repugnant to English common law).20
At independence the new constitutions of states in sub-Saharan Africa
guaranteed private property rights, but such rights were constrained by
various statutory provisions, such as land use planning; compulsory
acquisition by the state was allowed in the public interest, and with
appropriate compensation paid. Post-independence states, such as socialist
India and the former white settler colonies in East and South Africa, might
aspire to a more equitable ‘pro-poor’ distribution of land ownership, but
found themselves frustrated by these constitutional guarantees of private
property rights.21 The postcolonial state has, however, extended its control
over land use and ownership through local authorities and parastatal
bodies (such as utilities), while recent neo-liberal policies have facilitated
the large-scale privatisation of state land to foreign individuals and
companies, a trend justified in the interests of open markets and
international capital.22
The rights of private land-owners to exclude others resulted in the
sanctioning of powers over where Africans were and were not allowed to
stay. A notorious example was the South African pass laws, designed to
manage the supply of mine labour, and to control access to racially
segregated areas and settler property.23 Rural-urban migrants thus risked
eviction if settled on land without permission from the state or private
landowners; their temporary structures reflected not only their poverty and
limited access to building materials, but also the ever-present threat of
demolition and eviction. Thus present-day official disapproval and
18 J Cottrell at 6th Commonwealth Law Conference 1980, quoted in N Tobi Sources of
Nigerian law (1996) 19.
19 CB Macpherson The theory of possessive individualism (1962). Locke argued that an
individual’s labour could secure him an ownership right over land, unconstrained by
feudal ‘superior’ interests. Hegel later argued that property embodies the personality, so
that making claims to external things is part of the development of a personality.
20 T Allen The right to property in Commonwealth jurisdictions (2000) 83. 
21 L Ntsebeza ‘Land redistribution in South Africa’ in L Ntsebeza & R Hall (2007) (ed)
The land question in South Africa 107.
22 LS Cotula et al Land grab or development opportunity? (2008).
23 D Hindson Pass controls and the urban African proletariat in South Africa (1987).
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dwellers, has deep roots in the colonial experience, and has only begun to
moderate in recent years. The colonial state not only protected freehold
property rights for white corporations and settlers, but claimed all
apparently vacant or unused land for itself as ‘public land’, so that
occupiers without express approval could be designated as squatters, even
in the land of their birth, and subject to eviction (or ‘summary ejectment’,
to use the common law term). 
Colonial land confiscation denied indigenous peoples’ use rights:
hunting and gathering, even unfenced farming, was not considered to
change the character of the land enough to establish a claim to ownership.
For Africans to prove occupation in court three considerations were
typically applied: the nature of the claimants’ economic system
(agriculture leaves a permanent record, while pastoralism and hunting/
gathering show only an ephemeral attachment to land), the exclusion of
other groups, and length of continuous occupation (with evidence of
continuous separate identity). As late as 1986 a white South African judge
could opine that: 
whites own land by law, whether they are industrious or not, while non-
whites must demonstrate their worthiness to own land through their labour.24
2.3 Customary law
The idea of legal pluralism recognises that alongside and within the
hegemonic national legal order other systems of law may exist. They may
serve a homogeneous social group, be based upon oral traditions and
supported by communal sanctions, and concentrate on protecting shared
values and communal peace rather than individual rights. Such systems of
law have been variously labelled as tribal, customary, indigenous,
aboriginal, native, or chthonic.25 
Colonial administrators employed social anthropologists to survey
tribal land tenure systems, sometimes developing them as codes of law. A
conservative structural-functionalist theoretical approach was often
applied to justify segregationist policies.26 Customary land tenure was
territorially distinguished under the dual mandate system, and was often
24 TW Bennett ‘Historic land claims in South Africa’ in GE Van Maanen & AJ van der
Walt Property law on the threshold of the 21st century (1996) 526.
25 ‘Chthonic meaning in harmony with the earth’ Glenn (n 7 above) chapter 3. 
26 Such studies include L & P Bohannan The Tiv of Central Nigeria (1969); JL Comaroff &
S Roberts Rules and processes (1981); PC Lloyd Yoruba land law (1962); CK Meek Land
law and custom in the colonies (1968); AI Richards Land, labour, and diet in Northern
Rhodesia (1939); I Schapera Native land tenure in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (1943). In
1950 the British Colonial Office compiled a Bibliography of published sources relating to
African land tenure. For a more recent text on customary land law, GR Woodman
Customary land law in the Ghanaian Courts (1996). For urban anthropology, see P Mayer
Townsmen or tribesmen (1961).
32    Chapter 2misinterpreted and undermined by the colonial judiciary, manipulated by
administrators, and overlooked in legislation.27 The evolutionary theory of
land rights viewed customary tenure as a vestige of the past bound for
extinction by an inevitable historical process ‘towards a greater
concentration of rights in the individual and a corresponding loss of
control by the community as a whole’.28
After the First World War the League of Nations (advised by Lugard)
placed a fiduciary duty – the trusteeship principle – upon colonial
administrations towards indigenous peoples because of their peculiar
vulnerability; customary land rights were to be safeguarded in specially
designated ‘native reserves’. A series of Privy Council cases in the 1920s
held that customary land tenure did not confer ownership upon the
occupiers of the land, and thereby denied those living in such areas the
opportunity to create private property rights.29 
In a postcolonial and pluralist world customary or communal land
practices are now being revived and reconstituted. Tribal or customary
land tenure fulfilled an important welfare function, and served as a
reservoir of cheap, unserviced land in peri-urban areas, an important
common property resource, and indeed a defence against the penetrative
forces of globalisation and capitalism. Individualised land tenure is
increasingly being questioned for its negative impacts upon the excluded
poor, and the legal protection of communal land tenure is being reinforced.
Indigenous groups are increasingly pursuing legal challenges and human
rights arguments to reassert their land claims, emboldened by the
Australian Mabo case.30 New legal forms are seeking to reclaim
communal philosophical and value systems, examples being co-operative
land in South Africa, the social tenure domain model, and common pool
resource management.31 
27 MJ Chanock Law, Custom and social Order (1985); WD Hammond-Tooke Imperfect
interpreters (1997). 
28 JR Simpson Land registration (1976) 225. K Mantena ‘Law and “Tradition”’ in
M Lobban & A Lewis (eds) Law and history (2004) 159; JP Platteau ‘The evolutionary
theory of land rights as applied to Sub-Saharan Africa’ (1996) 27 Development and
Change 29.
29 T Allen (n 20 above) 147.
30 In a large literature on Mabo, S Motha & C Perrin ‘Deposing sovereignty after Mabo’
(2002) 13 Law and Critique; PH Russell Recognizing aboriginal title (2005); MA
Stephenson & S Ratnapala Mabo (1993). For a South African case, TM Chan ‘The
Richtersveld challenge: South Africa finally adopts aboriginal title’ in R Hitchcock &
D Vinding (eds) Indigenous people’s rights in Southern Africa (2004) 114; M Barry ‘Now
another thing must happen’ 20 South African Journal of Human Rights (2004) 355. Most
land cases reported in the Commonwealth Law Bulletin in the last twenty years relate to
indigenous people’s land rights.
31 C Lemmen The social tenure domain model (2010); C Ng'ong'ola ‘Land problems in some
peri-urban villages in Botswana’ (1992) 36 Journal of African Law (1992) 140;
M Torhonen & D Goodwin ‘Would a registry map hang comfortably in a round mud
hut?’ in R Dixon-Gough & R Mansberger (eds) Transactions in international land
management (2002) 139.
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The scope of human rights law has widened in the past two decades, as
economic, social and cultural rights have attracted a broader and more
grassroots constituency than the traditional human rights movement. It
nows offer a framework for holding institutions (both state and non-state)
accountable for their role in creating and sustaining poverty in a world of
fast-growing population, poverty and marginalisation.32 A universal right
to adequate housing was affirmed by the UN Committee on Economic,
Social & Cultural Rights in 1992, which was subsequently included in the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.33 
A number of aspects are recognised in such a right to housing: legal
security, availability of services, affordability, habitability, accessibility,
location, and cultural adequacy. Even the expanded approach to human
rights does not include any express right of access to land, nor is the state
required to provide a home for all. It can, however, do much to assist its
citizens, by providing plots on state land for home-ownership by the poor,
offering low-interest loans, and withholding from summary forced
evictions (such as occurred frequently in RSA under apartheid laws).34
Where land is the primary means of generating a livelihood, and the
main element in household wealth, the way land rights are defined has far-
reaching social and economic effects. The UN-Habitat Global Campaign
for Secure Tenure encourages the progressive regularisation of
unauthorised and informal settlements, through changes in legal
frameworks, policies and standards. If full land titling is becoming
perceived as too complex and expensive, then incremental tenure
regularisation can be linked to the physical upgrading of plots and
infrastructure. Insecurity of title is a major obstacle to improving housing
conditions in informal settlements (formerly labelled squatter or slum
areas), and many developing countries now provide for the progressive
regularisation of land tenure.35
A ‘pro-poor’ state is encouraged to develop effective relationships with
poor people: assessing the poverty impact of public policies, strengthening
32 C Jochnick ‘The human rights challenge to global poverty’ in W Van Genugten &
C Perez-Bustillo (eds) The poverty of rights (2001) 159; J Cottrell ‘Third generation rights
and social action litigation’ in S Adelman & S Paliwala (eds) Law and crisis in the third
world (1994) 102.
33 Article 11(1) of ICESCR refers to an adequate standard of living, including adequate
food, clothing and housing. Implied rights to food and housing/shelter were confirmed
in a decision by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights concerning
the Ogoni people and oil extraction activities in Nigeria: SERAC and another v Nigeria
(2001) AHRLR 60.
34 COHRE Legal resources for housing rights (2000); UN-HABITAT The rights to adequate
housing (2009); UN-HABITAT Forced evictions: Towards solutions? (2007).
35 The Brazilian constitution, for example, provides for regularisation of possessory title
through the right of usucapio, derived from Roman law: R Nunes Usucapiao (2002). 
34    Chapter 2poor people’s assets and capabilities, correcting gender inequity and
children’s vulnerability, and protecting poor people’s rights. The concept
of a pro-poor state has been incorporated into the UN Millennium
Development Goals, and land, while not specifically referred to, is a cross-
cutting theme in them. Improving security of tenure for the world’s poor,
for example through such UN-driven initiatives as the Global Campaign
on Secure Tenure and the Global Land Tools Network (GLTN), is linked
to Target 11 of MDG 7 (improving the lives of slum dwellers). 
Among the poor, women are often particularly disadvantaged and
vulnerable, holding fewer assets and less access to resources. In many
African countries the proportion of female-headed households has grown,
as a result of such factors as male migration, deaths of males in conflicts,
unpartnered adolescent fertility and family disruption.36 Notwithstanding
the constitutional guarantees of women’s property rights in many
jurisdictions, property settlements, for example after divorce or death of
spouse, often result in the disinheritance and impoverishment of women.
International bodies, such as the Huairou Commission, the Housing and
Land Rights Network, and the GLTN, are promoting women’s property
rights, but there is little systematic information or methodology for
devising better legal instruments (the so-called ‘gendered land tools’) other
than a general support for flexible tenure types.37
2.5 De Soto, property and the legal empowerment of the poor
The strongest theory-based argument for a pro-poor land law comes from
the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. The connection of insecure
land tenure with poverty and social exclusion has long been recognised by
many international agencies (notably the World Bank), who identify a
framework of secure, transparent and enforceable property rights as a
critical precondition for investment, economic growth and poverty
alleviation. The linkage between land titling and development stayed,
however, a largely closed discourse within the communities of
development policy-makers, until de Soto produced a more flamboyant,
‘magic bullet’, view of property rights in his best-selling book, The mystery
of capital.38 
De Soto claimed that, unless recognised by a formal legal system, the
property held by the world's poor is merely so much ‘dead capital’, locking
them in the ‘grubby basement of the pre-capitalist world’.39 With his
striking image of the bell-jar, he sees formal property rights as concentrated
among the colonial and postcolonial elites, who enjoy the economic
36 IFAD ‘The issue of poverty among female-headed households in Africa’ (2008) at
www.ifad.org/gender/learning/challenges/women (visited 22 April 2010).
37 LM Munyoni (ed) 2003 Women and land in Africa (2003).
38 H de Soto The mystery of capital (2000).
39 De Soto (n 38 above) 55.
  Towards a pro-poor land law in Sub-Saharan Africa    35benefits of the law and globalisation, and are usually located physically in
cities, while the mass of the population are stuck in poverty, often
physically marginalised in the peri-urban areas. 
Inspired by the work of de Soto, the high-level international
Commission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP) was created,
with de Soto a member, and reported in 2008. While criticised for a neo-
liberal economic ideology, it was based upon a conviction that legal
recognition and democratisation of property rights provide a sense of
identity, dignity, and belonging, and it made ‘secure and accessible
property rights’ one of its four so-called ‘pillars’ for the legal empowerment
of the poor.40
De Soto’s argument is contested by some. He is criticised for
reinforcing a narrative of inferiority in the South by treating poverty as a
specific phenomenon of the South, and for not recognising the effect of
neo-liberal economic reforms in increasing poverty.41 Integrating plural
and informal property rights into one unified system under state control, as
he advocates, may facilitate the spread of global capitalism and open land
markets, and has become an accepted goal for many nation states,
encouraged by donor agencies, but the process is not without risk or
resistance. His optimistic language conceals the likelihood that such a
system – converting oral into written, informal into formal, local into
national – will not be uniformly benign, neutral, or free from power
relationships and exploitation. Informal systems may resist integration,
preserving local community values and defending themselves against the
penetrative forces of global capitalism and the modern nation state.
Identification with land can be a vital component in retaining cultural
identity, and the deliberate with-holding of land from state land-titling
processes may be a means of preserving family and community cohesion
and continuity. 
De Soto is promoting formal property systems at a time when the
dominance of individualised land tenure in the policy prescriptions of
donor agencies is increasingly seen as having negative consequences for
the poor, and the process of integration and codification has its practical
difficulties and costs. Part of de Soto’s achievement, however, has been to
help lift the threat of demolition and eviction from the poor, who are
treated more as settlers or homesteaders rather than squatters, and restore
to them a greater measure of human dignity. 
40 CLEP Making the law work for everyone (2008); D Banik Rights and legal empowerment in
eradicating poverty (2008).
41 A Gilbert ‘On the “Mystery of capital and the myth” of Hernando de Soto’ (2002) 24
International Development Planning Review 1; RK Home ‘Land titling and urban
development’ (2003) 2 Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal Education 73.
36    Chapter 23 The players and stake-holders in land law
Land law in Africa not only operates under conditions of legal pluralism,
but with many players or stake-holders, at national, local and global levels,
whose interactions have been explored through actor network theory.42
The concept of the separation of powers distinguishes between the
legislative, judicial and executive functions of the state; legal and
bureaucratic cultures pervade all three, and many actors have a stake,
particularly international development agencies and civil society, as this
section now explores. 
3.1 Legal culture, law-making and the judiciary 
The concept of the rule of law originated as a defence against
totalitarianism and a path toward democracy, and is increasingly seen as
critical for economic, political and social development. The underpinning
theory is still subject to debate, particularly the extent to which the legal
order could or should respond to the aspirations of the community and be
‘pro-poor’.43 Both the UN and World Bank are committed to rule of law
activities at nation state level, such as strengthening the constitution and
institutions of justice, governance, security and human rights.44 
De Soto from his perspective on pro-poor property rights has attacked
lawyers and legal culture for in-built conservatism, adherence to
traditional processes, and sabotaging opportunities for poverty reduction:
‘their knee-jerk reaction to extralegal behaviour and to large-scale change
is generally hostile’.45 The very concept of pro-poor law is in itself a
challenge to legal culture and how lawyers are educated. Even the
existence of a pro-poor constitution, in post-apartheid RSA, does not
guarantee pro-poor judgments in its constitutional court.46 Much of the
research on poverty and land law has been undertaken by other disciplines,
hence the title of McAuslan’s book on the role of law in development
Bringing the law back in.47 
42 A Manji The politics of land reform in Africa (2006).
43 P Nonet & P Selznick Law and society in transition (1978). These authors identified three
modes of legal order, of which responsive law was one, the others being repressive law
(relying heavily on coercion to maintain order) and autonomous law (emphasising
regularity and predictability).
44 United Nations UN approach to rule of law assistance (2008)
45 De Soto (n 38 above) 210.
46 T Roux ‘Pro-poor court, anti-poor outcomes’ (2004) South African Journal of Human
Rights 511; J Dugard & T Roux ‘The record of the South African Constitutional Court
in providing an institutional voice for the poor’ in R Gargarella et al (eds) Courts and
social transformation in the new democracies (2006) 107; S Gloppen et al (eds)
Democratization and the judiciary (2004).
47 P McAuslan Bringing the law back in (2003).
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their colonial backgrounds. Different colonial powers imported their own
systems, and some nation states have a legacy of two or more overlaid
colonial legal orders: Cameroon, for example, had German, French and
British colonial masters at different times. The recent constitution of
Namibia (the former German South-West Africa) still draws from German
approaches to property, even though Germany ceased being the colonial
master in 1918, and South African law applies both Roman-Dutch and
British approaches to property, creating much legal complexity.48 
The high hopes of the law and development movement, which sought
to involve law in the processes of modernisation during the early post-
independence period, have now faded, for various reasons. Dependency
theory exposed the structural nature of under-development, and the critical
legal theory movement exposed the power relationships underlying law. A
Weberian culture of patrimonialism was reflected in the emergence of
post-colonial new elites, which are widely perceived as corrupt, and pro-
poor in rhetoric but not reality. The formal legal system, the main focus of
liberal legalism, only reached a small section of the population, and had
little relevance to customary land tenure, while reform through negotiated
and legally constituted processes could achieve little. Critiques of legal
culture in developing countries have asserted:
Generations of South lawyering elites (which provide a common law South
archetype of excellence in lawyering) acquire specialist legal knowledges
through Anglo-American circuits of “higher” legal education. Versatile in
dominant North common law discourse, they bring their formative, and
formidable, knowledges of comparative precedent in the course of
argumentation at home. They thus remain the carriers of contemporary
metropolitan common law to South legislation and adjudication.49
The blind and hegemonic push for uniformity around a non-African standard
simply increases resentments which have been simmering since colonial
times. We are dealing with a people who have grown suspicious of the
purveyors of “modernisation”, which in their minds translates into
“Westernisation”, a process not characterised in the past by too much respect
for the African viewpoint.50
In the years since independence many African countries have engaged,
usually through special commissions of inquiry, in review of their complex
inherited land laws, and passed new laws, often with foreign assistance
48 SD Girvin ‘The architects of the mixed legal system’ in R Zimmermann & D Visser
(eds) Southern cross (1996) 96; MJ Chanock The making of South African legal culture 1902-
1936 (2001).
49 U Baxi ‘Global development and impoverishment’ in P Cane & M Tushnet Oxford
handbook of legal studies (2003) 455.
50 RT Nhlapo in B Ajibola & D van Zyl (eds) The judiciary in Africa (1998) 88.
38    Chapter 2influencing the outcome.51 Among such law reforms have been: the
military government of Nigeria nationalising land in its 1977 Land Use
Decree; Uganda reforming its feudal mailo land tenure with its 1998 Land
Act; Lesotho applying a British model to its land law in 1979; Botswana
passing a Tribal Land Act in 1968; and Tanzania retreating from socialism
with various new land laws in 1990-93. Perhaps the most comprehensive
approach was in RSA, where many reforming land laws after 1994
dismantled apartheid and attempted a transformative approach, embedded
in its new constitution.52
The challenges of land law reform, especially land redistribution in
southern Africa, require no less than a transformation in legal thinking.
The concept of transformative constitutionalism appeared in post-1994
RSA, offering an approach to transformation through law-grounded
processes.53 Zimbabwean academics have sought to justify land
redistribution through a humwe doctrine of consent, sanctioning a
‘rejection of private property rights that were forcibly or immorally
instituted under the shield of colonialism’, and drawing also upon the post-
Mabo recognition that pre-existing indigenous land rights are not
extinguished and can be revived.54 
Land law reform also needs to be applied on the ground, recognising
the complexities of local situations. Special courts and tribunals, hybrid
forms of judicial administration, can be created alongside the main court
system to deal with the intricacies and factual evidence involved in land
disputes. Such ‘transplanted forms of bureaucracy’ are usually held close
to where the disputes arise, and are expected to be quicker and cheaper
than the courts, addressing factual rather than legal issues, with
determinations made by professionals in land matters. They have potential
to innovate, help protect the poor from arbitrary eviction, and allow the
recognition of local communal rights, but have also been criticised for
arbitrary decisions deviating from prior understandings of the law, even (in
one author’s view) to the point of absurdity.55
51 A Manji ‘Land reform in the shadow of the state’ (2001) 22 Third World Quarterly 327;
RJC Young Post-colonialism (2003) 45.
52 McAuslan (n 46 above) 384 has an appendix listing basic information on statutory land
laws in mainland Commonwealth Africa. 
53 K Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African
Journal of Human Rights 146 – 188, discussed in AJ Van Der Walt Property in the margins
(2009).
54 B Chigara Land reform policy (2004) 31. 
55 RP Werbner ‘The quasi-judicial and the experience of the absurd’ in Werbner (ed) Land
reform in the making (1982) 131. Examples of such tribunals include the Land Claims
Court in South Africa, customary land courts in Botswana and Ghana, and land
tribunals in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. 
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Land administration in the modern nation-state involves an array of
agencies, bureaucracies with specialist staff that undertake myriad tasks:
surveying and subdividing the land, preparing and examining plans and
legal documents, keeping and amending records, valuing property and
updating valuation lists, managing property, executing enforcements and
evictions, and handling appeals and disputes. Many of these functions
have been professionalised, and two key ‘professions of the land’ are those
of land surveying and planning.
The land surveyor undertakes cadastral surveys within a state-
guaranteed land registration system. Such a system claims to offer four
advantages: the so-called ‘continuous finality of the register’, an
unambiguous brief definition of the land, easier conveyancing, and an
official certificate of title.56 Such documentation builds a public memory
that permits society to engage in activities such as: identifying and gaining
access to information about individuals, their assets, their titles, rights,
charges and obligations; establishing the limits of liability for businesses;
knowing an asset’s previous economic situation; assuring protection of
third parties; and quantifying and valuing assets and rights. Many
postcolonial governments have, however, come to recognise the costs and
limitations of state land registration, and recent innovatory approaches
have attempted to combine effective records with local community
control, bringing land registration closer to the people on the ground. One
alternative to formal registration of individual rights is the registration of
collective or common property rights, potentially a simpler, cheaper and
more equitable process.57 
The land use planner seeks to regulate development and use of land,
and to provide a framework for future spatial development and
environmental protection. It was colonial town planners who largely
implemented the dual system on the ground, and its extreme form in
apartheid South Africa of segregated townships and the Group Areas Act,
The so-called Stallard doctrine regarded towns as European cultural
creations, restricting African access to those whose labour was needed, and
forcing Africans to live in ‘locations’ or the inappropriately named
‘townships’ (racially segregated housing on the edge of town, actually
usually outside the city limits).58 As rural impoverishment grew, those
tribal or communal lands that were near urban areas became places where
56 JR Simpson Land law and registration (1976) 163; E Dowson & VLO Sheppard Land
registration (1956); PF Dale Cadastral surveys within the commonwealth (1976).
57 A Durand-Lasserve & L Royston (eds) Holding their ground (2002); P McAuslan Urban
land and shelter for the poor (1985); Payne G (ed) Land, rights and innovation (2002); C
Toulmin & J Quan (eds) Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa (2000).
58 JB Robinson The power of apartheid (1996) 21; E Mutale The management of urban
development in Zambia (2004).
40    Chapter 2Africans could settle in unregulated, unserviced settlements and gain
access to urban employment opportunities. When apartheid state power
was no longer able to manage these peri-urban areas, the ‘squatter camps’
were relabelled as ‘informal settlements’, designated for upgrading rather
than clearance – ‘here to stay’.59
As well as surveying and planning, the state undertakes other functions
of land governance, State lands must be managed in their various forms
(for example local government estates, national parks, heritage areas and
security facilities); valuers (both public and private) appraise property for
taxation and securitisation purposes; environmental agencies protect the
natural environment, manage water resources and promote sustainable
development of wild-life habitats. These various professions of the land
have much power and influence, in addition to the lawyers and legislators,
and are supported by international knowledge networks.60 
Unfortunately the implementation capacity of land governance is
often inadequate to the tasks, contributing to the so-called ‘failing state’,
increasing rather than reducing tenure insecurity and conflicts over land,
and seeming remote and irrelevant to the everyday lives of the poor.61 The
reality on the ground in Tanzania, for example, was that: 
The peasants were pushed about by high-handed petty bureaucrats, their land
was seized without compensation, the urban poor were by a legal sleight of
hand deprived of the land on which they might have lived for years, they
received no or derisory compensation and no alternative land on which to
build another house.62
A review of cadastral systems found that only 1 per cent of sub-Saharan
Africa was covered by any kind of cadastral survey. The postcolonial state
is disengaging from the direct provision of housing and infrastructure, and
mass titling becoming more difficult to achieve. Eviction is, however,
increasingly seen as a bad option, which does not resolve the problems and
carries a high cost, both locally and internationally. 
3.3 International development agencies
Above the nation-state, land policy is influenced by an array of
international and regional agencies, with a multiplicity of programmes,
initiatives and associated networks, and these have been the main
champions of a pro-poor approach to land. While the World Bank charter
does not allow the pursuit of political reform, its governance agenda
59 D Hindson & J McCarthy (eds) Here to stay (1994).
60 These include the International Federation of Surveyors (FIG), and the
Commonwealth Associations of Surveyors and Land Economists (CASLE) and
Planners (CAP). 
61 B Derman et al Conflicts over land and water in Africa (2007)
62 McAuslan (n above 47) 48.
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decade advocated free-market land policies, which have been pre-
conditions for programmes in SSA, and in 2009 launched a new Urban
and Local Government Strategy.63 Increasingly these agencies co-ordinate
their efforts: the annual Land Policy conference of the World Bank in 2010
was organised jointly by the World Bank, UN-HABITAT (concerned with
human settlements), FIG (representing the surveying profession
internationally) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development
(an off-shoot of FAO). The agencies sponsor capacity-building in land
management, thus linking land law with the wider aspects of good
governance.64 
Two initiatives from UN-Habitat directly concern land law in Africa:
the Global Campaign for Secure Tenure and the Global Land Tools
Network (GLTN). Land titling programmes have been applied to reduce
poverty and upgrade slums, by promoting an incremental approach to
property certification for housing plots, zoning and planning, service
provision and improvement of infrastructure. The GLTN, launched at the
2006 World Urban Forum, seeks to formulate legal instruments for land
tenure that can be innovative, pro-poor, affordable and scalable. Examples
are land readjustment (a method of pooling ownerships for planned
development) and the social domain tenure model.65 
These are not the only international initiatives that are relevant to land
law. The advent of the MDGs after 2000 has been accompanied by the UN
Millennium Campaign, aiming to hold governments accountable for their
achievement. The so-called Pinheiro Principles (approved by the UNCHR
in 2005) concerned those displaced by wars, political upheaval and natural
disasters.66 Regional groupings, such as SADC and the EAC, are
increasingly concerned with land and land management. 
3. 4  Agencies of civil society
Civil society is a term applied to a wide range of non-governmental
organisations such as registered charities, development organisations,
community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations,
professional associations, trades unions, business associations, coalitions
and advocacy groups, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and
63 K Deininger Land policies for growth and poverty reduction (2003); World Bank Systems of
cities (2009) 11, emphasised that SSA had most of the countries furthest from achieving
the MDG target on slums.
64 J Faundez ‘Legal technical assistance’ in J Faundez (ed) Good government and law
(1997) 1.
65 C Fourie ‘Land readjustment for peri-urban customary tenure’ in R Home & H Lim
(eds) Demystifying the mystery of capital (2004) 31; RK Home ‘Land readjustment as a
method of development land assembly’ (2007) 78 Town Planning Review 459;
C Lemmen The social tenure domain model (2010).
66 PS Pinheiro (2007) Housing and property restitution for refugees and displaced persons.
42    Chapter 2power.67 The philosopher Hegel first identified civil society as a separate
realm, a ‘system of needs’ with its inherent conflicts and inequalities. In the
1990s NGOs and new social movements emerged on a global scale in what
has been called the ‘NGO revolution’.68 They became sources of resistance
to globalisation, concerned with the impact and conceptual power of the
international aid system. The shallow penetration of society by weak state
institutions, and pressures for states to shrink, created a larger realm of
unoccupied political space in Africa than elsewhere, and expanded the role
for civil society at the expense of politically derived state institutions.69
The formulation of the MDGs, and the subsequent Millennium
Campaign, has provided a new focus for NGOs (and more particularly
CSOs) to press their governments for greater accountability, transparency
and the legal empowerment of the poor. 
At the local level, new-style community-based organisations (CBOs),
empowered by links with international NGO coalitions, are developing
new styles of land rights advocacy and dispute resolution.70 CBOs may
seek to protect their communities against the forces of globalisation by
keeping control of land use and allocation without recourse to the
integrated property system offered by the state. Informal property rules
devised in squatter settlements may provide the poor with practical
recourse to protect their possessory title. Such institutions can be seen as
subaltern forms of legality, using traditional indigenous law as a ‘contact
zone’ between the global and the local. Generally, however, the poor are
understandably pre-occupied with day-to-day existence, rather than
engaged with time-consuming solidarity activity, while outside elites may
manipulate processes for their own advantage.
Land for housing may be provided through community self-help
movements, who buy and subdivide land for sale to their members, using
collective funds raised through subscription. Incremental tenure upgrading
can include such measures as: registering all plots and occupiers, providing
basic services, resolving land disputes, and allocating property rights to
recognised claimants. A community may keep its own registers of rights,
applying hybrid law through some form of local court or tribunal, and
indeed maintain its boundaries against outside forces by such practices as
beating the bounds, where the whole community turns out to re-assert
67 M Edwards Civil society (2004). For a generally accepted definition see the Centre for
Civil Society (London School of Economics) web-site at www.lse.ac.uk/collections/
CCS. 
68 CE Welch Protecting human rights in Africa (1995) 45.
69 M Keck & K Sikkink (eds) Beyond borders (1998); M Mamdani Citizen and subject (1996);
B Rajagopal International law from below (2003). T Tvedt Angels of mercy or development
diplomats (1998). 
70 Among the local NGOs concerned with land matters in SSA are the Tanzania Land
Forum, Uganda Land Alliance, South African National Land Committee, and Zambia
National Land Alliance, while international NGO networks include the Habitat
International Coalition, Housing and Land Rights Network, and Cities Alliance (with
its ‘Cities Without Slums’ action plan).
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community involvement requires a rethinking of professional roles,
stakeholder relationships, dispute resolution methods and record-keeping
systems, but it needs partnerships and capacity-building.
4 ‘The land question’ and pro-poor land law
Exploring the sources and actors in land law still leaves the question: what
would a pro-poor land law for Africa comprise? Although many sub-
Saharan African countries since independence have undertaken land law
reform, aspirations have been frustrated by weak implementation, and ‘the
land question’ or ‘the land issue’ remains persistent and politically
sensitive. To quote Kenya’s national land policy:
The land question has manifested itself in many ways such as fragmentation,
breakdown in land administration, disparities in land ownership and poverty.
This has resulted in environmental, social, economic and political problems
including deterioration in land quality, squatting and landlessness,
disinheritance of some groups and individuals, urban squalor, under-
utilisation and abandonment of agricultural land, tenure insecurity and
conflict.71
Unpacking the meaning of a pro-poor land law reveals four key elements:
more equitable land distribution, the forms of land tenure, land use
planning, and the system and processes of land administration. 
Firstly, at the heart of pro-poor land policy must be easier access to
land for the landless, and protection against arbitrary forced eviction. Pro-
poor land law reform would assist land redistribution from large private
estates (some with owners outside the country) to the landless and those in
effective occupation. The proportion of registered land in such large estates
is much higher in Eastern and Southern Africa, due to past white
settlement supported by the colonial powers. Delivery of land to the poor
may come from land held in either private, state or communal ownership,
typically through confirmation of effective occupation or possessory title,
legal recognition through adjudication processes, and protection from
arbitrary forced eviction.72 Post-independence sub-Saharan African states
have, however, generally been financially unable to pursue such policies
on the scale required, whether by ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ purchase or
compulsory acquisition.
71 Kenya Land Policy.
72 The South African Land Policy (1997) defined the aim of land redistribution as ‘to
provide the poor with land for residential and productive purposes in order to improve
their livelihoods’. The beneficiaries would include urban and rural poor, farm workers,
labour tenants and ‘emergent farmers’. See DL Carey Miller and A Pope Land title in
South Africa (2000) 398. 
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rights (seen as a central aspect to the rule of law), through registration of
land title and interests in property. Under the neo-liberal market-based
approach, the state protects the security of private property title as a basis
for finance and capital-raising, supported by land surveyors and valuers
who define the parcels of property parcels and appraise its value for
mortgage or hypothecation purposes. Transnational capital flows mean
that large tracts of land may be transferred to absentee legal entities, a
process which started in the colonial period and continues. Clear and
secure land rights, as de Soto argued, help economic growth and can
reduce poverty by empowering the poor, but may also reinforce unequal
land distribution. 
For the poor, land titling may not be their main concern, and has been
compared to a passport – useful, but only if you plan to go somewhere. For
most of the poor, the state is either irrelevant or interferes with their daily
life. It creates illegality, and only refrains from harassing them because of
its inertia and inefficiency. One achievement of the new thinking about
tenure security has been, however, to soften official hostility to ‘squatter’
settlements, and achieve a greater acknowledgment of the rights of the
poor to secure tenure. Governments have come to recognise the political
costs of squatter eviction, and are more willing to respond to pressure
exerted by the poor. Tenure reform has entailed a formalising of customary
or community land arrangements, and the status of such land, with its
traditional social importance, needs to be reinforced if it is not to be eroded
and turned into a tradable commodity.
Land law, traditionally concerned with private property rights, and
defining their relation to the state, has become increasingly involved with
the third element, planning and regulation of land use, a function of
government that only arrived in the 20th century. Land use planning can
assist with better food production, urban development, economic
productivity and environmental sustainability. The state has a particular
role in managing the conversion of land to urban use (especially housing),
and yet exclusionary zoning and lack of capacity mean that most new
development is unauthorised. The town planning system was largely a
colonial creation, and needs to decolonise its thinking – ‘unlearning
privilege’ – and adapt to new population pressures on land.73
Fourthly, better land governance can achieve much, through more
inclusive partnerships, capacity-building, education and training. The
traditional professional skills of surveyors and lawyers need to be
supplemented by the more political skills of mediation, dispute resolution
and local coalition-building. A modernising state needs to promote equal
73 L Porter Unlearning the colonial cultures of planning (2010) 151; RK Home Of planting and
planning (1997); C Rakodi (ed) The urban challenge in Africa (1997); C Rakodi &
CR Leduka (2005) Informal land delivery processes in African cities.
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poverty impact of public policies, strengthening poor people’s assets and
capabilities, through pro-poor policies, correcting gender inequity and
children’s vulnerability, and protecting poor people’s rights.
5 Conclusions: Prospects for a pro-poor land law
In the half century since independence in 1960s most sub-Saharan African
states have reformed their land laws, but new issues have emerged,
particularly pressures of population, urban growth and environmental
sustainability. Colonial legacies persist in the pattern of land ownership
and legal regulatory frameworks, and the early optimism of the law and
development movement has evaporated with the new concerns, and
challenges to the rule of law. Pressure for land law reform is being placed
upon governments from agencies of both the international development
community (linked to programme funding) and civil society, while the
Millennium Campaign and the broader approach to human rights law are
holding governments rather more accountable for poverty reduction. Land
law reform is a long process, and requires a national constituency, and
relation to the existing corpus of law. Without more participatory local
strategies, the management of land, that most basic resource of the modern
territorial nation-state, will not meet the needs of ‘the poor’.
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1 Introduction
Land rights have been recognised as a central human rights issue for
indigenous peoples,1 emerging both internationally and regionally. At the
international level, the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007
marked a resolute step from the international community in affirming
indigenous peoples’ human rights, and puts a great emphasis on land
rights. The African states under the guidance of the AU played an
important role in shaping this declaration.2 This reflects the developments
regarding indigenous peoples’ human rights that have been taking place at
the regional level, particularly the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which established a Working Group on
Indigenous Populations/Communities in 2001 with the mandate to
examine the situation of indigenous peoples on the continent.3 
A central issue of contention concerned the definition of indigenous
peoples, with several States proposing that in Africa all inhabitants are
indigenous,4 and viewing the legal emergence of such a category of rights-
holders as potentially a cause of ‘tension among ethnic groups and
1 See: ‘Indigenous people and their relationship to land’, Final working paper prepared
by Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Special Rapporteur. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21; J
Gilbert Indigenous peoples’ land rights under international law: From victims to actors (2007).
2 For an analysis, see A Barume ‘Responding to the concerns of the African states’, in
C Charters & R Stavenhagen (eds) Making the declaration work: The United Nations
Declaration on The Rights Of Indigenous Peoples (2009); W Genugten ‘Protection of
indigenous peoples on the African continent’ (2010) 104 (1) American Journal of
International Law 29.
3 N Kealeboga & GM Wachira ‘Protecting indigenous peoples in Africa’ (2006) 6 African
Human Rights Law Journal 382.
4 H Weber et al (eds) ‘Never drink from the same cup: Proceedings of the Conference on
Indigenous Peoples in Africa’ (1993); A Bernard & J Kenrick (eds) Africa’s Indigenous
Peoples: Peoples: ‘first peoples’ or ‘marginalised minorities’? (2001).47
48    Chapter 3instability between sovereign States.’5 Adopting a pragmatic approach, the
ACHPR has highlighted that ‘in Africa, the term indigenous populations
does not mean “first inhabitants” in reference to aboriginality as opposed
to non-African communities or those having come from elsewhere.’6 The
Commission has emphasised that there is no universally agreed definition
of the term indigenous peoples, and that the most constructive approach is
to refer to common characteristics which allow for the identification of
indigenous peoples in Africa. The Commission explains that a first major
characteristic is self-identification, which implies that a people initially
identify itself as indigenous. A second major characteristic is indigenous
peoples’ ‘special attachment to and use of their traditional land whereby
their ancestral land and territory have a fundamental importance for their
collective physical and cultural survival as peoples.’7 Finally, the
Commission adds that indigenous peoples are often communities which
face ‘a state of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion, or
discrimination because these peoples have different cultures, ways of life
or mode of production than the national hegemonic and dominant
model.’8 
As the work of the ACHPR highlights, access and security over land
rights are the principal issues for indigenous peoples. With the
establishment of protected areas and the ever increasing exploitation of
natural resources, indigenous peoples have experienced large scale
displacements and often been evicted without compensation or alternative
land. Most of them hold no formal legal title to land under national tenure
laws, which means that they have technically become squatters on their
own lands or on other people’s lands, and suffer permanent risk of
eviction. In some cases, indigenous peoples are allowed to remain on land
owned by non-indigenous communities in exchange for agricultural work;
others are allowed to stay on land owned by charitable organisations. Land
rights will determine whether indigenous peoples have the right to remain
on their lands, or at least get compensation for their expulsion, and are not
only crucial to their cultural survival as peoples but also for their
livelihoods and economic development. By becoming landless most
indigenous communities have been pushed into further economic and
spatial marginalisation, living in extremely vulnerable conditions. Loss of
access to their traditional territories is often synonymous with
marginalisation, homelessness, increased mortality, food insecurity, and
social disarticulation arising from the forced change of lifestyle. Securing
5 African Group, ‘Aide-memoire of the African group on the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2006).
6 ACHPR ‘Advisory opinion on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples’, 41st Ordinary Session, Accra, Ghana, May 2007.
7 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous
Populations/Communities submitted in accordance with ‘Resolution on the Rights of
Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa adopted by the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 28th ordinary session (2005) 93.
8 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group (n 7 above).
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indigenous communities.
International law, and more particularly international human rights
law, has for some time been seen as a positive tool to support indigenous
peoples’ rights; when it comes to land rights, however, such positivity is
new. September 2007 marked the start of a new era for indigenous peoples,
with the adoption of the UNDRIP. Despite this recent development,
international law has historically played a negative role regarding
indigenous peoples’ rights, and more especially their rights to land. An
important tool in the hands of the colonial powers, international law has
been a central vehicle in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. Most of
the rules regarding title to territory under international law were aimed at
justifying the dispossession of indigenous peoples of their lands. While
various legal systems applied, during colonisation, to land rights for
indigenous peoples – depending on which state was the coloniser –
international law played the role of common denominator, ensuring that
all powers adhered to the same legal doctrine. The rules governing title to
territory under international law became the basis of the ‘rules of the game’
between the colonial powers, and as such had a direct impact on
indigenous peoples’ land rights. Because of this legacy, international law
still plays a huge part in the contemporary situations faced by indigenous
communities throughout the continent today, a legacy now being
challenged by international human rights law. 
The first part of this chapter retraces in history the manner in which
territory was acquired by the State according to international law with a
view to analysing the consequences of this acquisition for indigenous
peoples. It examines to what extent international legal rules designed by
colonial powers directly and indirectly affected indigenous peoples’ land
rights. It is argued that international law played an important role in such
colonial operation, serving as a basis to establish the rule of territorial
rights. In contrast, the second section highlights that contemporary
international human rights law has supported the recognition of
indigenous peoples’ rights over their traditional territories. By undertaking
such a historical approach to land rights, the chapter analyses to what
extent contemporary international human rights standards support the
recognition of the land rights of indigenous communities. The emergence
of a specific body of law regarding indigenous peoples’ rights is becoming
important for Africa. The rights to land, and also the emerging
international legal standards on free, prior and informed consent, could
potentially play a key role in the future relationship between States,
investors, and indigenous peoples. By focusing on both the history of
international law and contemporary human rights law standards, this
chapter examines the sometimes contradictory rules, on the one hand rules
governing territorial possession by states, and on the other hand human
rights law arguing for the recognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights. 
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Ironically, the universalisation of international law was principally a
consequence of the imperial expansion that took place in past centuries, as
the development of international law was primarily guided by the
establishment of rules governing title to territory over newly colonised
countries. For the African continent, these rules were crucial in defining
land titles both for the colonial powers and for the so-called ‘native’
populations. In what is now referred to as the ‘scramble for Africa’,9
colonial powers needed rules to divide the continent between themselves,
and to justify the colonial enterprise of taking lands from the ‘natives’.
Most of the rules regarding title to territory under international law were
based on these two premises. 
2.1 International law and the ‘civilising’ mission
The colonial enterprise, especially during the new imperialist period (1880-
1914), justified itself under a banner of ‘Commerce, Christianity and
Civilisation’. While ultimately the primary goal of colonisation was
undoubtedly trade expansion, the notion of ‘Civilisation’ provided the
colonial powers with a moral vindication, the equation being: ‘Commerce
plus Christianity equals Civilisation’. Especially in Africa a ‘civilising
mission’ was proposed as the main justification for the colonial enterprise.
Illustrations of such a ‘civilising mission’ can be found in the Berlin
Conference (1884-85), which played a huge role in the development of the
international ‘rules’ regarding the colonisation of Africa. The Berlin
Conference represented one of the first gatherings of the main colonial
powers and the first formal recognition of their different ‘spheres of
influences’. Concomitant to the prevailing ‘mission civilisatrice’ governing
that period the Final Act refers to colonial states’ mission to bring the
‘blessings of civilisation’ to the African continent. The development of
international law throughout that period contains many references to
‘civilising mission’ (‘mission civilisatrice’), providing colonial powers with
rules justifying territorial dispossession of indigenous peoples in Africa.10
A legal consequence of this ‘civilising mission’ was the doctrine of
trusteeship, and the ‘humanitarian’ call to help the ‘natives’ (or
‘primitives’) to join the ‘enlightenment’ and stop their ‘barbaric’ traditions.
As a result colonial powers (or ‘civilised’ powers) had to act in a spirit of
trusteeship towards the non-civilised native populations. The trusteeship
doctrine is summarised in a 1919 decision from the Privy Council which
stated that: ‘some tribes are so low in the scale of social organisation that
their usages and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be reconciled
9 TF Pakenham The scramble for Africa (1991).
10 M Koskenniemi The gentle civiliser of nations (2002).
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‘civilising mission’ European powers took control of the lands in the hands
of indigenous communities, not for their own interest but for the benefit of
indigenous people themselves. This international doctrine of a trusteeship
mission was translated into colonial laws, as most (if not all) colonial
powers put in place a system of land control for the ‘most uncivilised’. In
central Africa such a doctrine can be found in legislation up to the 1950’s.
For example, a 1952 decree in the Congo stated that, to be able to register
a right to land, native peoples had to prove their degree of education and
civilisation.12 In practical terms the trusteeship doctrine resulted in the
establishment of reserved lands or reservations for indigenous
communities, conferring a right of usage for native communities with a
restriction on their ability to alienate such lands (as the aim was to ‘protect’
them). Even today reserved lands for indigenous peoples are based upon
hypocritical humanitarian grounds (to allow indigenous peoples to enable
to maintain a reasonable standard of existence), and on the absolute
control of the government over such right (the government holds the
ultimate title to the land).
The colonialist distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’
societies had another consequence for land rights for indigenous peoples
through the notion of ‘pre-existing rights’. Under colonial rules, when a
colonial power took control of a territory there was an obligation to
recognise ‘pre-existing rights’, including land rights, in that territory. The
Final Act of the Berlin Conference stipulated that colonial states had to
exercise their authority in such a way as to protect existing rights within
the territory (article 35 of the Final Act). In theory such recognition of ‘pre-
existing rights’ could have some important consequences for indigenous
peoples, as if their rights were ‘pre-existing’ the colonial legal regime they
could ‘survive’ it. However, in the words of Westlake, a prominent
nineteenth century publicist: not ‘all rights are denied to such natives, but
that the appreciation of their rights is left to the conscience of the state
within whose recognised territorial sovereignty they are comprised ...’.13
This statement accurately highlights how the recognition of pre-existing
land rights was in the absolute control of the colonial power. Lindley, in
his seminal work on the acquisition of territory, also highlighted the
distinction made by the colonial states between the recognition of
‘civilised’ and ‘un-civilised’ pre-existing rights, with states rejecting the
notion of ‘uncivilised’ pre-existing rights to land (such as customary
indigenous peoples’ laws).14 Some contemporary land claims at the
national level (especially under the common law) have started to examine
11 Privy Council, In Re Southern Rhodesia (1919) AC 211, 233 - 234.
12 Décret du 17 mai 1952 sur l’immatriculation des indigènes. tout indigène ayant justifié
par sa formation et sa manière de vivre d’un état de civilisation impliquant l’aptitude de
jouir des droits et à remplir les devoirs prescrits par la législation écrite pouvait passer
du régime de la coutume au régime du droit écrit. 
13 J Westlake Chapters on the principles of international law (1894) 138.
14 MF Lindley The acquisition and government of backward territory (1969).
52    Chapter 3what pre-existing rights ‘survived’ the colonial rules.15 Some courts have
stated to examine to what extent indigenous peoples ‘pre-existing’ laws
could have survived colonisation, and what their impact could be in
contemporary land claims, notably in the Ritchersveld decision of the
Supreme Court of South Africa.16 
One consequence of the colonial era’s classification of societies on a
scale of ‘civilisation’ is the view of nomadic societies. Under the tenets of
international law, nomadic peoples were traditionally considered to be at
the bottom of the scale. By being nomadic they had no right to the land, as
one of the rules of territorial occupation under international law is the
principle of effective use of the land. Only agricultural societies were
deemed to use lands effectively, and nomadic peoples were considered as
only wandering across territories and therefore having no rights to
occupation. The assumption was that nomadic peoples’ territories were
not used productively and therefore should be regarded as empty and
opens to colonisation. Nomadic peoples’ territories were regarded as terra
nullius, lands belonging to no-one. This assumption was partially
challenged only in 1975 when the ICJ in its advisory opinion on the
Western Sahara recognised that nomadic peoples could also exercise some
form of social and political organisation, but fell short of recognising the
capacity of nomadic peoples to exercise territorial sovereignty.17 As
highlighted by Reisman, ‘the Court formally acknowledged the existence
of a theory of international land tenure based on a non-European
conception of title as generative of “legal ties” ... But such “legal ties” were
not enough to defeat title deriving from European colonial claim.’18 The
view that only societies with a permanent settled population can exercise
territorial control remained. This historical bias against nomadic
communities still has some impact in contemporary land claims, as most
nomadic communities throughout the continent have only very limited
access to legal titles to their lands, and the dominant assumption is still that
they do not ‘effectively’ occupy their lands.
2.2  The principle of ‘effective occupation’ 
In contrast to other instances of colonisation, where European colonial
powers just decided that the colonised territories were empty and therefore
open to colonisation (Australia, Americas), in the case of Africa (at least
following the Berlin Conference) colonial powers had to establish formal
legal ties with the local populations to establish their authorities. Article 35
of the Final Act stated: 
15 J Gilbert, ‘Historical indigenous peoples’ land claims’ (2007) 56 (3) International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 538 – 611.
16 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2003 (6) BCLR 583 (SCA).
17 ICJ, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975.
18 M Resiman, ‘Protecting indigenous rights in international adjudication’ (1995) 89(2)
American Journal of International Law 354 - 355.
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establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of
the African Continent sufficient to protect existing rights (droit acquis) and, as
the case may be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions agreed
upon.19 
While the Final Act remained vague regarding the implementation of the
principle of effective occupation, it had several long-lasting consequences
for the development of the international rules regarding title to territory in
Africa. 
One of the first consequences was that colonial powers renewed their
use of chartered companies as agents of the state. As in most situations the
effective control of huge territories was deemed too expensive for the
administrative systems of the colonial states, and so states granted rights to
private companies (often referred to as chartered companies), not only
trading rights but also rights regarding the administration of the colonised
territories, including territorial rights. Thus chartered companies became
important actors regarding land rights for the local communities,
sometimes over huge areas of lands. For example, the UK placed the area
corresponding to what is today Uganda under the charter of the IBEAC20
in 1888, and ruled it as a protectorate from 1894. At some stage chartered
companies were responsible for securing control over 75 per cent of British
territory in sub-Saharan Africa.21 Similar processes were followed by the
French, German, Portuguese and Dutch administrations, so that private
trading companies could act as the colonial power with rights over land
and natural resources.22 Chartered companies also had the power to enter
into treaty relationship with communities, such treaties often having
territorial consequences. While treaties with indigenous populations have
always been part of the colonial enterprise, following the Berlin
Conference colonial powers (mainly through their chartered companies)
entered into a period of intense treaty making with African leaders and
communities. In the end of the nineteenth century, Africa (and especially
West and Central Africa) witnessed a ‘race’ between the main colonial
powers in trying to sign as many treaties as possible with local chiefs, to
ensure the transfer of the lands.23 While the forms of these treaties vary
across the continent, usually they involved a notion of peaceful
relationship and provided for the cession of land ownership from the
19 Note that such obligation of effective occupation was repeated in the 1919 Convention
of Saint Germain in its article 10.
20 Imperial British East Africa Company.
21 JE Flint ‘Chartered companies and the transition from informal sway to colonial rule in
Africa’ in S Forster et al (eds) Bismarck, Europe, and Africa (1988) 69 - 83.
22 On the power of such companies, see decision from the Privy Council in Southern
Rhodesia (n 11 above).
23 An account of such race for treaty making is available in Lindley (n 14 above) 34 - 36.
54    Chapter 3African communities.24 These treaties were then used by the colonial
powers as proof to ensure the transfer of sovereignty in their favour. 
3 Contemporary African and international human 
rights law
In contrast with the rationales behind colonial law-making processes,
human rights developments since the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights have created legal norms that operate according to a
different paradigm. While traditionally international law is concerned with
the rights of states to claim title to territory, human rights law focuses on
the rights of the peoples living in those states. Hence international human
rights law starts from a different perspective on land rights: it requires that
indigenous peoples’ ownership and other rights to their lands, territories
and resources be legally recognised and respected. It connects those land
rights to a variety of other rights, including the general prohibition against
racial discrimination, the right to property, the right to cultural integrity
and the right to self-determination. 
This section explains some relevant human rights standards pertaining
to indigenous peoples’ right to land, including provisions from the AU’s
instruments, the UN system and the ILO. Those sets of standards are
applicable to African countries, and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights can be interpreted by reference to other international
human rights instruments and decisions.25 The analysis of those standards
reveals an important gap between the human rights situation of indigenous
peoples and the human rights protection provided by legal standards. Their
implementation remains challenging, but they form the core guiding
principles to which states have committed themselves as members of
intergovernmental bodies, through their ratification and participation in
the adoption of these instruments. 
3.1 The right to land 
In the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1986, the right to
property is guaranteed, but can be ‘encroached upon in the interest of the
public need or in the General interest of the community and in accordance
with the provisions of appropriate laws’.26 This restriction could at first
glance be taken to provide justification for evictions and displacements of
indigenous peoples, but the right to property should be interpreted
24 For detailed analysis of these treaties and the role of international law, see J Castellino
& S Allen Title to territory in international law (2003).
25 Article 60 of the African Charter.
26 Article 14 of the African Charter.
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Group on Indigenous Peoples/Communities.
The Working Group on Indigenous Peoples/Communities is a special
mechanism of the ACHPR, the human rights organ of the regional inter-
governmental African Union. It was established in 2001, and part of its
role is to research the human rights situation of indigenous peoples in
Africa and to formulate recommendations to prevent and provide remedy
for violations of indigenous peoples’ human rights. In an extensive report
adopted in 2003, the working group explained that:
The protection of rights to land and natural resources is fundamental for the
survival of indigenous communities in Africa and such protection relate … to
articles 20, 21, 22 and 24 of the African Charter.27
These articles provide the rights of all peoples to: existence and self
determination; freely dispose of their wealth and resources and, in case of
dispossession, the right to recover their property and be compensated;
development and equal enjoyment of the common heritage; and a general
satisfactory environment favourable to their development. They amount to
a solid legal protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights in Africa. 
The report of the working group further emphasises that a major
problem leading to the loss of indigenous peoples’ land in Africa is that
customary collective tenure was neither recognised nor secured. Instead,
land occupied by pastoralists and hunter–gatherers was defined as terra
nullius. Also collective land titles are not granted by most national laws,
and yet: ‘Collective tenure is fundamental to most indigenous pastoralist
and hunter gatherer communities, and one of the major requests of
indigenous communities is therefore the recognition and protection of
collective forms of land tenure’.28 
The ACPHR, by endorsing the report of the working group, has
acknowledged that the land rights of indigenous peoples have been
violated:
The land alienation and dispossession and dismissal of their customary rights
to land and other natural resources has led to an undermining of the
knowledge systems through which indigenous peoples have sustained life for
centuries and it has led to a negation of their livelihood systems and
deprivation of their means. This is seriously threatening the continued
existence of indigenous peoples and is rapidly turning them into the most
destitute and poverty stricken. This is a serious violation of the African
Charter (article 20, 21 and 22), which states clearly that all peoples have the
27 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group (n 7 above) 21.
28 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group (n 7 above) 22.
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right to their economic, social and cultural development.29 
In 2009, the ACHPR issued a decision on the first formal complaint
received about indigenous peoples’ land rights, submitted by the Centre for
Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE) on behalf of the Endorois
Community against the government of Kenya.30 A nature reserve was
established by the Kenyan government in the 1970s in the Lake Bogoria
region on lands inhabited since time immemorial by the indigenous
Endorois pastoralist communities. When the reserve was created the
Endorois were evicted and relocated without compensation, and in vain
sought redress in Kenya’s national courts. They continued to face
contestation from the state when they brought their case before the
ACHPR. The ACHPR’s decision constitutes an extensive and clear piece
of jurisprudence, which is unequivocal on the definition of indigenous
peoples and the necessity to recognise their ownership rights over their
ancestral lands. 
The ACHPR built on definitions provided by the UN, the ILO and its
Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities to clarify the
contested terms, and noted that: 
there is a common thread that runs through all the various criteria that
attempt to describe indigenous peoples – that indigenous peoples have an
unambiguous relationship to a distinct territory and that all attempts to define
the concept recognise the linkages between people, their land, and culture.31
The ACHPR found that articles 1, 8, 14, 17, 21 and 22 of the African
Charter had been violated, referring respectively to: the duty of States to
recognise the rights enshrined in the Charter; the right to practice religion;
the right to property; the right to culture; the right of peoples to the free
disposal of their natural resources; and the right of peoples to development.
It recommended that the State of Kenya: 
(a) Recognise rights of ownership to the Endorois and restitute Endorois
ancestral land. 
(b) Ensure that the Endorois community has unrestricted access to Lake
Bogoria and surrounding sites for religious and cultural rites and for grazing
their cattle.
(c) Pay adequate compensation to the community for all the loss suffered. 
(d) Pay royalties to the Endorois from existing economic activities and
ensure that they benefit from employment possibilities within the Reserve.
29 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group (n 7 above) 108.
30 Complaint No 276/2003 – Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority
Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya. Decision adopted
by the ACHPR in May 2009 and endorsed by the AU Assembly of Heads of State in
February 2010.
31  (n 29 above) para 154.
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(f) Engage in dialogue with the Complainants for the effective
implementation of these recommendations.
(g) Report on the implementation of these recommendations within three
months from the date of notification. 
This ground-breaking decision has become the most important precedent
in international human rights law with regard to indigenous peoples land
rights in Africa.
These rights are also affirmed by the UNDRIP of 2007, which states
that indigenous peoples have the ‘right to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
used or acquired.’32 This also comprises ‘the right to own, use, develop and
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of
traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as
those which they have otherwise acquired.’33 Furthermore, the UNDRIP
affirms that states’ duty to guarantee the right to land must be realised in
respect of tradition and land tenure systems of indigenous peoples. The
vast majority of UN member states voted in favour of its adoption, and no
African country voted against it.34 
African indigenous peoples’ right to land also stems from fundamental
binding international treaties. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 protects the right of ethnic, religious and
linguistic minorities to enjoy in community their own culture, practices,
religion and language.35 The Covenant also affirms the right of all peoples
to self-determination and freely to dispose of their natural wealth, and fifty
AU member states ratified it. The UN Human Rights Committee, the body
monitoring the implementation of the ICCPR, linked the right to land to
cultural rights guaranteed in the Covenant, and advised that measures be
taken to restitute to indigenous peoples their native lands.36 
The ILO has adopted two Conventions pertaining to indigenous
peoples’ rights: Convention 107 (ILO 107) of 1957 and Convention 169
32 Article 26(1) of UNDRIP.
33 Article 26(2) of UNDRIP.
34 The African Group submitted an ‘Aide mémoire’ to the United Nations session in
November 2006 in New York. Namibia and Botswana led this group, which raised
several concerns concerning the adoption of the Declaration. These concerns were
responded to by expert NGOs and the African Commission’ Working Group on
Indigenous Peoples/Communities. The Declaration was adopted without any African
vote against in 2007. See the Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples Rights Concerning the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, adopted at the 40th Ordinary session of ACHPR, May 2007,
Accra, Ghana.
35 Article 27 of ICCPR.
36 Concluding observations by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Australia, 24 March 2000, CERD/C/56/Misc. 42/rev. 3.
58    Chapter 3(ILO 169) of 1989.37 Their content is, however, only partially applicable in
Africa, as African states have not yet broadly ratified these instruments.38
Yet the two Conventions are part of the ILO’s standards on indigenous
land rights and represent the views of a major intergovernmental
organisation. 
While ILO 107 has been superseded and replaced by ILO 169, it
remains in force for those countries which ratified it but have not ratified
ILO 169. ILO 107 states that ‘The right of ownership, collective or
individual, of the members of the population concerned over the lands
which these populations traditionally occupy shall be recognised’. The
Committee of Experts stated that the fact that a people has some form of
relationship with land currently occupied, even if only for a short time, was
sufficient to form an interest and, therefore, rights to that land and the
attendant resources.39 
ILO 169 contains a number of provisions on the territorial rights of
indigenous peoples. It requires that governments recognise and respect the
special spiritual, cultural and economic relationship that indigenous
peoples have with their lands and territories, and especially the collective
aspects of this relationship.40 It further affirms that states shall recognise
indigenous peoples’ collective rights of ownership and possession over the
lands which they traditionally occupy, and take the necessary measures to
identify these lands and to guarantee effective protection of indigenous
peoples’ rights of ownership and possession.41 Finally, it states that
indigenous peoples may be relocated only as an exceptional measure and
only with their free and informed consent, and stipulates the measures to
be taken in the event of relocation.42 
3.2 A matter of equality and non-discrimination 
When indigenous peoples claim their land rights, they claim the rights to
equality and non-discrimination. Discrimination was both a catalyst in
and a consequence of their loss of ancestral lands. Human rights standards
pertaining to discrimination issues are thus fundamental to indigenous
land rights. At the international level, the rights to equality and non-
discrimination are guaranteed in numerous international instruments,
37 ILO 169 came into force in 1991.
38 ILO 107 is ratified by only a few and ILO 169 by none. Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Malawi and Tunisia have ratified ILO 107. However, both the Central African
Republic and Cameroon have actively started a process of negotiation towards the
potential adoption of ILO 169. See ILO Programme to Promote ILO Convention No
169.
39 International Labour Conference, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations, Report III (4A), (1988) 287.
40 Article 13(1) of ILO 169.
41 Article 14 of ILO 169.
42 Article 16(2) of ILO 169.
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Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, the body responsible for monitoring of the CEFRD of
1969 affirms that it:
calls upon States parties to recognise and protect the rights of indigenous
peoples to own, develop, control and use their communal lands, territories
and resources and, where they have been deprived of their lands and
territories traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited or used without their
free and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and territories.
Only when this is for factual reasons not possible, the right to restitution
should be substituted by the right to just, fair and prompt compensation. Such
compensation should as far as possible take the form of lands and
territories.45
At the regional level, rights to non-discrimination and equality are
guaranteed by the African Charter, and equality of all peoples is explicitly
protected.46 The Working Group on Indigenous Populations/
Communities of the African Commission explains how different
indigenous groups in central Africa suffer from being looked down upon
by other members of the society, how in many places they are
dehumanised and described as creatures, and how the rest of the
population would prefer them to ‘settle down and abandon their way of life
and imitate their own way of living and earning’. The working group
declares that: ‘the rampant discrimination towards indigenous peoples is a
violation of the African Charter’.47 
While it is clear to the ACHPR that groups of hunter-gatherers from
the African forests, such as the Batwa, Baka and Bagyeli, are indigenous
peoples as understood in international law,48 the Commission also
acknowledges that ‘very few African countries recognise the existence of
indigenous peoples in their countries’ and ‘even fewer recognise them in
their national constitutions or legislation’.49 In many African countries,
the use of the term indigenous peoples – and by extension the
implementation of international standards pertaining to indigenous
peoples – has revealed a challenge because of its colonial meaning relating
to natives or first inhabitants. It was argued by some African states that the
meaning of ‘indigenous’ in their constitution is not the same as the one
43 Article 7 of UDHR.
44 Article 26 of ICCPR. 
45 General Recommendation XXIII of 1997.
46 UN CEFRD, General Recommendation XXIII (51) concerning Indigenous Peoples, adopted at
the 1235th meeting, 18 August 1997, UN Doc. CERD/C/51/Misc. 13/Rev. 4,
paragraph 5; and article 2 and 3 of ACHPR.
47 Article 19 ACHPR; ACHPR Report (n 7 above) 35 – 36.
48 ACHPR Report (n 7 above) 95 – 97.
49 ACHPR Report (n 7 above) 107. For a definition of indigenous peoples see 86 – 104.
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implementing the rights of indigenous peoples under international law will
generate conflicts as it risks being seen as preferential treatment. Rwanda,
for example, explained to the AHCPR during the examination of its state
report in November 2007, that, because of the genocide of 1994, the
government could not integrate the concept of indigenous peoples, and
claimed that every Rwandan was equal, there were no indigenous peoples
in Rwanda, and therefore the legal concept of indigenous peoples and its
different protections did not apply to the country.51 
However, as stated by the ACHPR, reactions such as that of the
Rwandan government reveal a misunderstanding of the status of
indigenous peoples. According to the Commission:
One of the misconceptions regarding indigenous peoples is that to advocate
for the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples would be to give special
rights to some ethnic groups over and above the rights of all other groups
within a state. This is not the case. The issue is not special rights. As explained
above, the issue is that certain marginalised groups are discriminated [against]
in particular ways because of their particular culture, mode of production and
marginalised position within the state. This is a form of discrimination which
other groups within the state do not suffer from. It is legitimate for these
marginalised groups to call for protection of their rights in order to alleviate
this particular form of discrimination.52
The Commission further explains a related misconception: ‘talking about
indigenous right will lead to tribalism and ethnic conflicts’, and responds
that human rights promote multiculturalism and diversity, while the
conception of unity and assimilation that causes conflicts.53 African
countries should not, therefore, fear that accepting the concept of
indigenous peoples will cause conflicts in the country and divide their
peoples. 
3.3 Conservation practices and customary use of land and 
natural resources
Relevant norms on indigenous land rights can also be found in instruments
pertaining to environmental conservation. The Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) of 1992 was ratified by many African states, and its
preamble recognises
50 See for example the constitution of Cameroon and of Uganda.
51 There are no official transcripts of the oral response delivered in public session during
the ACHPR meeting in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, in November 2007. However,
unofficial notes taken by the International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs can
be found at http://www.gitpa.org/Peuple%20GITPA%20500/GITPA%20500-6.htm
52 ACHPR Indigenous Peoples in Africa: the Forgotten Peoples? (2006) 11 - 12.
53 ACHPR Report (n 7 above) 88.
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communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources, and the
desirability of sharing equitably benefits arising from the use of traditional
knowledge, innovations and practices relevant to the conservation of
biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components.54 
The respect and preservation of traditional knowledge relevant for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity is also promoted
and protected.55 The CBD further provides that states should ‘protect and
encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with
traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or
sustainable use requirements.’56 This includes indigenous agriculture,
agro-forestry, hunting, fishing, gathering, use of medicinal plants, and
other subsistence activities. This article, by implication, should also be
read to include protection for the land base, ecosystem and environment in
which those resources are found, as acknowledged in the Addis Ababa
Principles and Guidelines on Sustainable Use of Biodiversity of 2004.57 
In addition, in 2000, states party to the CBD adopted guidelines for the
conduct of cultural, environmental and social impact assessments to help
develop a collaborative framework within which governments, indigenous
and local communities, decision makers and managers of developments
can act. It also gives advice on the incorporation of cultural,
environmental – including biodiversity-related – and social considerations
of indigenous and local communities into new or existing impact-
assessment procedures.58
The African Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, in
its revised version adopted in 2003,59 provides that states should take
measures ‘to ensure that traditional rights and intellectual property rights
of local communities including farmers’ rights are respected’.60 The
Convention further recognises that access to indigenous knowledge
requires prior and informed consent from communities.61 This
Convention revises the 1968 version, which did not integrate specific
54 The CBD entered into force in 1993.
55 Article 8(j) of CBD.
56 Article 10(c) CBD.
57 Adopted by the VIIth Conference of Parties to the CBD, especially in Principles 1 and
2. Principle 2 provides that ‘sustainability is generally enhanced if Governments
recognise and respect the “rights” or “stewardship” authority, responsibility and
accountability to the people who use and manage the resource, which may include
indigenous and local communities ...’. The first principle of the ‘Ecosystem Approach’,
adopted by the COP in Decision V/6 and considered to be one of the main tools for the
implementation of the Convention, states that ‘Different sectors of society view
ecosystems in terms of their own economic, cultural and societal needs. Indigenous
peoples and other local communities living on the land are important stakeholders and
their rights and interests should be recognised.’
58 Secretariat of the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines (2004). 
59 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (2003).
60 Article XVII(1) of African Convention (n 58 above).
61 Article XVII(2) of African Convention (n 58 above).
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protection of soil, flora, fauna and other natural resources. The revised
Convention is not yet in force, as only eight states have so far ratified it
since its adoption.62 The Convention has potential for indigenous land
rights if its provisions are interpreted in conjunction with other relevant
international and regional standards, first and foremost, the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the work of the African
Commission’s working group on indigenous populations/communities. 
Another useful guideline in the context of conservation and land rights
is the African Model Legislation for the Protection of the Rights of Local
Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological
Resources, developed in 2000 by the OAU, and designed to provide
guidelines for access and benefit-sharing regimes with respect to
biodiversity.63 In 2004, more than half of African countries had taken steps
to adopt legislation based on the model law.64 The model legislation
promotes and supports traditional and indigenous technologies for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological resources, guides states into
recognising local and indigenous communities’ collective rights to their
biological resources, and includes an obligation to obtain prior and
informed consent of indigenous and local communities to access
resources.65 
3.4 Participation and consent
The principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is possibly the
most dramatic example of the paradigm shift since the international
colonial era to the modern conception of international human rights law.
In contemporary international law, indigenous peoples’ have the right to
participate in decision-making and to give or withhold their consent to
activities affecting their traditional lands, territories and resources.
International human rights law places clear and substantial obligations on
states in connection with resource exploitation on indigenous lands and
territories. Several decisions of intergovernmental human rights bodies
have established the rights of indigenous peoples to free prior and informed
consent, founded upon an understanding of the full range of issues.66
62 According to article XXXVIII fifteen ratifications are required for its entry into force. 
63 OAU (2000), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/measures/abs/msr-abs-oau-en.pdf.
64 N Zerbe ‘Biodiversity, ownership and indigenous knowledge’ (2005) 54 Ecological
Economics 493 – 506.
65 OAU (n 62 above) article 18.
See, inter alia, UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation XXIII (51) Concerning Indigenous Peoples (1997); UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 7 (1997); Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies
(2001) 49 – 54, paragraph 18; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Day of General
Discussion on the Rights of Indigenous Children: Recommendations (2003) para 4;
66
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CBD requires that the traditional knowledge of indigenous and local
communities may be used only with their ‘approval’.68 The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has developed
considerable jurisprudence on FPIC.69 The African Commission also used
this principle in the case of the Ogoni people of Nigeria considering the
impact of oil exploration on them through an analysis of both the
economic and social rights and the collective rights in the Charter.70  The
Government of Nigeria was part of a consortium involved in oil
production in Ogoniland, part of the oil-rich Niger delta region. Local
Ogoni communities were not involved in the decisions affecting
development of their region, and production activities were carried out
without regard for their health or environment. A number of oil spills
contaminated the water and soil, causing short- and long-term health
consequences for the Ogoni people, due in part to the lack of proper safety
measures. When the Ogoni people protested, state military forces carried
out violent and often lethal attacks against them. The Commission found
a violation of the right of peoples to a general satisfactory environment,71
linking it with a violation of the individual’s right to health.72 Moreover,
the Commission found a violation of the right of peoples freely to dispose
of their wealth and natural resources,73 since the government failed to
involve Ogoni communities in the decision-making regarding oil
exploration.74 In the Endorois case, the ACHPR also expressed the view
that, in any development or investment project, the state had a duty to seek
the free prior and informed consent of indigenous communities, which had
not been respected by the Government of Kenya.75
3.5 The right to reparation
According to international legal principles and standards, indigenous
peoples have a right to reparation for the human rights violations they have
experienced, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
66 Organisation of American States, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador
(1997) 89; Report No 96/03, Maya Indigenous Communities and their Members Case 12.053
(2003) para 149.
67 Articles 10, 11(2), 19, 28 and 32 of UNDRIP (2007).
68 Report of the Second Meeting of the Ad Hoc, Open-Ended, Inter-Sessional Working
Group on article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the CBD (2001) 11.
69 See, inter alia, IACHR Report No 27/98 (Nicaragua), para 142; Report No 96/03, Maya
Indigenous Communities and their Members Case 12.053 (2003) para 141.
70 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights
(SERAC) v Nigeria, Communication 155/96 (2001 – 2002).
71 Article 24 of African Charter.
72 Article 16 of African Charter.
73 Article 21 of African Charter.
74 SERAC (n 69 above) para 58.
75 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International (n
29 above), para 290 - 291.
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relieve the suffering of and afford justice to victims ‘by removing or
redressing to the extent possible the consequences of the wrongful acts and
by preventing and deterring violations’.77 One basic aspect of the right to
reparation is the availability of effective remedies.78
Theo van Boven, UN Special Rapporteur on the right to restitution,
compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human
rights, states in his landmark UN study on reparations that:
Restitution shall be provided to re-establish, to the extent possible, the
situation that existed for the victim prior to the violations of human rights.
Restitution requires, inter alia, restoration of liberty, citizenship or residence,
employment or property.79 
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights has consistently held that
‘Reparation of harm brought about by the violation of an international
obligation consists in full restitution (restitutio integrum), which includes the
restoration of the prior situation …’ and compensation or other forms of
indemnification for material and immaterial damages.80 The same
principle has been applied by UN bodies responsible for oversight of state
compliance with universal human rights and instruments, the ICJ, and the
European Court on Human Rights, pursuant to article 50 of the ECHR.
The general principle of restitution in human rights law also applies to
indigenous peoples. There is a difference in its application to indigenous
peoples, however, because indigenous people hold property rights
individually and collectively. As van Boven stated, a
coincidence of individual and collective aspects is particularly manifest with
regard to the rights of indigenous peoples. Against this background it is
therefore necessary that, in addition to individual means of reparation,
adequate provision be made to entitle groups of victims or victimised
communities to present collective claims for damages and to receive collective
reparation accordingly.81 
He adds that:
76 For a detailed treatment of remedies in human rights law, see D Shelton, Remedies in
international human rights law (1999).
77 T Boven, Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of
gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms (1993) 56.
78 In human rights law, the availability of effective remedies is a right in and of itself that
complements other recognised rights. See, inter alia, UDHR, article 8; ICCPR, article 2
(3); CERD, article 13; ECHR, article 13; American Convention on Human Rights,
articles 1, 8 and 25; ACHPR, article 7. 
79 Boven (n 77 above) 57.
80 n 77 above, 13.
81 n 77 above, 8 para 14.
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relating to natural resources and the protection of the environment. Existing
and emerging international law concerning the rights of indigenous peoples
lays special emphasis on the protection of these collective rights and stipulates
the entitlement of indigenous peoples to compensation in the case of damages
resulting from exploration and exploitation programmes pertaining to their
lands, and in case of relocation of indigenous peoples. The draft declaration
on the rights of indigenous peoples [article 27] recognises the right to the
restitution or, where this is not possible, to just and fair compensation for
lands and territories which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged
without their free and informed consent. Compensation shall preferably take
the form of lands and territories of quality, quantity and legal status at least
equal to those territories which were lost.82
Article 28 of the UNDRIP states that:
(1) Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include
restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation,
for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or
otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken,
occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.
(2) Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned,
compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in
quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other
appropriate redress.
In 1997 the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
also addressed this issue, and its General Recommendation XXIII called
upon States parties: 
to recognise and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop,
control and use their communal lands, territories and resources and, where
they have been deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned or
otherwise inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, to take
steps to return those lands and territories. Only when this is for factual
reasons not possible, the right to restitution should be substituted by the right
to just, fair and prompt compensation. Such compensation should as far as
possible take the form of lands and territories.83
In the case of indigenous peoples in Africa evicted for environmentally
protected areas, some might want to argue that restitution of ancestral
lands is impossible. This hypothesis has, however, been defeated in the
ACHPR Endorois decision, that the indigenous community rights of
ownership of an area gazetted as a Game Reserve be recognised and that
they should be granted unrestricted access to the said area.84
82 Boven (n 76 above) 9. 
83 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation
XXIII (51) concerning Indigenous Peoples (1997) para 5.
84 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International (n
29 above).
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collective rights of ownership and possession over the lands which they
traditionally occupy shall be recognised.85 The term ‘traditionally occupy’
does not require a continued and present occupation, but rather, according
to the ILO, ‘there should be some connection to the present’.86
Consequently, under ILO 169 – and ILO 107, which uses the same
language – indigenous peoples have the right to restitution and recognition
of their rights to lands ‘traditionally occupied’ that they have been expelled
from or that they have lost title to or possession of in the recent past,
including those incorporated into protected areas without their consent. In
the case of relocation, both consensual and non-consensual, ILO 16987
also contains specified remedies: the right to return to traditional lands
once the reason for relocation no longer pertains; allocation of lands of
equal quality and legal status, unless the people(s) concerned express a
preference for compensation; full compensation for any loss or injury
resulting from relocation.
4 Conclusion
As highlighted, international law has played a mixed role regarding land
rights in Africa. During the colonial era international law was an
important factor in initiating the dispossession of indigenous peoples. The
emergence of human rights law as a branch of international law marks an
important change of approach. Indigenous peoples’ rights to land and
natural resources are strongly affirmed and guaranteed by numerous inter-
related human rights decisions and instruments, which emerged from both
regional and international human rights mechanisms in recent years. The
wide ratification by African states of international and regional
instruments pertaining to indigenous peoples’ rights demonstrates a strong
commitment toward the protection and promotion of indigenous land
rights. However, the realisation of these rights through the implementation
of the relevant decisions and instruments remains challenging. While
international and regional bodies have created solid instruments and taken
pioneering decisions, few of the principles expounded have been
implemented in practice. Concrete measures are needed to translate the
standards into reality, including those of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination and the Convention on Biological Diversity.
States can show greater commitment by ratifying other recent international
and regional treaties engaging the rights of indigenous peoples, such as the
revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
85 Article 14 of ILO Convention 169.
86 International Labour Office, ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 1989: A
Manual (2000) 18.
87 ILO 169, article 16 (3 – 5).
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from international law should be seen as minimum standards of protection
for the rights of indigenous peoples, which no state legislation should fail
to integrate.
The recognition of the existence of indigenous peoples in Africa is
crucial to the realisation of the human rights guaranteed in international
and regional instruments. Confusion around the concept of indigenous
peoples has been recognised in documents of the Working Group on
Indigenous Peoples/Communities, and few African countries recognise
the existence of indigenous peoples on their territories.88 Recognition must
be the starting point, and then indigenous peoples should be given the
opportunity to reacquire their ancestral land and acquire legal property
rights on these lands. International law is unequivocal: it provides for
reallocation of ancestral land to indigenous peoples and, when this is
impossible, the allocation of alternative lands. The ongoing reforms on
land rights undertaken at the national level are opportunities for
government to take affirmative measures to tackle the specific problems
that indigenous peoples face. In some cases, reintegration on the ancestral
lands is possible and compatible with environmental conservation
objectives. In other cases, alternative land can be provided, in accordance
with international standards. Additionally, urgent measures to fight
extreme poverty and marginalisation can be taken while reforms are being
implemented. 
Contemporary human rights law is also clear about participatory
requirements in relation to decisions affecting indigenous peoples’ right to
land, which must be validated through their free, prior and informed
consent. Displacements and eviction of indigenous peoples have happened
without them being consulted and involved in the decision. Still landless,
indigenous peoples continue to be marginalised from decisions concerning
land. Viable and fair solutions will only emerge from consultations with
indigenous communities and their involvement in decision-making
processes.
88 The report of the working group: Advisory Opinion of the ACHPR Concerning the UNDRIP,
adopted at the 40th Ordinary session of ACHPR, in May 2007, Accra, Ghana.
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R INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
ANCESTRAL LANDS:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE
BAKWERI CASE IN CAMEROON
Ambe J Njoh
1 Introduction 
Conflicting claims of entitlement to land in Cameroon exist at two levels.
The first level involves conflicts between the state and society, while the
second involves conflicts between indigenous groups and strangers.1 These
conflicts and the tensions they engender have historically been heightened
in Fako Division, particularly the region occupied by the Bakweri,2 which
is home to Mount Cameroon, one of Africa’s three highest peaks.3 Thanks
to soil from this volcanically active mountain, the region boasts the best
land for agriculture in the nation. German colonial authorities recognised
the region’s agricultural potential early in their brief colonial tenure, and
hastened to expropriate large tracts of land for plantation agriculture. The
concomitant need for labour resulted in an influx of ‘strangers’ to the
region, a land shortage for habitation, cultivation and other needs of the
Bakweri people.4 The land shortage and the persistent refusal on the part
of successive governments in Cameroon to recognise this people’s
entitlement to land constitute in essence the Bakweri land problem. 
This chapter discusses how the problem has evolved since the German
colonial era. It briefly describes the Bakweri and their traditional land
tenure system, then reviews the colonial era in Cameroon as a source of the
Bakweri land problem. Next, it identifies and discusses major relevant
1 The term ‘strangers’ connotes people living in areas to where they do not trace their
ancestry. Conversely, the term ‘indigenous groups’ encompasses people living in areas
of their ancestry. 
2 This region lies on the southwestern slopes and foot of Mount Cameroon bordering on
the Atlantic Ocean. The term ‘Bakweri’ in its plural form refers to the indigenous
people of this region. 
3 The two other high peaks are Kilimanjaro in East Africa and the Atlas Mountains in
North-west Africa. 
4 This problem was brought to the attention of the German colonial authorities at an
early date. See CK Meek, Land tenure and administration in Nigeria and the Cameroons
(1957) 404.69
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drawing from the case of the Bakweri Land Claims Committee (BLCC),
the accredited agent of the Bakweri, against the Government of
Cameroon, which was heard by the African Commission of Human and
People’s Rights (ACHPR) in Banjul, Gambia in 2002. The chapter ends
with some concluding remarks. 
As with other cases of conflicting state-society claims of entitlements
to land involving indigenous minorities, such as the Mabo v Queensland5
case in Australia, the Guerin v The Queen6 and the Ogoni people of Nigeria’s
Delta region case against the Government of Nigeria,7 the Bakweri case
has implications that transcend the socio-economic and politico-
administrative frontiers of Cameroon.8 
2 The Bakweri in brief
The Bakweri are said to have migrated to their present locale on the slopes
and foot of Mount Cameroon from an area east of the mountain in the
mid-18th century. By the time the Germans arrived Cameroon in the late-
1800s, the Bakweri were already completely but sparsely settled in the
region around the mountain, stretching from its south-western slopes to
the creeks by the Atlantic Ocean. The Bakweri population has always been
relatively small in comparison to other indigenous Cameroonian groups,
and is thinly spread and organised in small clusters over their ancestral
lands. At independence, the Bakweri were estimated to be at most 16,000.9
As a polity, the Bakweri were largely fragmentary and acephalous. Thus,
unlike some of their hinterland counterparts, pre-colonial Bakweri society
was neither centralised nor possessed powerful paramount chiefs.10
Presently, the Bakweri are grouped into sixty-three villages, each headed
by an autonomous and independent chief.11
5 Mabo and Others v Queensland (1992) 2 HCA 23; Mabo and Others v Queensland (1992) 175
CLR 1.
6 Guerin v the Queen (1984) 2 S.C.R. 335.
7 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights
(SERAC) v Nigeria, Communication 155/96 (2001 – 2002).
8 MA Stephenson & SR Stephenson Mabo: A judicial revolution (1993) MM Slaughter
‘American indian tribes: Not as belonging to but as existing within’ (2000); S Motha &
C Perrin ‘Deposing sovereignty after Mabo: Special issue’ (2002) 13(3) Law and Critique
63 - 83.
9 C Fisiy & P Geshier ‘The Bakweri: Nyongo witchcraft and the “Banana Boom”’ trans
D Tande http://www.bakweri.org/files/Bakweri_Nyongo_Witchcraft.pdf (accessed 30
May 2010).
10 It is erroneous to believe that all hinterland polities, particularly those of the country’s
grassfield region are centralised. As anthropologists with research experience in
Cameroon have noted, some grassfield polities, such as Meta of the North-West
Region, are acephalous. See R Dillon Ranking and resistance: A precolonial Cameroonian
polity in regional perspective (1990).
11 See Communication 260/2002, BLCC v Cameroon, reply presented by the Government
of Cameroon on the exhaustion of remedies (2003) 6. 
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observed a land tenure system centred on the communal control of land.
Members of this society used land in the built-up areas mainly for
residential building, food crop cultivation, and the raring of animals. The
rest of the land served as hunting grounds and the source of medicinal
products such as tree barks, roots and leaves. The pre-colonial Bakweri
used rivers and other bodies of water on their ancestral lands for
hydrotherapeutic and other rituals designed to positively affect their
physical, mental and spiritual health. These bodies of water also served,
and continue to serve, as a food source, with fishing the vocation of choice
for many Bakweri. 
In pre-colonial Bakweri society, communities comprising mainly
extended families (as opposed to individuals) controlled land. Such control
as was commonplace throughout most of Africa before the European
conquest did not imply ownership of any sort. Consequently, it was never
permissible for individuals to alienate or transfer land as custom allowed
for no more than the privilege to use land. Land therefore had use, as
opposed to economic, value in this society, was never viewed as a
commodity and therefore could not be sold.12 All living members of pre-
colonial Bakweri society viewed themselves as custodians and not
proprietors of the land bequeathed from earlier generations: the living had
the responsibility of guarding and protecting land for the unborn.  
3 Colonialism and the emergence of the Bakweri 
land problem
The formal annexation of Cameroon by the Germans came with the
signing of a treaty between the German government representative,
Nachtigal, and the native chiefs in 1884. By this time, German commercial
interests in Cameroon, or what they called Kamerun, had expanded to
encompass plantation agriculture, and the German imperial government
had been quick to recognise the agricultural potential of the Mount
Cameroon region. Accordingly, the government embarked on well
orchestrated efforts to amass vast parcels of land in the region for
plantation agriculture. Initially, these efforts included the active support of
private German farmers to acquire agricultural land in the territory, and
later the direct involvement of German imperial authorities in the land
appropriation process. 
Evidence suggests that both private German farmers and the German
imperial government employed questionable means to acquire land in
12 Over the years, and especially as a result of continuous contact with Europeans, this
situation has changed. The most remarkable change has had to do with the practice of
alienating and selling land, which has been adopted and recognised by the Bakweri. 
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been present in the region since 1883, and acting on behalf of German
capitalist interest, coaxed, tricked, and deceived local chiefs into making
wholesale transfers of vast parcels of communal land to private German
farmers.13 On its part, the German imperial government gave explicit
orders to its representatives on the ground in the territory to employ every
means necessary to convert as much land as possible into German Crown
property. A letter dated 6 May 1884 from Adolph Woermann14 to this
effect instructed colonial authorities in the territory thus: ‘By all means get
the cession of very extensive land as private property – especially those
suitable for plantations.’15 From instructions such as this, it is clear that
German imperial authorities were bent on forcibly expropriating lands
from indigenous groups without any meaningful compensation. 
By the end of the First World War, when Germany relinquished
control of the territory, some 264,000 acres in the area around Mount
Cameroon were in the hands of German private companies and
individuals, mainly in the form of freehold estates under German Crown
Grant.16 Following the conclusion of World War I, Proclamation No 25
of 1920 conferred public custodianship of these estates upon the colonial
government of Nigeria. Although this was meant as a temporary measure
while awaiting a final decision to properly dispose of the estates, no efforts
were ever made to seek the input of the natives. The importance of this
point will become obvious when we turn our attention to the grievances of
the Bakweri. 
Efforts to dispose of the estates culminated in a public auction in
London in October 1922, intended to sell the estates and apply the
proceeds towards the war reparations payable by the vanquished
(Germany) to the victors (the Allied Powers). One condition of the auction
was that ex-enemy nationals could not bid, but hardly any estates sold.
Meek, the foremost authority on land tenure in colonial Africa at the time
attributed the failure to the ambiguous and perhaps dubious nature of the
titles to the estates.17 It is also possible that the nature of the League of
Nations’ Mandate that transformed the Cameroonian territory into a Trust
Territory raised questions about the status of the estates. 
13 E Arderner Kingdom on Mount Cameroon: Studies in the history of Cameroon coast, 1500-
1970 (1996) 151 - 155; A Njoh ‘Continuity and change in Cameroonian land policy’
(2000) 15 Planning Perspectives 241 - 265.
14 Adolph Woermann (1847 – 1910) was a German merchant active in trade in West
Africa and influential in Germany’s territorial acquisition ventures in the region during
the years leading up to the formal annexation of Cameroon in 1884. 
15 C Fisiy Power and privilege in the administration of law: Land law reforms and social
differentiation in Cameroon (1992) 27 Leiden: African Studies Centre; AJ Njoh, Planning
in contemporary Africa: The state, town planning and society in Cameroon (2003) 76. 
16  Meek (n 4 above).
17  Meek (n 4 above) 355. 
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enemy nationals, was held in November 1924, and yielded better results,
with most estates being purchased by their former owners. While the
Cameroonian territory was under the control of Allied Powers, private
German farmers either as individuals or companies maintained control of
the estates until the Second World War. 
When the war ended in 1945, the colonial government of Nigeria
adopted a new stance toward the estates, deciding to purchase and
administer the estates for the common good of the African inhabitants of
the territory. In 1946 the colonial Nigerian legislature enacted two
ordinances, Ordinance No 38 and 39. The first of these empowered the
Governor of colonial Nigeria and Southern Cameroons to acquire and
employ the ex-enemy lands, as he sees fit for the purpose of promoting the
common good of the indigenous inhabitants of the territory.18 The second
established the Cameroons Development Corporation (CDC) as a
statutory body to assume control and exploit the ex-enemy lands, to
operate on a commercial basis and devote the surplus profits for the benefit
of the natives. By 1950, a decade before the formal termination of the
colonial era in Cameroon, the CDC had assumed control over 395 square
miles of land previously classified as ex-enemy estates, which were granted
to the corporation for a period of 60 years, with the possibility of renewal
for a further 60-year period. Entitlement to the corporation and its
possessions was claimed by the post-colonial Cameroonian Government,
yet the terms of the Mandate Territory Agreement of the League of
Nations, and the subsequent 1946 Directives of the UN General Assembly,
raise serious questions regarding about the constitutionality of the
situation. In its Annual Report of 1946, the colonial government of Nigeria
stated that the estates in question were held for the indigenous people until
such time as they can assume control on their own. The fact that successive
governments in Cameroon since the colonial era have deviated from this is
a critical element in the Bakweri land problem.
4 The state, land laws and the Bakweri land 
problem
Successive governments in Cameroon have reinforced the state’s power
over land, typically in legislation masquerading as land reform initiatives.
A number of these legislative actions are especially relevant to this chapter.
The first is the German colonial government policy establishing ‘native
reservations’, to which the Bakweri farming communities were confined.
This policy, dating from the first tenure of Governor von Puttkamer, was
designed to free large tracts of Bakweri ancestral lands for private
18 These are the lands that had been vacated by German plantation farmers. 
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this policy entailed assigning each native an area of no more than 1.5
hectares for habitation and cultivation purposes, and the policy also
required that dispersed settlements be consolidated into villages, with
surveyed and numbered buildings and plots.20 
For the fishing communities of Tiko, the German colonial government
enacted a scheme to convert all lands that were not ‘needed’ by the natives
into property of the Crown in 1911.21 This dubious scheme arbitrarily
determined that each native adult male (not females) should receive six
hectares of land for habitation and cultivation, so that some 300 hectares
of land were set aside and distributed, since the colonial government’s
census of 1908 recorded 50 adult males. 
The decision to convert Bakweri ancestral lands in the Tiko area into
property of the state was one of the last policy initiatives by German
colonial authorities before the First World War, after which France and
Britain assumed control of the territory as trustees of the League of
Nations, the forerunner to the UN. In principle, France and Britain
operated under the watchful eyes of the League of Nations, and could
therefore not forcibly expropriate or convert native lands into property of
the state. An important provision of the League of Nation’s Trust
Agreement exhorted the administering authorities to ensure the
preservation and protection of all native laws and customs, especially
relating to land. Article 8 of the Agreements approved by the UN General
Assembly on 13 December 1946 and 1 November 1947 stipulated thus: 
In framing the laws relating to the holding or transfer of land and natural
resources, the Administrative Authority shall take into consideration native
laws and customs, and shall respect the rights and safeguard the interests,
both present and future, of the native population. No native land or natural
resources may be transferred, except between natives, save with the consent of
the competent public authority.22 
In practice, the designated trustees of the territory (France and Britain)
spared no opportunity to replicate the efforts of their imperial predecessors,
Germany. On paper, the trustees appeared to be attentive to the
stipulations of the UN Mandate Agreements. France established two
parallel systems of land laws in her portion of the territory.23 One of these
systems, namely l’indigènat, was designed for lands of the natives or les
indigènes, which comprised the unassimilated members of the indigenous
19 Njoh (n 4 above) 78. 
20 Njoh (n 11 above). 
21 AJ Njoh ‘Development implications of colonial land and human settlement policies in
Cameroon’ (2002) 26 Habitat International 399 - 415.
22 As quoted in Meek (n 4 above) 370. Also see Njoh (n 11 above) 79; Fisiy (n 13 above)
30. 
23 Njoh (n 11 above) 80 - 81.
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essence, the transfer of a policy that had been in force in French West
Africa since 1917 to Cameroun. The other system was designed to govern
European residents and assimilated members of the indigenous population
(ie, les assimilés or les evolués). Although the first of these systems appeared
to be sensitive to native customs and traditional land tenure practices, it
functioned just like the second one, which was simply a replica of land
ordinances in force in France at the time. French land laws in Cameroon,
like those of their German predecessors, sought to convert as much land as
possible into property of the state. A French decree of 1938 declared as
property of the colonial state all land left unused or unoccupied for a period
of ten years (ie terres vacantes et sans maître).24 
British colonial authorities were also bent on endowing the state with
as much land as possible, although on the surface the most attentive of all
the colonial authorities to customary practice. Support for this assertion
can be found in the decision of the British imperial government to adopt in
Southern Cameroons the land laws of colonial Northern Nigeria rather
than those of colonial Eastern Nigeria. This decision hinged on the fact
that whereas the land laws of Northern Nigeria accorded due regard to
native customary land tenure practices, those of the Eastern Province of
Nigeria, of which Southern Cameroons was administratively a part, did
not. The Land and Native Rights Ordinance (No 9 of 1910) of colonial
Northern Nigeria traces its roots to a Report of 1908 that was the
brainchild of a committee comprised mainly of officials of two major
British colonies, Nigeria and India. British colonial authorities considered
the Ordinance such a success that they transferred it to Tanganyika and
British Southern Cameroons, where the Ordinance was adopted verbatim
in 1925.25 The preamble to this Ordinance is immediately followed by a
statement to the effect that all lands of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria
and the Cameroons ‘whether occupied or unoccupied’ shall be considered
‘native lands,’26 but Section 4 stipulates that ‘all native lands and all rights
over same are hereby declared to be under the control and subject to the
disposition of the Governor.’27
Efforts on the part of the government to aggrandise the powers of the
state, and reduce those of other societal entities, in the land domain did not
end with the demise of colonialism in Cameroon, but were accelerated by
the post-colonial authorities, who have proven to be the most oblivious to
the Bakweri land problem. These authorities have pursued initiatives that
have done more to supplant customary land laws with Euro-centric
24 Njoh (n 11 above) 82; Fisiy (n 13 above) 35.
25 Meek (n 4 above) 371; Njoh (n. 11 above) 86.
26 Njoh (n 11 above) 86; Meek (n 4 above) 371.
27 Njoh (n 11 above) 87; Meek (n 4 above) 371.
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Four major initiatives on the part of the indigenous leadership are worth
noting in this connection. Decree No 63-2 of 9 January 1963 effectively
reversed the 1959 colonial law that re-established the supremacy of
customary entitlements to land. Secondly, the state ignored all claims to
land backed by other than formal or modern instruments, with officials
rejecting more substantive terms such as 'owners' and 'landlords' in favour
of lesser terms such as 'holders' and ‘occupants’ for members of the
indigenous population in relation to ancestral lands. 
The third has to do with rejuvenating relevant provisions of pre-
independence laws that were specifically aimed at increasing the colonial
state's inventory of land and/or dispossessing the indigenous population of
same. To accomplish this objective, the indigenous leadership drew
inspiration from two colonial acts, namely the German Crown Lands Act
of 15 July 1896 and the Act of 12 January 1938 that was introduced in
Cameroun under French Mandate. Recall that both Acts converted so-
called vacant and unoccupied lands into property of the colonial state. As
demonstrated by the land law of 1974, post-colonial authorities inherited
and adhered to the letter and spirit of the land legislation blueprint of their
colonial predecessors. 
Fourth, major amendments to the 1974 law were effectuated two years
later in 1976, the groundwork being in Law No 73-3 of 9 July 1973. This
law authorised the Head of State to establish rules governing land tenure
in the country. With the powers conferred upon him by this law, President
Ahidjo enacted a major land ordinance on July 6, 1974. Part I, section 1
(2) of the Ordinance makes the State the guardian of all lands throughout
the country: 
The State shall be the guardian of all lands. It may in this capacity intervene
to ensure rational use of land or in the imperative interest of defence or the
economic policies of the nation.29 
Part III, of the Ordinance declares national lands to include:
(a) Lands that are free of any effective occupation;
(b) Lands confiscated from private parties for committing any of a number of
infringements including failure to convert informal instruments or deeds of
land rights into land certificates; and
(c) All parcels of land, which do not fall into the category of public or private
property of state and other public bodies.
28 Fisiy (n 13 above). AJ Njoh ‘The political economy of urban land reforms in a post-
colonial economy’ International Journal of Urban & Regional Research (1998) 22. Republic
of Cameroon Land tenure and state lands (unknown).
29 Republic of Cameroon (n 28 above).
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duplicated by post-colonial authorities in Cameroon is the requirement
that all interests in land be registered in the National Lands Registry,
continuing the Grundbuch of the German colonial era. The post-colonial
authorities went further in efforts to ‘modernise’ the land tenure system, by
making registration of land titles in the Registry a pre-condition for
claiming entitlement to any parcel of land in the country. The Ordinance
No 77-1 of 10 January 1977, gave all urban land owners until 6 July 1984
(rural owners until 6 July 1989) to convert all land deeds or certificates of
occupancy into land certificates duly registered in the National Land
Registry, at risk of forfeiting their rights. Thus, urban and rural land
owners had 10 and 15 years respectively from the date of publication of
Land Ordinance No 1 of 6 July 1974 to formalise their land claims. 
5  Important features of the Bakweri land problem
The Bakweri land problem possesses both tangible and intangible
dimensions. The notion of intangibility captures attributes of the African
ethos that places inordinate premium on a people’s ancestral lands, as the
venue where a people’s souls must re-unite once their sojourn on earth is
concluded. Such attributes are deemed intangible, not because they are any
less important, but because they are neither visible nor easily appreciated
by non-Africans. The architects of the Trusteeship Agreement of 1946
recognised this intangible attribute of land, and administering authorities
in UN Trust Territories were exhorted to respect the traditions and
customs of the natives relating to land. 
The tangible dimensions include land shortages and the social and
political upheavals they may generate. Three major factors are at the root
of the problem of land shortage among the Bakweris: the fact that a
substantial portion of the terrain around Mount Cameroon is neither
habitable nor cultivable, government policies, and incessant pressures
from members of non-indigenous populations. The first of these problems
is rooted in the nature of the terrain of the region, which is dominated by
the volcanically active Mount Cameroon, one of the highest peaks in
Africa, the unmanageable slopes of the mountain and the swamps marking
the outer reaches of the Atlantic Ocean. 
Pressure from members of hinterland groups as a cause of land
shortage among the Bakweri is rooted in pro-plantation colonial
government policies that created the need for workers from these groups,
and led to the alienation of significant tracts of land to non-natives. As far
back as the early-1900s, the influx of ‘strangers’ in Victoria Division
(present-day Fako Division) had already attracted the attention of not only
the Bakweri but also the German colonial authorities. Members of the
indigenous population, particularly those located on the slopes of Mount
Cameroon, drew the attention of the German colonial authorities to this
78    Chapter 4problem during the first decade of the 1900s.30 In a rare attempt to address
the land-related grievances of the Bakweri, the German colonial
government in 1908 decided to considerably increase the size of the areas
that they had designated as ‘reservats’ or ‘native reservations’, and to which
the Bakweri had been confined. The severity of the land shortage problem
grew over the years. This compelled the British colonial government of
Nigeria to take steps aimed at addressing the situation, through the 1931
decision to purchase and place at the disposal of members of the
indigenous Bakweri population 5,089 acres of land at the cost of £6,871 in
Victoria Division.31 As indicated in a 1932 Colonial Government Report,
this and similar purchases of the ill-gotten lands were meant to settle the
land-related concerns of the natives, but the colonial government efforts
did not succeed in making a dent on the problem, let alone resolving it.32
The potential for such problems was long appreciated by the Bakweri.
Recognition of the need to resist government policies led to the creation of
the Bakweri Lands Committee (later the Bakweri Land Claims
Committee, or BLCC) in 1946. Created as a reaction to the establishment
of the CDC, this committee was initially placed ‘in charge of all the land
in Victoria Division,’ and defended Bakweri land rights through many
petitions to the British colonial government of Nigeria and the UN
Trusteeship Council.33 In a letter dated 24 August 1946 to the Governor
of colonial Nigeria, the BLCC requested the UN Trusteeship Council to
return to the Bakweri 580 square miles of land illegally expropriated by the
German colonial government.34 The Trusteeship Council invited the
BLCC to appear in 1947, but the committee lacked the funds to do so. The
BLCC’s charges show the roots and magnitude of land shortage facing the
Bakweri: the BLCC alleged that colonial authorities had sold or leased
plantations, or converted into Crown lands, the most fertile and usable
areas of Bakweri ancestral lands, leaving the community with swamps,
rocky and barren mountain slopes. At its Sixth Meeting in March 1950, the
UN Trusteeship Council voted to declare that a total of 250,000 acres of
formerly alienated lands be reinstated as ‘native lands’.35 This declaration
was the last major official action on the Bakweri land issue before the
Southern Cameroons became independent as part of the Republic of
30 Meek (n 4 above) 404.
31 Meek (n 4 above) 405.
32 Meek (n 4 above) 406. 
33 According to the BLCC, it represented the entire Bakweri people, including the sub-
tribes of Bota and Bimbia of the Victoria Division of the Cameroons under British
Mandate.
34 Njoh (n 11 above), Africa ‘Petition of the Bakweri Land Committee, Cameroons under
British Mandate’ Africa (1948) Journal of the Royal African Society 18.
35 Reinstating the lands as ‘native lands’ meant that the land became effectively part of the
inventory of lands under the control of the Cameroons Development Corporation
(CDC).
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and political independence for Cameroon served to complicate, rather
than simplify, the Bakweri land problem. The post-colonial government of
Cameroon adopted almost verbatim the land policy of its colonial
predecessors.37 
The BLCC was unable to continue mounting pressure under the
political climate of the unitary party state that emerged in the post-colonial
Cameroon, which not only ignored but undertook initiatives that
significantly aggravated the problem. One such initiative was Decree No
94/125 of 14 July 1994, to privatise the CDC along with the ancestral
Bakweri lands upon which its plantations stand. This action, which came
at a time that the country was enjoying a climate of political liberalisation,
induced a revival of the BLCC. In August 1994 it addressed a
memorandum to the Head of State, declaring that the Bakweri can only
endorse a plan to privatise the CDC that commits the corporation to pay
ground rents to the Bakweri.38 This same point was reiterated in another
memorandum of 3 March 1999, signed by HRM Billa F. Manga Williams,
Paramount Ruler of the Victoria Coastal District Traditional Authority;
HRM Chief Philip Mofema Ewusi, Chairman of the Bakweri Land Claims
Committee, and co-signed by 300 chiefs and notables of Bakweri
extraction.39 
Attempting to unilaterally privatise the CDC is only one of many
instances in which the government of Cameroon has sought to treat the
CDC and its assets as property of the Cameroonian state. Another instance
involves the sale of 38 hectares of CDC land in the Isongo, Idenau area in
Limbe (formerly Victoria) to a private entity, Cam-Mal Timber Industries
Ltd., Douala. The sale is attested to by Land Certificate No 01754 of 30
September 1997.40 Also, the Minister of Lands has recently announced the
procedure that anyone, Bakweri or not, can follow to acquire a parcel or
more of CDC land as freehold property. The Secretary-General of the
BLCC, Mola Njoh Litumbe, charges that such attempts on the part of the
Cameroonian government to bestow upon any entity title over CDC land
36 Cameroon under French Mandate gained independence in 1960, and the following
year the British Mandate Territory of Southern Cameroons decided through a plebiscite
to re-unite with French Cameroun to become the Federal Republic of Cameroon. In
1972, the Federal Government structure was replaced with a unitary government
structure known as the United Republic of Cameroon. In 1982 the country became
simply the Republic of Cameroon.
37 Njoh (n 11 above); Njoh (n 13 above). 
38 D Tande ‘A brief history of the Bakweri land problem’ http://www.blccarchives.org
(accessed 30 May 2010).
39 Memorandum from BLCC to H.E. President Paul Biya Concerning the Privatisation of
the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). 3 March 1999. http://
www.blccarchives.org (accessed 30 May 2010).
40 N Litumbe ‘Illegitimate pretence of Cameroon government’ The Sun (2007) http://the-
news-from-cameroon.com/article.php?category_id=1&article_id=177 (accessed 2
February 2010).
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violation of the human rights of Bakweri.41
The government of Cameroon has continued with its objective of
privatising CDC, despite the BLCC’s memoranda requesting involvement
of the Bakweri in any decisions on CDC assets, which are comprised
largely of estates on ancestral Bakweri lands. As one analyst has observed,
the Cameroonian government has opted to silence all dissenting voices
through intimidation and persecution especially of BLCC members.42 In
addition, the government has employed a ‘divide-and-conquer strategy’
that has resulted in pitting one group of Bakweri, the pro-BLCC camp,
against another, the pro-government camp. Prominent among those
constituting the latter camp are the Paramount Chief of Buea Town, His
Royal Majesty (HRM) SML Endeley and a notable local lawyer, Gordon
Mwambo Ngu. These two personalities appeared on the Government side
in the case against the Government of Cameroon filed by the BLCC at the
African Human and People’s Rights Commission in Banjul. 
The government has never had any dialogue with the BLCC or the
Bakweri people it represents in this matter. On its part, the Bakweri Lands
Committee (BLCC) has responded on two major fronts. The first of this
entails the launching of an international campaign designed to draw
attention to the plight of the Bakweri land problem. No effort has been
spared to highlight the Bakweri as an indigenous minority group whose
human rights have been grossly and wantonly violated by its own
government. To succeed along these lines, the BLCC has made maximal
use of state-of-the-art communication technology, including the internet,
to contact entities with real or potential roles in efforts to privatise the
CDC.43
Secondly, the BLCC, filed a complaint against the Government of
Cameroon with the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights
in Banjul under articles 55, 56 and 58 of the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights.44 The Complaint, which was filed in September 2002,
charged that the Government of Cameroon grossly violated the land rights
of the indigenous people of the country’s administrative division known as
Fako. The remainder of this chapter analyses the BLCC case against the
41 Litumbe (n 40 above).
42 Tande (n 38 above) 3. 
43 An open letter dated 12 October 2000 was addressed to ‘All prospective buyers of CDC
Plantations’. A second letter dated 23 August 2001, was addressed to Mr Hampo
Ghazurossian of Price Waterhouse Coopers. A third letter was addressed to Mr
Marwan Ahmed Hayel Saeed, General Manager of Pacific Inter-Link SDN BHD.
These letters sought to put the concerned companies on notice that they (BLCC)
planned to seek legal redress against them if they persisted in dispossessing the Bakweri
of their ancestral lands.
44 These articles stipulate the procedures and conditions governing how petitions may be
submitted to the ACHPR and how the ACHPR must proceed in dealing with these
petitions.
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implications of the Bakweri land problem. 
6 Human rights dimensions of the problem
The human rights dimensions of the Bakweri land problem have been
eruditely articulated by Ndiva Kofele-Kale, counsel to the BLCC in its case
against the Government of Cameroon on behalf of the Bakweri. The
BLCC charges that by forcibly expropriating Bakweri ancestral lands, and
by privatising the CDC, which owns the plantations occupying these
lands, the Government has violated the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of Bakweri people.45 The remainder of this chapter discusses the
relevant articles of the UDHR as adopted by the UN General Assembly on
10 December 1948,46 and the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights, ratified by Cameroon on 20 June 1989.47 
The BLCC case against the Government of Cameroon prayed the
ACHPR to recommend inter alia that the Government of Cameroon: 
• affirm the rights of the Bakweri over the lands that were forcibly
expropriated by the German colonial authorities and have since been
occupied by CDC plantations;
• fully involve the Bakweri in any CDC privatisation negotiations; and 
• pay into a Bakweri Trust Fund, ground rents owed to the Bakweri dating
back to 1947.
On its part, the Government, represented by Dr Dion Ngute, Minister-
Delegate for Commonwealth Relations, submitted a motion for dismissal
of the BLCC case on the following specific grounds:
• the BLCC is not the accredited agent of, and does not speak for all of, the
Bakweri (in other words, the BLCC lacked locus standi);
• the BLCC had an imprecise and unclear case;
• the BLCC unjustifiably casts suspicion and aspersions on Cameroon’s
judicial system and its complaint must therefore be viewed as insulting;
• the UN Sub-Commission had already dealt with the BLCC case; and
• the BLCC had failed to exhaust local remedies prior to bringing the matter
to the ACHPR.
In its ruling, the Commission rejected the Government’s motion, arguing
that the BLCC was indeed the accredited agent of the Bakweri, and that it
45 The Presidential decree privatising the CDC 94/125 of 14 July 1994.
46 UN, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 17(1) & (2). 
47 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October
1986; BLCC (2002) 4; article 14 of African (Banjul) Charter on People’s and Human
Rights.
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end, the Commission availed both parties in the dispute of its ‘good offices’
and recommended that they to seek an ‘Amicable Settlement’ of the
longstanding Bakweri land problem. The BLCC appears to have very little
faith in the Cameroonian Government’s good faith, seeing the
Commission’s ruling as fuel for its efforts to seek a just solution. 
The Bakweri claim violations of specific human rights including the
right to:
• human dignity and equal protection under the law (article 1, Universal
Declaration/article 1, African Charter);
• have one’s cause heard in an appropriate forum (article 7, African
Charter);
• an effective remedy for acts violating one’s fundamental human rights
(article 8, Universal Declaration);
• own property (article 14, African Charter/article 17 Universal
Declaration);
• the same degree of respect as other human beings (article 19, African
Charter);
• dispose of one’s own wealth, property and natural resources (article 21,
African Charter);
• economic, social and cultural development (article 22, African Charter). 
6.1 The right to human dignity
Arguably the most egregious violations of the human rights of the Bakweri
occurred during the German colonial era, when they were hurled into
‘reservats’ to make room for agricultural plantations and colonial
government facilities. In doing so, the German colonial authorities failed
to treat the Bakweri as human beings ‘born free and equal in dignity and
rights’ as required by article 19 of the African Charter and article 1(1) of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Instead, these authorities
packed the Bakweri into disease-infested and inhospitable reservations. In
one swoop, this policy transformed ‘the Bakweri, who prior to the arrival
of the Germans were described as aggressive, independent and dynamic’
into a ‘dejected, despondent, lethargic and dependent people.’48 An
Annual Report by the British Mandate Administration in Southern
Cameroons to the League of Nations drew attention to this problem as far
back as 1922 noticed that the alienation of Bakweri land had eroded the
sense of tribal unity and cohesion enjoyed by other groups whose lands
have never been forcibly expropriated. This apparent lack of unity and
cohesion among the Bakweri and the concomitant inability to compete
economically with the so-called ‘stangers’ have led members of the
48 Tande (n 38 above).
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the Bakweri. 
Post-colonial governments in Cameroon have done nothing to reverse
the situation. While the Bakweri were confined to native reservations and
treated as criminals, with no access to economically productive activities,
members of the ‘stranger’ population were gainfully employed in the
agricultural plantations or in ancillary activities on Bakweri ancestral
lands. Thus, the opportunities for income generation that were available to
the ‘strangers’ were denied the Bakweri. Since the demise of the
reservation policy, no effort has ever been made to afford the Bakweri an
opportunity to make up for lost time. Arguably, this policy explains the
inferior economic status of the Bakweri vis-à-vis ‘strangers’ in Fako
Division.
Successive governments since the German colonial era have had an
opportunity to reverse this situation, but have not done so. The British
Mandate government, through the colonial government of Nigeria, is on
record for ‘re-purchasing’ and returning to the Bakweri some minute
portions of their expropriated ancestral lands. Yet the Bakweri land
problem, its appellation notwithstanding, is not exclusively about land.
Rather, land must be appreciated as a factor of production and source of
socio-economic and political power. Elsewhere, such as the United States,
where native Americans (or American Indians) were dispossessed of their
ancestral lands by Europeans, robust programmes, including affirmative
action, have been created with the aim of compensating for past
discrimination and exploitation. Instead of exploring the possibility of
such programmes, the government of Cameroon has opted to behave just
like its colonial predecessors. It is currently converting some of the lands
previously occupied by colonial plantation farmers into state lands and
selling them as freehold lands to private individuals.49 Most of these
individuals are ‘strangers’ whose ancestral lands in their regions of origin
remain intact. By its actions in this regard, the Government has reneged on
its promise, as a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the African Charter to protect the human dignity of all, including the
Bakweri. 
6.2 The right to have one’s cause heard in an appropriate 
forum
Successive governments of Cameroon have ignored the Bakweri land
problem, wishing it would go away on its own. In addition to the
unrecorded and sometimes unorganised efforts by villages throughout
49 Examples are the Elders and Fyffes estates in Likomba (Tiko), the CDC rubber
plantations in Mutengene and Ombe (Tiko), and the CDC palms plantations in Moliwe
and Bonadikombo (Limbe). 
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employing sound, peaceful and methodical methods to draw the attention
of successive governments to the problem. However, in violation of articles
1 and 7 of the African Charter, and article 8 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, these governments have never deemed it necessary to
afford the Bakweri an opportunity to have their cause heard. Article 8 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees an individual or
members of any aggrieved group the right to effective remedy by
competent national tribunals for acts violating their fundamental human
rights. On this score, the successive governments of Cameroon, dating
back to the colonial era, have violated the fundamental human rights of the
Bakweri in multiple ways. First, they never prioritised the need to look into
the complaints of the Bakweri. Second, there has been a dearth of
competent national tribunals capable of adjudicating in matters where the
State is the defendant. For this reason the BLC felt compelled to seek
redress to the Bakweri land problem at the UN Trusteeship Council in
1950. At the time, the BLC was concerned with the growing scarcity of
land for members of the native Bakweri population – a problem that was
rooted in the colonial economic development endeavours. The BLC
demanded a thorough revamping of these aggressive economic
development initiatives of colonial authorities, but the Trusteeship
Council objected to this demand, which it characterised as recalcitrant:
The BLC 
have persisted in their non-co-operative attitude, in spite of explanations given
them by the Acting Governor in November-December 1950, and by other
Government officers during 1951 on lines recommended by the Trusteeship
Council.50
The right to an effective remedy for the Bakweri people was thus violated
not only by the government of the British Mandate Territory of Southern
Cameroons but also by the UN Trusteeship Council.
Like its colonial predecessors, the current Government of Cameroon
comes shy of guaranteeing its citizens, as individuals or members of
aggrieved groups, the right to an effective remedy by national tribunals.
Such tribunals, as the BLCC argued, are non-existent in Cameroon,51 and
the notion of ‘independence of judiciary’ is alien in Cameroon.
Cameroon’s judiciary, made up completely of appointees of the Head of
State, is found wanting on almost all of the basic principles of the
50 See section 495 of the 1951 Report of the Sixth Meeting (March 1950) of the UN
Trusteeship Council on Cameroons under United Kingdom Trusteeship, prepared by
the British Colonial Office for the UN General Assembly.
51 The BLCC was responding to the charge by the Government of Cameroon that it had
failed to exhaust all available local legal remedies in accordance with article 56(5) of the
African Charter. See N Kofele-Kale ‘Response of the Bakweri Land Claims Committee
to the reply presented by the Government of Cameroon on the exhaustion of local
remedies’ (2003). 
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the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders that was held in
Milan (26 August to 6 September 1985).52 Thus, in Cameroon, judicial
power is inseparable and non-distinguishable from executive and
legislative powers. There is no denying that the Bakweri land case has
never been dealt with by any court in Cameroon. Therefore, the
Government can be said to have reneged on its promise, as a signatory of
the Charter on Human Rights, to guarantee everyone – including the
Bakweri – the right to be heard.
Considering a Government’s action on a problem such as the Bakweri
land problem as a violation of fundamental human rights is not without
precedent. A case of this nature has come before the ACHPR before,
pitting the Social and Economic Rights Center and Social Rights against
the Government of Nigeria.53 In this case, the plaintiffs charged that the
Government of Nigeria ignored and even condoned the destruction of
Ogoniland by multi-national oil companies for several decades. The
ACHPR ruled in favour of the plaintiffs arguing that by condoning and
facilitating the activities of oil companies, and by ignoring calls for
intervention from the people of Ogoniland, the Military Government of
Nigeria violated several aspects of the human rights of this people. These
rights, the Commission argued are clearly stated or implied in the African
Charter. 
6.3 The right to property
The right to property, which can only be encroached upon for the greater
good of the public at large is guaranteed everyone under article 14 of the
African Charter. An identical right, the right to own property is guaranteed
under article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There is no
question that successive governments throughout the history of Cameroon
have strived to either expropriate and transfer to preferred private entities
or convert into property of the State, Bakweri ancestral lands. Rather, the
question has to do with the basis upon which these governments justify
their actions. To address this nagging question, it is necessary to peruse the
policies or instruments through which these lands have been expropriated
or converted. The common denominator of these policies is their marking
indigenous lands intended for expropriation or conversion to state
property as ‘vacant and ownerless.’ The Germans were the first to enact
such a policy on July 15 1896. Subsequent governments had their own
version of this policy, and today, the country’s current law declares as
belonging to the state all ‘lands that are free of any effective occupation.’54
52 The principles were endorsed by General Assembly as Resolutions 40/32 of 29
November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985.
53 Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Social Rights v Nigeria (Communication No
155/96, paras 37-39).
54 See the Cameroon land law of 6 July 1974 Section 1, part III(a). 
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authorities, the Bakweri lived in village clusters, which occupied only a
minute portion of all their land, and used the rest of the land for farming,
hunting and other cognate purposes. Today little has changed among the
Bakweri, which means that while lands may not be under effective
occupation, they are used for other purposes. 
From the use of terminology such as ‘vacant and ownerless’ it is clear
that the Cameroonian government’s rationale for converting so-called
Bakweri ancestral lands into state property is based on the notion that there
is such a thing as ‘no man’s land’ or ‘land belonging to no-one.’ The
government of Cameroon is neither the first nor unique in harbouring this
notion, but its foundation has never been on terra firma since the landmark
Australian High Court case that pitted the Meriam people (the plaintiffs)
against the government of Queensland, (the defendant), decided by the
High Court of Australia on 3 June 1992.55 The plaintiffs contended that
they were entitled to the lands which their ancestors had occupied or used
in one form or another prior to the arrival of the British. The defendant
argued that subsequent to the British conquest, lands throughout the entire
territory of Australia, including those on the Murray Islands, where the
Meriam people are found, became part of the dominions of the British
Crown and automatically subject to the law of England. In this case, the
Crown had acquired the ‘absolute beneficial ownership’ of especially all
‘land belonging to no-one’ throughout the territory upon British conquest
in 1788. 
Finding in favour of the plaintiffs, the judges viewed the doctrine of
terra nullius (that is, ‘land belonging to no-one’) as preposterous. Rather,
five out of the six High Court judges who rendered judgment on this case
agreed as follows. The Meriam people had a concept of land tenure and
entitlement that preceded the British conquest. Title to land in traditional
Meriam society is/was derived from sources that differ from those known
under English law, and the notion of occupation of land in this society is
not the same as what obtains under the English system. Briefly, the judges
recognised the concept of customary entitlement to land, as well as
traditional instruments attesting to land ownership. 
The Mabo decision holds many lessons for the Bakweri land case. Like
the Meriam people, the Bakweri have lived on their ancestral lands in a
subsistence economy built around cultivation, hunting and fishing before
the colonial era. The Meriam people like the Bakweri had a functional land
tenure system based on their customs and tradition that preceded the
colonial era. Also, like the Meriam people, the Bakweri have a special
connection to their ancestral lands that cannot be measured in exclusively
55 (n 5 above). In this case, the Queensland Government’s case that the land in question
belongs to no-one (i.e., the doctrine of terra nullius) was deemed preposterous and
rejected by the High Court of Australia.
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or ‘vacant and ownerless land,’ invoked by successive governments of
Cameroon, is untenable. To the extent that the Government has never
been able to demonstrate that the customary title of the Bakweri over their
ancestral lands has been extinguished, as part of a valid exercise of the
police power of the state, the Government has been in violation of article
14 of the African Charter and chapter 17 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. This Charter guarantees everyone the right to own
property, and, by converting Bakweri ancestral lands into property of the
state, the government of Cameroon has effectively denied the Bakweri this
right. 
6.4 The right to economic development
This is guaranteed under articles 21 and 22 of the African Charter. Article
21 specifically states that ‘All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth
and natural resource. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest
of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.’ The article is not
oblivious to the fact that occasionally a need arises for the state to employ
its police power to claim private property in the interest of the greater good
of society at large, but requires that dispossessed individuals or groups be
adequately compensated.
Apart from the questionable payments made to some gullible chiefs
during the earlier phase of the German colonial era, no compensation has
ever been made for the large tracts of Bakweri ancestral lands expropriated
over more than a century. It has already been established that the German
colonial authorities forcibly expropriated and converted these lands into
property of the colonial state. During their brief tenure as UN Trustees of
the Mandate Territory of Southern Cameroons, the British attempted to
reverse the egregious actions of the Germans, and the British colonial
administration is on record for re-purchasing so-called Ex-Enemy lands
and re-instating same as native property. As noted earlier, these lands were
leased to the CDC in 1947 for a period of 60 years with the possibility of
renewal for a further 60-year term. One confusing aspect of the afore-
described transaction is the fact that CDC was established as a statutory
body, and along with the repurchased ex-enemy lands, placed under the
control of the Governor of colonial Nigeria. At the same time, the CDC
was given the mandate to administer and develop the plantations which
occupied said lands until such time as the Bakweri people were competent
to manage them without assistance. One cannot but ponder whether this
confusing language was inadvertent or a well calculated attempt on the
part of the authors to convert Bakweri ancestral lands into property of the
state. 
It would appear that the Government of Cameroon interpreted the fact
the land in question was under the control of the colonial governor to mean
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inheriting Southern Cameroons from the colonial government of Nigeria,
it inherited all of its property, including the Bakweri ancestral lands. To the
extent that this is true, the Government can be said to have misrepresented
the terms of the transaction involving the Bakweri lands to the Bakweri,
which constitutes a breach of trust on the part of the Government. This was
the finding in the landmark case of Guerin v the Queen, decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada.56 In this case, an aboriginal group, the
Musqueam Indians, held 416 acres (about 1.7 sq. km) of land in the
Vancouver area. In 1958, the Canadian Government leased 162 acres (0.7
sq. km) of the lands to a private Golf Club, but misrepresented the details
of the deal to the Musqueams, who sued the Government in a lower court
for breach of trust. The Court ruled in favour of the Musqueams and
awarded them $10 million, a ruling overturned by the Federal Court of
Appeal, so the Musqueam took the matter to the Supreme Court of
Canada, which as the lower Court, ruled in their favour. 
Post-colonial authorities in Cameroon have been less tolerant of
customary entitlements to land than their colonial predecessors. By so
doing, these authorities have denied indigenous peoples such as the
Bakweri the right to enjoy and celebrate their tradition and cultural
heritage, a right implicitly guaranteed in article 22 of the African Charter.
Sections 1 - 2 of this article states that,
All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural
development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. States shall have the duty,
individually and collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to
development. 
As stated at the outset of this chapter, African traditional ethos does not
consider land as a commodity. In other words, land cannot be sold,
exchanged or permanently transferred to anyone. No-one owns or can
own land; the living have only use rights over land, and are seen merely as
custodians of the land bequeathed them by their ancestors. Those alive are
charged with the duty of guarding and protecting land for the generations
to come. Any theory purporting that Bakweri ancestral land had been
bought by colonial authorities, who in turn handed it to their post-colonial
successors, must first seek to address the following question. How could
the Bakweri alive at the time have sold land they did not own?
7 Summary and conclusion
The state in Cameroon, dating back to the colonial era, has demonstrated
a penchant for striving to usurp all other societal interests in the land
domain. The country’s first colonial rulers, the Germans, proceeded early
56 Guerin v the Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
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designed to achieve this goal. Prominent in this regard, is the Act of 15 July
1896, which converted all so-called ‘unoccupied lands’ into property of the
German colonial state. The converted lands were in turn, placed at the
disposal of private German farmers who used it for plantation agriculture. 
Subsequent administrations, following the ousting of the Germans
from the country after World War I, adhered to the aggressive land
acquisition blue print left behind by the German colonial authorities. The
French who controlled four-fifths of Cameroon as a Trust Territory of the
League of Nations, enacted a law in 1932 – a facsimile of the 1896 German
colonial government Act – classifying all vacant lands as ‘terres vacantes et
sans maïtres’ and converting same into property of the French colonial state.
On their part, the British enacted a law 1927 the Land and Native Rights
Ordinance, classifying as ‘native land’ all land in the British Mandate
Territory. This classification was deceptive because the so-called native
lands were placed under the control of the colonial governor of Nigeria,
who could in turn do as he chose with the land. 
The actions of the post-colonial state in the land domain have mirrored
those of its colonial predecessors. The country’s 1974 landmark land law
was designed to consolidate the state’s power. According to Ordinance No
74-1 of the Law, not only is the state the guardian of all lands, it is also
endowed with the powers to use the land as it sees fit in the interests of the
nation at large. More importantly, the post-colonial governments have
been less tolerant of, and even oblivious to, customary entitlements to
land. The state recognises only formal instruments of land ownership,
particularly a government-issued land certificate, and the concomitant
registration of such title in the National Land Register. These and other
requirements and behaviour of the government in the land domain has
heightened land-related tensions, which manifest the continuing struggle
over legitimacy and control over valuable resources between the state and
society.57 
Since the 1990s, and as part of efforts to fulfill its obligations under the
Structural Adjustment Programmes of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank, the Government of Cameroon has proceeded to
unilaterally privatise the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) and
its assets. This action has triggered a flurry of reactions especially from the
Bakweri, whose ancestral lands are occupied by CDC’s estates. Thus, the
Government decision to privatise the CDC fuelled the longstanding
Bakweri land problem. 
57 Njoh (n 13 above); Njoh (n 28 above); Z Ergas (ed) The African state in transition (1987);
G Feder & R Noronha ‘Land rights systems and agricultural development in sub
Saharan Africa’ (1987) 2 Research Observer.
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German colonial era, through the creation of the CDC in 1946 to date. The
Bakweri acted through their accredited agent, the Bakweri Land Claims
Committee (BLCC), to thwart, at least temporarily, the Government’s
effort to privatise the CDC. To accomplish this feat, the BLCC addressed
a barrage of letters to national, regional and international entities asserting
the customary land rights of the Bakweri over the lands in question, and
protesting what it views as the state’s callous disregard of these rights. In
October 2002, the BLCC filed a formal complaint against the Government
of Cameroon at the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights
(ACHPR) in Banjul. In its communication to the ACHPR under articles
55, 56,and 58 of the African Charter, the BLCC prayed the Commission to
find that by refusing to affirm the rights of Bakweri people over the lands
occupied by the CDC, the Government of Cameroon has violated some
fundamental human rights of these people. The BLCC further urged the
Commission to recommend that the Government makes a good faith effort
to resolve the longstanding Bakweri land problem. Despite a motion for
dismissal from the Government, the Commission not only entertained the
case, but also found in favour of the BLCC. 
This case has implications that transcend Cameroon’s frontiers,
holding important lessons for indigenous groups whose lands have been
expropriated by the state elsewhere. One can only hope that international
organs such as the ACHPR are not toothless barking dogs, but, upon
finding in favour of the Bakweri, the Commission did not lay down any
mechanism to implement its recommendations. What authority does the
Commission have over Cameroon as a sovereign nation? What if the
Government were to invoke its police power to employ the land in
question? The country’s landmark land law provides for such invocation
of the police power of the state. Although the BLCC appears oblivious to
this possibility, it recognises the apparent inability of the Commission to
compel the Government of Cameroon to implement its recommendations,
and is consoled by the fact that the Commission has confirmed the
legitimacy of its case. Furthermore, as the BLCC notes, the Commission
has the authority to forward the matter to the African Union Assembly
should the Cameroonian Government fail to take the steps necessary to
implement its recommendations. 
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R NOT JUST ANOTHER ‘CUSTOM’:
ISLAMIC INFLUENCES ON
AFRICAN LAND LAWS
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1 Introduction
The grand narrative of African land law tends to rehearse an unequal
contest between the exotic and chaotic customary communal tenures and
the self-evidently redeeming individual title enterprises, the two mediated
through modernist statutory compromises. Variations of the theme include
probes into pluralism and hybridity of tenures, critiques of the motives and
methodologies of land reform experiments, and assessments of
improvements in security of tenure. Yet, missing from the discourse is
another tenurial influence with a historical presence in Africa,1 a highly
developed land tenure framework2 and a potential application to over a
third of the continent3 – Islamic land law. 
No country in Africa – or in any other part of the world – can claim to
follow Islamic land law exclusively. Customary norms and successive
waves of colonialism, modernisation and reform have created legal
pluralism and hybridity in Muslim countries too. Yet no country with
significant Muslim populations is without the influence of Islamic land
laws or principles, official or informal, however varied or mutated. As
Islamic land law evolved in Africa it often interlocked with customary,
colonial and statutory systems pollinating its distinctive concepts that are
discernible even today. 
For over a thousand years Africa experienced dynamic and turbulent
spells of Islamic stimulus – from Muslim conquerors, traders, missionaries
1 JS Trimingham Islam in East Africa (1964); N Levtzion & R Pouwels (eds) The history of
Islam in Africa (1997); D Robinson Muslim societies in African History (2004). 
2 S Sait & H Lim Land, law and Islam: Property and human rights in the Muslim world (2006).
3 Recent studies show that the Muslim populations in Africa account for a third of the
continent, and up to a third of the world Muslim population: Pew Research Centre
Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's
Muslim Population (2009); H Kettani ‘World Muslim Population: 1950 - 2020’ (2010)
1(2) International Journal of Environmental Science and Development 1.91
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Songhai, to the Sokoto Caliphate (1809-1906) in present day Nigeria,
Islam influenced African ways of life and was transformed into many
‘African Islams’. Along with new beliefs and socio-political frameworks,
Islam brought into Africa far reaching changes in trading protocols,
livelihood techniques and tenure concepts.4 As Callaway and Creevey
reflect, ‘in each major region of each country [of Africa], the impact of
Islam is different. No study can reasonably blanket the region with one set
of generalisations about how Islam interacts with society and shapes it’.5
There is no single edition of Islamic land law because Islam is contested,
responsive and evolving, determined by local histories, cultures and
politics. 
Islamic land tenures are seen in Gambia; the Moroccan family code
Mouduwana affects gendered property flows; and Mauritanian law
legislates appropriation of abandoned land (indirass). The inheritable rights
of first clearer of land in Niger, the Islamic long-term land leases (hikr) in
Egypt, individual land rights among the Tuareg, the Fulani and Chad’s
savannah inhabitants can only be understood with reference to Islamic
concepts. The Shari’a courts in Ethiopia, the recognition of Islamic
contracts in South Africa, or Islamic endowments (waqf) in Uganda are all
cogs in Islamic land law working within pluralist African legal
frameworks. To unlock the land conflicts in Darfur in Sudan one needs to
refer to the Funj Islamic kingdom (1504-1821) where individual ownership
was marked through concession documents (hakura) that prevail even
today. Islamic influences appear in 1984 Sudanese legislation which
stipulates that land belongs to god and is a public utility. A recent report
on Somalia finds alternative tenure models in Sufi communities derived
from Islamic principles.6 Throughout Africa, there are reports of
innovative Islamic land tools such as endowments (waqf or habus), pre-
emption (shufa), land sanctuaries (hima), land grants (iqta) or the revival of
dead land (mewat), as well as Islamic-inspired processes, institutions and
resources in an African context.
This chapter explores Islamic land law through legislation or policies
derived from Islamic law (Shari’a), and from principles, concepts and
practices associated with Islamic theory and philosophy (fiqh). It focuses
upon the complex relationships and dynamics informing land policies in
selected Muslim countries. The four countries chosen – Kenya, Nigeria,
Senegal and Tanzania – represent very different Islamic contexts
(minority, secular, socialist and religious), and the varied ways in which
4 G Lydon On trans-saharan trails: Islamic law, trade networks, and cross-cultural exchange in
nineteenth-century Western Africa (2009).
5 B Callaway & L Creevey The heritage of Islam: Women, religion, and politics in West Africa
(1994).
6 G Norton Land, property, and housing in Somalia (2008); United Nations Human
Settlements Program (2008) 86 - 87.
  Islamic influences on African land law    93Islamic land law expresses itself (individual, collective, customary and
pluralist tenure). Each country case study explores the complex interplay
between colonial, Islamic, customary and statutory tenures in contrasting
African settings. 
The Ottoman Empire (1302-1922), known for its developed land
tenures, at one time straddled several continents, including Western Asia,
North Africa and Southeastern Europe. Between the sixteenth and
nineteenth centuries, countries such as Egypt and Sudan and much of the
African Maghreb (now Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and
Western Sahara) came under Ottoman suzerainty. The Ottomans
encountered in Africa a different and diffused Islam. Rather than their
usual Hanafi code, they adopted the Maliki Sunni doctrine in Africa, the
most accommodating and flexible legal code, already worked on by
African Muslim scholars. While the slave trade and some jihads reflect a
darker side of African encounters with Muslims, Islam survived and grew
in Africa because of tolerance and interchange between Islamic and
African customs. Islamic law explicitly recognises urf (custom) as long as
there is compatibility. A vital difference between Islamic law and African
customary norms is said to be the codified and written form of the former,7
yet the close interaction between Islamic norms and Muslim customary
practices produced ‘unwritten customary law of an Islamic nature [which]
existed and continues to exist’.8 
When the Europeans scrambled for Africa in the 1880s, a formidable
obstacle to control and transformation of its land tenure system was Islam.
Even France, with its uncompromisingly secularist ideology at home,
projected itself as a ‘Muslim power’ in Africa,9 and a successor to the
Ottomans. Land reform was central to the colonial project.10 A variety of
deals were struck by colonial administrators with African Muslim power-
brokers, over the continuation of Islamic land principles, protection of
Islamic practices as ‘custom’ or their absorption into colonial laws.
Mamdani argues that, even where the colonial powers preferred ‘indirect
rule’, allowing customary or Islamic practices to continue, they were
actually distorting traditions, racialising and dividing communities.11
7 TO Elias The nature of African customary law (1956).
8 J Miles ‘Customary and Islamic law and its development in Africa’ (2006) 1 African
Development Bank Law for Development Review 81.
9 D Robinson ‘France as a Muslim Power in West Africa’ (1999) 46(3) Africa Today 105-
127
10 CK Meek Land law and custom in the colonies (1946); E Colson ‘The impact of the
colonial period on the definition of land rights’ in V Turner (ed) Colonialism in Africa
1870-1960, Profile of change: African society and colonial rule (1971).
11 M Mamdani Citizen and subject: Contemporary African and the legacy of late colonialism
(1996); see also D Robinson Paths of accommodation: Muslim societies and French colonial
authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920 (2000); JL Triaud ‘Islam in Africa under
French colonial rule’ in The history of Islam in Africa. Levtzion N & R Pouwels (eds)
(1997) 169 - 188.
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conceptions into their legal terminology and systems.12 ‘Inventions’ of
tradition in colonial Africa often took place when the Europeans believed
themselves to be respecting age-old African custom when in fact they were
manufacturing convenient innovations.13 Another myth about the
colonial land project is the European ‘introduction’ of individual tenure to
a continent. Pre-colonial indigenous African tenure systems already
recognised extensive individual property rights, including ownership
though within a spiritual and community-based framework. Furthermore,
Islamic law had imported sophisticated individual property ownership
doctrines into Africa centuries before the European colonisers. 
The Islamic individual property concept differed from the Western
equivalent in being conditional upon responsible and productive land use
and subject to Islamic egalitarian principles. Since Islam also facilitated
collective tenures similar to customary norms, colonial administrators
banished Islamic tenure into the fold of customary norms. This rebranding
of Islamic law as Muslim customary practices was not resisted by African
Muslims because it brought no material change in their practices. Islamic
law continued to evolve in the garb of an indigenous framework, though
with greater flexibility. Muslims had secured the formal recognition and
legal protection of their Islamic inheritance and private (family) property
laws.  
The colonial policy to let Muslims practice Islamic norms designated
as ‘custom’ continued after independence. Yet, the Europeans were well
aware of the difference, and Islam and custom have been distinct but
related fields. While they were often harmonised, competing spaces and
identities lead to conflicts between the two (or between different customs),
and mechanisms were developed to resolve them.14 A key question for this
research is whether land customs of Muslims can be studied without
reference to Islamic land law. It will argue that African Islamic land laws
emerged as a distinct field which cannot always be subsumed within an all
encompassing ‘custom, informal and alternative’ category. Nor can the
power of Islamic ideas understood without exploration of the dynamic and
pluralistic relationship between Islamic, secular, customary and State
norms.15 
12 SF Joireman ‘Inherited legal systems and effective rule of law’ (2001) 39(4) Journal of
Modern African Studies 571 - 596; M Chanock Law, custom, and social order: The colonial
experience in Malawi and Zambia (1985).
13 T Ranger ‘The invention of tradition in colonial Africa' in E Hobsbawm & T Ranger
(eds) The invention of tradition (1983) 211 - 62.
14 E Cotran ‘Integration of court and application of customary law in Tanzania’ (1965)
5(1) East African Law Journal 108 - 123.
15 GR Woodman ‘The idea of legal pluralism’ in B Dupret et al (eds) Legal Pluralism in the
Arab World (1999).
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Kenya
In colonial coastal Kenya (Mwambao), the British faced a web of land
tenures. The Sultan of Zanzibar had long administered Islamic law
(Shari’a) for the Arab settlers, the local Swahili Muslims had developed
their customary practices (mila) and customary laws applied to the
indigenous tribes, particularly the Mijikenda. Islamic individual tenure for
farmland and urban lands was well-established, while pastures, forests and
water bodies were seen as to belong to God, regulated by the Sultan for the
benefit of the community. Within towns (kiambo) commercial and
residential land was demarcated, individually owned and transferred
under Islamic law, backed up by the Islamic court judge (Qadi) and
administrator (liwali). 
Outside towns Muslims dealt with land through Swahili customs
(mila), a customary adaption of Islamic ideas.16 Mila is often used in
contradistinction with religion (dini). Despite individual tenure being
available, lands were mostly not demarcated or transferred outside, and
the community elders played an important role in allocation and use.
Thus, mila land tenure was a hybrid of Islamic and African customary
tenure, fusing individual and collective ownership.17 Several features of
mila distinguished the system from Islamic law proper. It embodied values,
rituals and meanings of land that reflected the social function rather than
the economic asset approach. It varied from place to place, and was
custom-responsive, not administered by the Qadi, though Swahilis could,
in theory, assert their Islamic land rights. 
The Mijikenda of the coastal areas are a conglomeration of nine Bantu-
speaking heterogenous tribes, of which Digo and Giriama are sub-group
discussed below.18 The Mijikenda were farmers, fisherfolks and traders,
and constituted the majority of the coastal population before being pushed
into the hinterland, first by the Arabs and Swahilis, and then by the British
into ‘native reserves’. Mijikenda considered the earth to be their mother,
blessed or impregnated by the Supreme Being through rain. All Mijikenda
were entitled to use a demarcated piece of land within their fortified forest
village (kaya), and had grazing and hunting rights outside. They were
allotted suitable lands by a council of elders (kambi) that was not in conflict
with other users, and ownership of land and trees was differentiated. The
same land was often passed to the next generation. The British considered
16 P Caplan Choice and constraint in a Swahili community (1975); R Loimeier & R
Seesemann (ed) The global worlds of the Swahili: Interfaces of Islam, identity and space in
nineteenth- and twentieth-century East Africa (2006).
17 HA Hamidin ‘From bad to worse: The implementation of the Land Titles Ordinance in
Coastal Kenya, 1908-1960s’ (2003). 
18 See RL Pouwels Horn and crescent: Cultural change and traditional Islam on the East African
Coast (1992).
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merely individual user rights within communal tenure, and so created
‘native reserves’ for the Mijikenda. In 1934 the Kenya Land Commission
reversed the British policy, recognising that the Mijikenda in fact practiced
individual ownership, but this was too late. 
The British were aware of the diverse land tenure arrangements of the
Arabs, Swahilis and various coastal tribes such as the Mijikenda. Under the
1895 arrangement, the Sultan of Zanzibar obtained a commitment that the
non-Muslim Mijikenda would also be consulted on land matters, but the
British reneged, considering the coastal tribe as different from Muslims,
and never the Sultan’s subjects. This differentiation meant that the Muslim
Arabs and Swahilis, governed by Islamic law, were able to register land as
private property, while the Mijikenda, governed by custom, could not.19 
Individual land ownership under Islamic law was convenient for the
Imperial British East Africa Company, and later the colonial government,
to ‘purchase’ land from Muslims. In doing so, the British were also seeking
to superimpose the Western concept of private ownership on the Islamic
doctrine, even though Islamic individual rights are subject to responsible
use. The British also recognised two other principles of Islamic land law,
the revival of dead land (mewat) as a means of acquiring ‘waste or
abandoned land’ unused for twelve years by individuals and the State.
Cooper argues that British propped up the former planter elite after slavery
was abolished, making them local allies and agents, at the expense of the
coastal tribes who were sent to ‘native reserves’ in the interior.20 The
British preferred the Arab or Persian (Shirazi) class, and later the Indian
Banyan, over the African identity, as part of its socio-racial hierarchy.21 
A key component of British land policy was the 1908 Land Titles
Ordinance (LTO) for Kenya, which initiated a process of survey, land
adjudication and registration, critical for revenue-raising and security of
tenure. Between 1919 and 1926 vast sections of land were surveyed and
registered, with Arabs and Swahilis given freehold titles, but the Mijikenda
not. The exercise was a disaster, because the British failed to understand
the relation of Islamic and customary tenure. The reports of the British
Secretary for Native Affairs (AC Hollis), tasked with clarifying the
application of land laws for the Arabs, Swahilis and Mijikenda in 1907,
emphasised the application of Shari’a (Islamic) land tenure to all Muslims,
without considering the prevalence of Swahili customary land practices.
He also decreed that Mijikenda did not follow individual rights and
recommended reserve lands for their communal rights. In a twist, some of
the Digo group of Mijikenda converted to Islam, raising the question of
19 VP Ghai & J McAuslan Public law and political change in Kenya (1970). 
20 F Cooper From slaves to squatters: Plantation labour and agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal
Kenya, 1890 - 1925 (1980). 
21 C Leo Land and class in Kenya (1984).
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communal? In 1913 the colonial government went ahead with the Digo
reserve, but also demarcated individual parcels in case individual claims
arise from within. Cooper shows how the colonial perspectives and
political interests disrupted the close social and historical ties between the
Mijikenda and Swahili, and many Mijikenda were dispossessed and sent to
native reserves elsewhere to make way for European settlement.22 When
the British attempted to collect hut and poll tax, and recruit forced labour,
the largest group of the Mijikenda, the Giriama, and other sub-groups rose
up in rebellion (1913 - 1914).23 They suffered significant losses but no
change of heart from the British, and the underdevelopment of the
Mijikenda coast has been seen as partially a punishment for rebellion, the
region being deemed largely ungovernable. 
The implementation of the Land Titles Ordinance (LTO) in the coastal
areas was slow and expensive, and triggered complex land disputes. The
exercise was meant to determine the extent of private possessions along the
coastal area, before alienating land for the crown and giving grants to
individual settlers, as unregistered land under freehold was deemed crown
land. Sir Ernest Dowson, veteran of the Zanzibar land tenure study and an
expert on Islamic tenure from Egypt to Palestine (although
unsympathetic),24 was called in as a consultant in 1934, and his report
(delayed until 1938) found that the process was flawed, and recommended
a fresh start, but, lacking official support or funds, the British gave up on
land reform in coastal Kenya. 
The LTO recognised land ownership among the Arabs and Swahilis
through their Islamic norms, but not for the Mijikenda and the ex-slaves,
thereby creating divisions and widespread squatters in Kenya even today.
The Mijikenda occupy land, but technically ownership is with others,
making them legally squatters on the land they may have long inhabited
under absentee landlords. On Kenyan independence in 1963, Mijikenda
hopes of restitution of their land rights evaporated, with the independent
government decreeing all colonial crown land, over which Mijikenda had
claims, to be government land, yet accepting the Sultan’s demands for
recognition of Islamic private land rights on the coast.25 Equally
precarious were the land rights of freed slaves (slavery was abolished in
1907) who stayed on the property abandoned by their owners, thereby
acquiring ‘Islamic’ rights but recognised by both the British and
independent Kenya. 
22 Cooper (n 20 above).
23 CS Brantley The Giriama and colonial resistance in Kenya 1800 - 1920 (1981).
24 R Home ‘Scientific survey and land settlement in British colonialism, with particular
reference to land tenure reform in the Middle East 1920 - 1950’ (2006) 21(1) Planning
Perspectives 1 - 22; G Forman ‘Settlement of the title in the Galilee: Dowson's Colonial
Guiding Principles’ (2002) 7(3) Israel Studies 61 - 83.
25 K Kanyinga Struggles of access to land: The 'squatter question' in Coastal Kenya (1998).
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systematic procedures for converting customary tenure into individual
freeholds. Systematic adjudication of rights and registration of title
continue to drive post-colonial land policy, marginalising the landless and
‘squatters’.26 Recent developments, including the 2007 land policy and
2010 referendum, are trying to shed the colonial land baggage. Kenya
voted in the 2010 referendum to continue Islamic law and courts in
personal law matters, but, despite widespread Islamic land practices such
as Islamic endowments (waqf), Islamic land rights are absorbed into land
statutes applicable to all Kenyans. Islamic land law, at the hands of the
Sultan and the British colonial administration, was manipulated to create
unequal and differentiated land rights, arising from a selective and partial
understanding of the law and its relationship with customary norms. 
3 ‘Socialist’ Islamic land law in Tanzania
At independence, the East African neighbours of Tanzania and Kenya
(Muslims being in minority in both) chose divergent paths on land tenure,
prompting Islamic land law to negotiate different deals. Independent
Kenya individualised title, while permitting lineage or clan ownership, and
Islamic land concepts continued either as specific tenure types (such as
waqf) or were absorbed into the ‘modern’ land tenure system. Independent
Tanzania by contrast proclaimed state ownership of all land, and
demonstrates a different relationship between customary systems, Islam
and the State, with indirect influence of Islamic land law. 
On the pre-colonial Tanzanian mainland, land was traditionally held
communally through chiefs and elders who controlled and allocated land
to members of the tribe.27 Arab and other Muslims exercised individual
ownership rights under the patronage of the Sultan of Zanzibar.28 The
German colonisers introduced freehold mainly for settlers, and seized all
land not individually owned or possessed by chiefs and indigenous
communities as ‘crown’ land in 1895, thereby initiating the ultimate
nationalisation of land. Their British successors went further to designate
all land, whether occupied or unoccupied, as public land under the 1923
Land Tenure Ordinance, obtaining radical title, merging property and
sovereignty. Users would be given ‘rights of occupancy’, sometimes
projected as ‘native title’ under customary law. Unlike Kenya, it was not
individualisation but the strong centralisation of land control that created
the platform for nationalisation of all land in independent Tanzania. In
1928 the Land Ordinance was amended to recognise customary law title,
26 P Shipton ‘The Kenyan land tenure reform: Misunderstandings in the public creation of
private property’ in RE Downs & SP Reyna (eds) Land and society in contemporary Africa
(1988).
27 RW James Land tenure and policy in Tanzania (1971). 
28 AY Lodhi ‘The Arabs in Zanzibar: From the Sultanate to the People’s Republic’ (1986)
7(2) Journal of Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 404 - 418.
  Islamic influences on African land law    99but not conferring equal status with rights of occupancy. Where customary
rights were not recognised, the Africans became ‘tenants of the crown’ in
their own lands. 
Tanzania was formed through the 1964 merger of Tanganikya
(independent in 1961) and Zanzibar (independent in 1963), with Zanzibar
guaranteed considerable autonomy – but not in land matters. For the
socialist President Nyerere, ujumaa (‘pulling together’ in Kiswahili) based
upon communitarian or communal property ideals, was a key pillar of his
African socialism and de-commoditisation of land. Nyerere argued that
ujumaa was a return to African values, but also embodied Islamic values,
so that Islam was backing up socialism.29 Mwaisondola argues that since
independence a common land law has emerged in Tanzania, blending
customary, Islamic and English concepts.30
In pre-independent Tanganikya and Zanzibar individual land
ownership, certainly among Muslims, was widespread. For example,
plantations were Islamic freehold tenure, while also recognising traditional
rights of slaves and squatters.31 During the independence struggle,
however, Okello,32 the revolutionary leader, in contrast from the Kenya
narrative, publicly decried the Arabs as ‘squatters’ on African land, while
Kurume coined the political slogan directed at Muslims: ‘the trees are
yours, the land is ours’.33 Both Western and Islamic individual property
rights were derecognised at Tanzanian independence, with freehold titles
converted to leaseholds in 1963 and to ‘rights of occupancy in 1969’.
Effectively, the current tenure system recognises three forms of ownership:
customary, right of occupancy and public land, and all lands and villages
were vested in the President of Tanzania and owned by the State. The
Land Act 1999 provides for application of the customary law in land
matters. Despite classical Islamic land law being formally displaced, it
continues to echo both Muslim practices and concepts that apply to all
Tanzanians. 
When the Sultan of Zanzibar was overthrown shortly after
independence, the succeeding revolutionary government promised to
permit Islamic laws, and (unlike the Tanganyika government) did not
declare itself as owner of all lands in Zanzibar. A 1964 decree merely
arrogated powers to confiscate lands in public interest for land
redistribution in favour of the African peasant majority. A year later,
29 D Westerlund Ujamaa na dini: A study of some aspects of society and religion in Tanzania,
1961 - 1977 (1980); I Yusuf ‘Islam and African socialism: A study of the interactions between
Islam and Ujamaa socialism in Tanzania’. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Temple University,
1990.
30 GN Mwaisondola ‘The modern law of mortgages in Tanzania: The role of the Land Act, 1999’
unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2007.
31 J Middleton Land tenure in Zanzibar (1961) 69.
32 J Okello Revolution in Zanzibar (1967). 
33 Middleton (n 31 above) 77.
100    Chapter 5however, the government decided to equate Zanzibar with the rest of
Tanzania, and declared itself the paramount landlord of the country,
vesting itself with all land (Decree 13/1965). The caveat was that it would
respect the Islamic principle, that State ownership was subject to
usufructuary rights, and a citizen could apply for an allocation based upon
user or potential user rights. 
The technical repudiation of ownership was thus more a psychological
adjustment, as Tanzanians were granted rights to keep the land on which
they already lived or worked. The occupation right is perpetual and
transferable, subject to termination on grounds of misuse or abandonment
of land (Land Tenure Act 1992, article 8). This was similar to the Sultan of
Zanzibar’s right to take private unused lands under Islamic law.34 
The 1999 Land Act gives Tanzanian women right of access to land,
including the right to own, use and sell land,35 as recognised under Islamic
law. Inheritance rights of Tanzanian Muslims (which was protected) allow
occupancy right not ownership to be transferable. Though this is often the
case under customary rights tenures, rights of individual occupancy
transfers are innovative. Under the law, the inheritance will only be
recognised if registered like any other occupation right. Thus unregistered
inheritance rights would be void, since the Land Transfer Board do not
approve them under the 1994 Land Transfer Act. For the Board to
approve, it must be shown that the inherited share is intended to be used,
and can be lost by improper use. Both registration and the requirement of
productive use provide safeguards, particularly for women, in keeping
with Islamic injunctions of ‘use it or lose it’. Islamic inheritance thus
follows the principle that land entitlements are based upon the fulfilment
of obligations, a compatible Islamic concept.
Islamic law is an important source of land law in Tanzania,
particularly in Zanzibar. Some tenures (such as waqf, once covering half of
Zanzibar)36 continue despite the socialist framework, as waqf objectives are
unchangeable by even the government. Developments in Tanzanian land
policy exhibit another aspect of Islamic land law. The paradigm shift from
rights-based to needs-based tests is easily accommodated in Islam, with its
emphasis upon rights being conditional on productive use. According to
Jones-Pauly, ‘the Islamic injunction that those with more land than they
need or use “lend” to those in need’ becomes important for Tanzania, so
34 VN Moyo ‘The National Land Policy 1995, the Land Acts 1999 & the Presidential
Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters: Contradictory perspectives on land reforms
and securing rights of disadvantaged Tanzanians’ ( 2002). 
35 D Tsikata ‘Securing women’s interests within land tenure reforms: Recent debates in
Tanzania’ (2003) 3(1) Journal of Agrarian Change 149 - 183.
36 L Fair Pastimes & politics: Culture, community and identification in post-abolition urban
Zanzibar, 1890 - 1994 (2001).
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‘borrowing’ from relatives and non-relatives.37 
Despite the absence of land ownership and the official state monopoly
of land, an active property market exists.38 Under the Village Land Acts
1999 such lands can be alienated to foreign investors, and the President
may transfer ‘in public interest’. Though no monetary value was attributed
to land, per se, contributions and improvements (such as construction,
cultivation and trees) created security of tenure tantamount to ‘ownership’.
A holder of deemed or customary right of occupancy may dispose of his/
her interest by mortgage, pledge or sale in accordance with customary law,
but the commodification of land emphasises its productive use. The
ideological shifts and the free market forces appear to point towards a
return to individual unrestricted freehold. 
Shivji argues that the land tenure system in Tanzania needs
revolutionary steps and greater democratisation if security of tenure is to
be made available to the majority.39 The Tanzanian Land Commission
(1991) which he headed found that most Tanzanians, especially in rural
areas, do not have security of tenure over land, but the move towards a
land market economy required revisiting notions about the value and
ownership of land.40 The Commission’s recommendations were mostly
accepted by the Government in 1995, but it disagreed with the location of
radical title and the reform of land administration. The 2004 amendments
to the Land Act now render bare land as a transferable commodity at
market value. 
The Tanzanian experience differs from Kenya’s because of their
respective colonial encounters with customary and Islamic law. Some of
the players (Sultan of Zanzibar and the Arab land owners) were similar but
the revolutionary politics and ideologies varied. In Kenya, Islamic land
law was hijacked primarily as a tool for individual land ownership,
without accountability. In Tanzania, it had a more subtle but responsible
role in supporting socialist and customary tenures balancing land rights
and productive use. Whether Tanzania retains its socialist model or moves
towards individual ownership, Muslim customary land norms will
continue to influence land tenure initiatives. 
37 C Jones-Pauly ‘Old problems and new ideologies in land reform in Tanzania’ in Land
tenure in development cooperation: Guiding principles (1998).
38 JM Kironde ‘Understanding land markets African urban areas: The case of Dar Es
Salaam, Tanzania’ (2000) 24 Habitat International 151 - 165.
39 IG Shivji Not yet democracy: Reforming land tenure in Tanzania (1998) 19.
40 Government of Tanzania Report of the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Land
Matters (1991).
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Nigeria
Long before the advent of British colonial rule in the area, Islamic land
tenure and land administration were well established under the Sokoto
Caliphate,41 and Nigeria offers an intriguing study of Muslim customary
practices and Islamic land law fused in the face of the colonial onslaught.
Commentators from Meek to Yakubu point to Islamic and customary laws
as key sources of Nigerian land law, alongside statutory law and English
law, but embedded within customary systems and the newer forms of
tenure.42 Northern Nigeria is predominantly Muslim, with Kano and
Sokoto among the oldest and biggest centres of Islam in West Africa. A
fusion of Hausa and Muslim cultures and pre-existing customary land
tenure are well-adapted to local conditions.43 Though Shari’a operates in
northern Nigeria, especially in civil matters (marriage and inheritance), the
customary laws of the various ethnic groups continue. 
The Sokoto Caliphate (1809-1906) was the largest state in West Africa
after the fall of Songhai in the sixteenth century, and followed classical
Islamic land law.44 Land was ‘owned’ by God, and human beings only
had ‘usufructuary’ rights, constructed more broadly than under Roman
law. The valid possessor of land could sell, pledge or loan, and enter into
tenancy agreements, without interference from any authority, subject to
the rights of others or community welfare. The land tenure systems
asserted political control over the emirates, while securing political and
social cohesion. 
Land classification, regulation and taxation were guided by the nature
of land (occupied or unoccupied), land use and the status of the owner. The
five land categories introduced by the Caliphate were land held in absolute
ownership by individuals/groups (mamluka); state land (amiriyya);
common land (matruka); ‘dead’ land (mawatoi) or God's bush (dajin Allah);
endowments (waqf). These closely resemble the 1858 Ottoman Land Code
(though Nigeria was not ruled by the Ottomans), indicating how land
jurisprudence was shared between Africa and the rest of the Muslim
world.45 Though individual ownership was recognised by Islamic land
law, it was subject to productive and responsible use, and private
ownership could be exercised either individually or collectively. While the
Caliphate was relying on Islamic law sources from the Qur’an to ijma
41 M Last The Sokoto Caliphate (1977).
42 CK Meek Land tenure and administration in Nigeria and the Cameroons (1957) 163; MG
Yakubu Nigerian land law (1985) 6. 
43 A Frishman ‘The impact of Islam on the urban structure and economy of Kano,
Nigeria’ (1986) 7(2) Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 464 - 475. 
44 HJ Abdullahi & I Hamza ‘Women and land in Northern Nigeria: the rights’ in LM
Wanyeki (ed) Women and land in Africa (2003) 133 - 175.
45 Sait & Lim (n 2 above).
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aristocracy from taking more land, and to resettle those displaced by jihad.
Key features of the Sokoto land policies were generating revenue,
increasing land productivity and improving access to land as well as
protection of lands (hima) and grant of virgin lands (iqta). Valuable lands,
such as those containing minerals, were held by the State and granted to
those who could exploit it and paid mining royalties.46 
Like the Ottomans, the Caliphate administered land closely, through
annual tributes or land tax paid by the emirates, tax on Muslims and non-
Muslims, tax on farm produce (kharaj or kudin - al - barkar kasa), and
charitable levy (zakat). Non-Muslims, governed by their own customary
laws, had both proprietary and usufructuary land rights, but had to pay
tribute tax (zijya) for protection as well as exemption from military
service.47 They were allowed to observe their religion and customs, and
had rights to buy, sell, bequeath and lease out their land as freehold
without interference; non-Islamic courts served non-Muslims who had
dhimmi or tributary status within a Muslim domain.
The Sokoto Caliphate is known for several land innovations. First,
Islamic law here did not recognise holding of land for a fixed tenure, but
on the duration of productive use, even though extensions may involve
formal re-applications. Second, the Caliphate extended the concept of
Islamic endowments (waqf) to land obtained by jihad, so that annexed lands
were not booty but protected for the benefit of the community. Lands in
Sokoto and Gwandu (the capital) were declared waqf, exempt from taxes
and protected from alienation. Third, the Caliphate recognised the
practical difference between urban and rural land: lands in and around
towns required permits from the Emir, but less for those further away.
Another Islamic land categorisation is based on whether land is occupied,
unoccupied or common land. Lands deemed as ‘dead’ (mewat) are those
that have not been owned or cultivated, such as pasture, fallow land or
vacant land. In addition to the State, it was the religious leader with
community and political status (Imam) who granted ownership to
individuals, while accountable to the Emir for his decisions. He could not
alienate waqf land, but distributed ushr or abandoned non-booty land
acquired by Muslims from non-Muslims, on the basis of need and ability
to use, as well as charity. 
Lugard, first High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria (1900-06), with
experience from India, Egypt, and East Africa, in 1903 addressed the
defeated Fulani elders thus:
46 Sait & Lim (n 2 above) 77.
47 I Jumare ‘Land tenure in Sokoto Sultanate Northern Nigeria’ unpublished PhD thesis, York
University, 1995 11.
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by conquest from the people, and if Government require land it will take it for
any purpose.48 
The Land Proclamation Act of 1902 made all lands in Northern Nigeria
public or crown land (public lands acquired from the Caliphate, crown
lands bought by the Royal Niger Company). Under indirect rule, caliphate
officials became merely salaried district heads accountable to the British
for peace-keeping and tax collection, and were to supervise and protect the
indigenous population's traditional rights.49 Now, the government
derecognised private ownership in ‘community lands’ and required
‘occupancy certificates’. For the Muslims, the Islamic land inheritance
laws continued but their land was sought to be administered in the name
of Muslim customary land laws derived from Islamic law. 
Lugardian indirect rule policy created multiple systems of land tenure
and administration. Islamic laws and court system (headed by Islamic
judge alkali) continued to govern the personal status of Muslims including
land disputes, marriage and release of slaves, to which was added English
property laws, particularly for the settlers and eventually for the Nigerian
elite. The British in effect confirmed the Hausa-Fulani socio-cultural and
political model in the Nigerian middle belt.50 The emirs were empowered
as ‘traditional rulers’ and justified their interpretation of 'tradition' on the
basis of their understanding of Islamic law and how their decisions
promoted general welfare.
Lugard’s successor Girouard recognised the significance of Islamic
law from his Sudan experience, and translated from French the
Moukhtasar, a well-known treatise on Islamic jurisprudence from the North
African Maliki school (followed by the Sokoto Caliphate) which he argued
guided Islamic conceptions on tax and land.51 He amended the 1902 Land
Proclamation Act in the Land and Native Rights Proclamation of 1910,
which remained in use until 1962, and reduced the rights of chiefs and
subjects. Colonial representations of land tenure were not merely aimed at
revenue generation, but followed a political logic which misrepresented
indigenous experience and led to contemporary problems in African
states.52 
48 F Shaw A tropical dependency: An outline of the ancient history of the Western Sudan, with an
account of the modern settlement of Northern Nigeria (1905) 451.
49 A Kirk-Greene The principles of native administration in Nigeria: Selected documents 1900 -
1947 (1965).
50 M Ochonu ‘Colonialism within colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate imaginary and the
British colonial administration of the Nigerian Middle Belt’ (2008) 10(2) African Studies
Quarterly 95 - 127.
51 ML Smith ‘Sir Percy Girouard: French Canadian proconsul in Africa 1906 - 1912’
unpublished MA thesis, McGill University 1989.
52 S Pierce Farmers and the state in colonial Kano: Land tenure and the legal imagination (2005). 
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law, to be administered by the Muslim elite, created a situation where
Islam was expressed through a customary framework. Customary land
practices had endured during the Caliphate, particularly in the rural areas.
While Islamic land law did not extinguish customary tenures, it certainly
borrowed from them and in turn influenced them. As Islamic land law
retreated into customary forms, it interacted with Muslim customary and
non-customary practices more intensively. A 1949 report on land tenure by
a colonial officer documented eight modes of acquisition or transfer of land
under customary laws, which bear close resemblance to Islamic land
tenures: allocation of an abandoned farm or uncleared bush by the village
head, inheritance (gado), gift by an existing owner (kyauta), purchase (saye),
acceptance of a pledge (jingina), lease (aro) sharecropping (kashi or
nomamuraba) and loan (aro).53 
No uniform system of customary law operated in Nigeria, but a
plurality of localised customs intersecting with Islamic norms. Customary
laws varied among ethnic groups and even within an ethnic area, not in
essence but in detail.54 Individual usufructuary rights could be upgraded to
absolute rights, but in the context of family decisions and particular modes
of acquisition such as reclamation of an area, partition of family property
or gifts among living persons (inter vivos). The Nigerian tribal philosophy
that land was sacred corresponded with Islamic ideas of land as a gift of
God, to be exercised responsibly and for the benefit of the whole
community.55 
Customary tenure did not forbid alienation of land, although there
were restrictions on it leaving the community. The right of disposal
belonged only to the community, acting through traditional authorities,
and exercised in accordance with customary law. Land in Northern
Nigeria could be held individually or jointly, or by the gandu (extended
family) as a lifetime allotment. In most communally held land, individuals
or households exercised usufruct rights rather than ‘ownership’ of the land.
The customary system is based on the needs of the individual, within the
bounds of the land available. 
In 1960 independent Nigeria assumed ownership of all land, and the
1962 Land Tenure Law repealed previous laws and created the nationally
uniform category of ‘native lands’. The 1978 Land Use Act sought to
nationalise land, but its centralised land governance led to bureaucratic
hierarchical decision-making which undermined customary institutions. It
divided lands into ‘urban’ and other land, and distinguished two rights of
53 CW Rowling Report on land tenure: Kano Province (1939).
54 BT Aluko & AR Amidu ‘Women and land rights reforms in Nigeria: Promoting land
administration and good governance’. Paper presented at the 5th FIG Regional
Conference, Accra, Ghana, 8 - 11 March 2006.
55 OA Famoriyo ‘Administration of land allocation in Nigeria’ (1985) 1(3) Land Use Policy
103.
106    Chapter 5occupancy (customary and statutory), echoing the Tanzanian experience.
Customary rights were bestowed by the local government, statutory rights
by the governor. The statutory Certificate of Occupancy confers leasehold
rights (on payment of rents) for periods up to 99 years, renewable, and
acceptable to banks for purposes of mortgages and loans, while individuals
could sell or transfer their interest. If the land is undeveloped, the holder
can only retain one plot of up to half a hectare; any excess, or undeveloped
land, returns to the state. 
While controversy remains over the imposition of other aspects of
Islamic law in Northern Nigerian, Islamic land law is not on the agenda
because customary land practices of Muslims are seen as compatible with
Islamic land principles. Customary rights, including those obtained by
inheritance, are adjudicated in local (Shari’a) courts, and traditional
authorities regularly use Islamic principles to settle land disputes (such as
the Supreme Council of Shari’a in Oyo State).56 Thus Islamic law remains
an important source of Nigerian land law. 
5 Secularised Islamic land law in Senegal 
Islam since the eleventh century, and the French even before colonisation,
have combined to create Senegal’s unique Western African Muslim
secular model. The 1963 Constitution declares Senegal to be a secular state
(article 1), with no allowance for Islamic land tenure. Senegal was led for
over twenty years after independence by a French-speaking and Catholic
modernist, Senghor, yet one can still discern Islamic dynamics in
negotiating land relations. 
While Vallon, the Governor of Senegal and proponent of assimilation,
saw Islam as private, custom, and not openly challenging to French culture
and laws, taming Islam was important because the French understood the
potency of political Islam and that its growth was partly because it was not
associated with the colonialists. The French scholar-administrators
developed a theory of ‘Black Islam’ (Islam noir) which held that the
localised and unorthodox African Islam was inferior to proper Arab Islam.
The French attempted to racialise Islam by projecting differences and
dividing the Western African Muslims and sub-Saharan Muslims.57
During the French colonial rule, Islam expanded, exploiting the French
grudging toleration of Muslim practices and also the growth of city-based
trade. 
56 R Blench et al The role of traditional rulers in conflict prevention and mediation in Nigeria
(2006).
57 JL Triaud ‘Islam in Africa under French colonial rule’ in N Levtzion & R Pouwels
(eds) The history of Islam in Africa (1997) 169 - 188.
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and survival. Islamic norms hid among customary laws to avoid being
purged, and the chiefs had wide discretion in applying both custom as well
as Islamic Maliki law (Risala) in land matters. Islamic leaders (marabouts)
resisted colonial land tenure, packaging Islam as indigenous custom.
Despite running their taalibé (Qur’anic or Coranic schools), marabouts were
seen as the only organised social institution capable of legitimising colonial
policies, in return for toleration of their customary or Islamic character.58
The French also found it difficult to rid the Senegalese of other Islamic
groups such as the mystical Sufi brotherhoods,59 and the Murids who
developed their own tenure systems. Most ‘mainstream Muslims’ (Sunni
Malikis) were sufficiently enmeshed in customary land practices to be
characterised as adherents of customary rather than Islamic tenure, yet
conflicts did arise between Islamic and customary land systems within
communities. 
Islamic family and inheritance law shows the influence of Islamic land
law in Senegal. The 1963 Constitution had no specific provisions relating
to customary and Islamic law, but Islam directly influences laws on
marriage, affiliation, succession and ownership relations. French attempts
at secularising the laws did not displace either customary or Islamic laws,
and the current legal system follows legal pluralism through civil law,
customary norms and Senegalese Islamic law. The post-independence
modernisation of Senegalese family and property law borrowed from
French law, but the objectives of the 1961 Codification Commission
included ‘observing prescriptions related to family law in the Qur'an’. The
resulting Family Code 1973 shifted recognition from customary to the
Islamic. It abrogated all general and local customs apart from those
regulating the formalities of marriage, and any reference by the courts to
customary laws is not permitted, recognising only Islamic law. In practice,
however, custom continues to flow into Senegalese practice even though
not a formal source of succession and family laws. The Family Code
contains provisions on succession derived from classical Islamic law, while
incorporating some French succession ideas and Senegalese Islamic
customary laws. Senegal chose to be modern, with no one religion for the
basis of its laws, but promoted legal pluralism and rejected anti-faith
approaches. The hybrid model of Islamic/modern works because it
preserves the unity of the family and respects the social diversity of the
nation. Thus, Senegal refined ‘secularism’ not as the French did
(separation of church and state), but as a positive example of Islamic law
applied within a secular system.60 
58 MC Diop & M Diouf ‘L’Administration Sénégalaise, les confréries relieuses et les
paysanneries’ (1992) 17 Africa Development 65 - 87.
59 L Behrman Muslim brotherhoods and politics in Senegal (1970).
60 AA An-Na’im Islam and the secular state: Negotiating the future of Shari’a (2008).
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them. In 1904, it stated that all ‘vacant and unowned land’ (terres vides et
sans maîtres, derived from the Islamic indirass principle) belonged to the
state. Private rights are generally established through ten (or twelve) years
of continuous occupation and use, and landholders not cultivating their
own land are obliged to have it worked by others (tenants, sharecroppers,
borrowers), otherwise their ownership lapses. Such powers were endorsed
and expanded by 1976 laws which govern state property and rules on
expropriation of land for public purposes. The French also used favourable
Islamic support for private property for their decrees of 1932 and 1935,
which resonate in the Senegalese Civil Code even today. Article 56 of the
Constitution of Senegal guarantees the protection of human rights, but
private landed property applies only to about 2% of the land. However, the
chaotic nature of customary property regimes (through which Muslims
accessed their individual property rights) and abuse prompted reform of
customary systems. In 1964 the law on the domaine national repealed all
autochthonous land rights, turning most land into national land. 
In practice, both custom and Islamic law (the Maliki Risala) were the
basis of customary land law and were accepted by the colonial
administration, the Chefs de Canton who had wide discretion in dealing with
land matters. The Senegalese colonial land tenure system (Lamanat)
administered through the customary chiefs (chef de terre) were supplanted
by hand-picked district chiefs as part of the colonial administration (chef the
canton), leading to both chiefs allocating state land. Such was the
continuing confusion over roles, that in 1964 President Senghor
superseded customary law and structures. The French also failed in their
efforts to register customary land use rights (immitriculation) because of
resistance to registering ownership of customary lands. 
At independence, the Senegalese Commission on Tenurial Reform
(1960) recognised that French individual land registration had failed, the
customary tenurial system was problematic, and expressed concerns over
religious groups’ abuse of lands at their disposal. The 1964 Law of
National Property recommended unifying a complex system including
customary, colonial and Islamic rights. The law recognised existing titles
and provided a two-year period for registration, and classified lands into
urban areas, classified areas, cultivated land and recently developed
agricultural land in forest area.61 The independent government retained
the colonial regime of state ownership of most land, but created a
framework of local institutions called communautes rurales to administer the
land.62 
61 HE Golan ‘Land tenure reform in the peanut basin of Senegal’, in Bruce JW (ed),
Searching for land tenure security in Africa (1994).
62 MS Freudenberger Land tenure, local institutions and natural resources in Senegal (1994). 
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responsible for planning and implementing development. Senegalese
achievements include the extensive but controversial land reform that
strengthened the village community's land allocation role and mechanisms
for resolving disputes, where Islamic practices are evident. Senghor called
the 1964 law a ‘return to the African culture’ and a negation of colonialist
legal doctrine and bourgeois concepts of land ownership. The privileges of
the Islamic leaders (marabouts) were safe-guarded, and their role in
customary land tenure system continues. Islamic and customary land
norms are not ‘officially’ part of the land tenure system but not hard to
find. 
6 Conclusions
The case studies in this chapter show that Islamic land law in each country
or local region takes a different form and role within pluralist land systems.
Though its visibility varies, its influence direct or indirect is detectable
though its own name, under the rubric of custom or through principles
captured in statute. The relevance of religion and the creativity of culture
keep changing in globalising communities where Islam and custom
continually intersect.63 African Islamic land law challenges the Orientalist
and neo-colonial characterisations of Islam as autonomous,
homogeneous, unchanging or rigid. Islamic and customary tenures are
either modified and formalised into law, or absorbed into national land
legislation and policies, usually without comment or credit. 
Each African country’s colonial encounter has been different. The
colonial drama involved personalities, ideologies, corporate interests,
resistances and alliances. The contest was not simply between collective
custom and colonially inspired individual tenures, but a range of tenure
concoctions, accommodations and compromises, with Islam playing an
important visible or background role. The colonial legacy on land
generally was the promotion of individualised tenure, but the colonisers
hardly ‘introduced’ individual tenure. 
At independence, most African countries with large Muslim
populations and Islamic histories and identities mostly kept the
metropole’s legal systems with some repackaging. Unlike many Arab
States who reverted to Islamic law, the Africans consciously chose not to
adopt a single religious framework. This multiculturalism can be partly
explained as respect for non-Muslim minorities, while Islamic family law
for Muslims was invariably retained. This was also because the Muslim
Africans were generally comfortable with their dual identity as Muslims
and Africans, and so chose Islamic law and custom as arbitrated by
63 MI Aguilar ‘Religion as culture or culture as religion? The status quaestionis of ritual and
performance’ (2000) 1(2) Culture and Religion: An Interdisciplinary Journal 233 - 245.
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countries such as Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and Mauritania the contest
between Islamic and customary law is more pronounced, but with regard
to land the two are closely joined. African culture and traditions are seen
as the glue that holds people together and allow communities, including
Muslim societies, to function. 
The successful partnership between Islamic land law and Muslim (and
often non-Muslim) customary land norms is a curious but comprehensible
phenomenon. A supposedly uncompromising monotheist religion was
often combined with drums, dances, magic and superstition, blurring the
lines between Muslim African customs and Muslim religious beliefs.
Many Africans view Allah as the supreme traditional spirit, or at least one
of the two parts of the same religious experience. The accommodation
between the two has been attributed to the Islamic concept of racial
equality, acceptance of practices such as polygamy and circumcision and
(in defiance of traditionalists) belief in spirits. Common to Islam and
African custom are family, community and kinship loyalties which often
take precedence over religious ties for many individuals, and in some West
African areas there are many families with Muslim and non-Muslim
members.
The conversation between the spiritually sacred character of African
communal property and the religiously founded Islamic land tenure is
striking. African customs, though varied, generally constructed land as
belonging to the Gods and the spirits, through ancestors and with regard
to future generations, where the living venerate the land and use it
gratefully.64 Land was worshipped under traditional customs as the
expression of the Gods, just as Qur’an refers to land as God’s bounty and a
‘sign’ of divine gifts (ni’amah). Though Islamic land tenures promoted
individual (as well as communal) rights these are not unconditional, as
God alone has the right to absolute ownership of all worldly things, and
individuals merely have usufructuary rights.65 As such it is widely
recognised that ‘the Islamic philosophy of property is more similar to the
African way of thinking than the northern ideal of private property’.66 The
colonial commodification of land threatened the African way of life,
leading a closer liaison between African custom and the Islamic range of
land tenures. 
The resilience of Islamic land law is broader than common law or civil
law, and its significance, as a way of life, goes beyond the appeal of
colonial law or modern legislation. It is the socio-cultural values and
64 ES Craigwell-Handy ‘The religious significance of land’ (1939) 38 Royal Africa Society
114 - 123. 
65 S Behdad ‘Property rights in contemporary Islamic economic thought: A critical
survey’ (1989) 47 Review of Social Economy 2.
66 GTZ ‘Property regimes in land – a socioeconomic analysis’ in Land tenure in development
cooperation: Guiding principles (1998).
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Islamic land law its vigour. Islam also served as a trading and law-giving
religion, and furnished ethical rules for markets, financing (prohibition of
interest) and contracts. In addition to core legal doctrines covering the
family, wrongs, procedure, and commercial transactions, Islamic law also
includes detailed rules regulating religious ritual and social etiquette. 
The gendered impact of Islamic land law also requires further study,
for example the much-vaunted claim that Muslim women are better off
than under customary laws which mostly did not permit inheritance by
women. Islamic law does recognise extensive rights of Muslim women to
own, manage, inherit and dispose land under the authority of the Qur’an,
despite lesser inheritance shares.67 Muslim women develop strategies to
counter the patriarchal control of assets.68 When Muslim women are
denied their land rights despite their Islamic prescriptions, what are the
remedies?69 From pre-independence Nigeria where Islamic law had to be
clarified to permit women to inherit land (again),70 to present day debates
over land and gender in Muslim African countries, it is civil society
debates, political space and gendered participation that are critical to
translating property rights of Muslim women. 
African Islam in general and African Islamic law in particular, has
remained largely neglected in the global land discourse and agenda,71
which assumes that Africa is ‘only superficially Islamised’.72 It is also an
anthropological obfuscation to collate custom and Islamic norms despite
their close relationship. The persistence of sophisticated Islamic land tools
arising from Islam’s historical presence in Africa and the size of its Muslim
populations should challenge the indifference of land researchers,
professionals and policy makers, such as the Global Land Tool Network
(GLTN). Hanretta73 argues that conventional research methods, derived
from colonial misunderstandings, prevent an appreciation of Muslim
intellectual history and its contributions in Africa. Islam is a distinctive
contributor to African land law, directly or indirectly, not just another
morphing custom. More detailed studies, at African, country and local
level are needed to test Muslim claims of human rights, empowerment and
67 JP Platteau et al Marriage system, access to land, and social protection for women (2000) 17 -
18.
68 S Sait & H Lim ‘Accidental Islamic feminism: Dialogical approaches to Muslim
women’s inheritance rights’ in H Lim & A Bottomley (eds) Feminist perspectives on land
law (2007) 133 - 157.
69 SF Hirsch Pronouncing and persevering: Gender and the discourses of disputing in an African
Islamic court (1998).
70 S Pierce ‘Farmers and “Prostitutes”: Twentieth-century problems of female inheritance
in Kano Emirate, Nigeria’ (2003) 44 Journal of African History 463 - 486.
71 S Sait The relevance of Islamic land law for policy and project design (2008). 
72 O Kane ‘Moderate revivalists: Islamic inroads in sub-saharan Africa’ (2007) Harvard
International Review 64 - 68.
73 S Hanretta Islam and social change in French West Africa: History of an emancipatory
community (2009).
112    Chapter 5participation, and the compatibility of Islamic land laws with universal
development goals and standards. 
Whilst both customary law and Shari’a have an influence beyond their
more narrowly defined area of personal status law, their respective futures
are quite different. Customary law faces an uncertain future, but Shari’a
will continue to grow and develop on the continent, with few countries
unaffected. 
6CHAPTE
R THE HUMWE PRINCIPLE:
A SOCIAL-ORDERING
GRUNDNORM FOR ZIMBABWE
                                         AND AFRICA?  1
Ben Chigara 
 
1 Introduction 1
The obligation of our profession is to serve as healers of human
conflict. To fulfil our traditional obligation means that we should
provide mechanisms that can produce an acceptable result in the
shortest possible time, with the least possible expense and with the
minimum of stress on the participants. That is what justice is all
about!2
Zimbabwe’s land issue has been subject of much litigation between the
principals, namely the commercial farmers and the government of
President Mugabe, involving the Zimbabwe Supreme Court, the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal in Namibia, and the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes in
Washington, but remains unresolved. The coalition government of
President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsvangirai appears to hold
contrasting views. This chapter considers not whether the Zimbabwe land
issue is a justiciable matter,3 but upon what principle it should be resolved. 
Public international law is clear that the existence of a legal dispute is
an objective question.4 Non-legal disputes are generally regarded as non-
justiciable.5 The logic behind the distinction may no longer subsist in light
of the requirement attendant upon tribunals to establish their jurisdiction
1 The term Grundnorm denotes the basic norm, order, or rule that forms an underlying
basis for a legal system. H Kelsen General theory of law and state (1949).
2 WE Burger ‘Isn’t there a better way?’(1982) 68 American Bar Association Journal 274, 275. 
3 See especially South West Africa case (1962) ICJ Rep. 319 328; Interpretation of Peace
Treaties case (1950) ICJ Rep. 65 74; Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (1924) PCIJ Ser.
A, No 2, 11; SMG Koopmans diplomatic dispute settlement: The use of inter-state conciliation
(2008) 11 - 16; J Nijman & A Nollkaemper New perspectives on the divide between national
and international law (2007).
4 South West Africa (1962) ICJ Rep. 319 328; Interpretation of Peace Treaties case (1950) ICJ
Rep. 65 at 74; Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (1924) PCIJ Ser. A, No 2, 11. 
5 Haya de la Torre (1951) ICJ Rep. 71 at 8.113
114    Chapter 6before considering the issues. Thus the alleged distinction between
justiciable and non-justiciable disputes has the effect of enabling or
disabling a tribunal’s capacity to address a matter. Writing in 1921, Master
of the Supreme Court Jelf supposed that the distinction between justiciable
and non-justiciable disputes was plain to see:
Everyone can understand the general meaning of justiciable disputes. They are
those disputes which admit of judicial determination in the Courts of Justice,
and everyone can name certain disputes which fall obviously upon one side or
the other of the line.6 
Some eighty-seven years later, Koopmans pointed to the difficulties with
the distinction.7 The quest for a typical definition of ‘legal dispute’ has
proved extremely elusive and difficult.8 If we suppose that political
disputes, as opposed to legal disputes, are characterised first and foremost
by a lack of competing legal claims, then that would make the former
synonymous with non-legal disputes. But such a supposition presupposes
also the existence of a comprehensive legal system that has previously
contemplated and provided for all eventualities, which exists nowhere.
The situation is made more complex because the term ‘political dispute’ is
used habitually ‘to argue that a matter is of greatest importance’, not to
suggest that a matter lacks legal claims.9 Consequently, it seems better to
refer to political disputes as those where application of the law would not
be useful, because of the higher general interest that would be affected by
the insistence upon legal claim rights of disputants. 
Non-justiciable disputes are often described as those disputes that do
not lend themselves to judicial settlement, where settlement by the
application of rules of law would not resolve the dispute at all. Koopmans
concludes that within the scope of non-justiciable disputes ‘… fall those
disputes of which treatment by a court would not allow the court to fulfil
its function as a court of justice.’10 He prays in aid Hersch Lauterpacht
(‘certain disputes should not be decided judicially, because practical reality
does not allow for solution of the case through legal settlement’) and Kunz,
who writes that, while ‘disputes can be judicially decided, it is not true that
they can be judicially settled’.11 
This suggests that the mere presence of competing legal claims may
not be sufficient to qualify a dispute as justiciable, with acceptance by the
disputants of a judicial determination of the issues. This enhances the
perception of the Tribunal’s stature in the estimation of those regulated by
6 A Jelf ‘Justiciable disputes’ (1921) 7 Transactions of the Grotius society 59.
7 Koopmans (n 3 above) 11 - 16.
8 See also B Chigara Legitimacy deficit in custom: A deconstructionist critique (2001) 118 - 121;
P Allot ‘The emerging universal legal system’ in Nijman & Nollkaemper (n 4 above)
63 - 83.
9 Koopmans (n 3 above) 15.
10 Koopmans (n 3 above) 18.
11 As above.
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determination of the relevant Tribunal, and neither the Tribunal nor the
abiding party can do anything about it, then such a dispute could be termed
political. In this sense the potential of disputants to cooperate with the
decision of the relevant Tribunal becomes a significant factor in the
determination whether a dispute is justiciable or not. 
This chapter argues that the rejection of considerations of underlying
context by all the Courts that have so far pronounced on the matter,
coupled with their common insistence on a blind rule-of-law approach that
acknowledges only current context, not the underlying context, has
resulted in the alienation of the much favoured context specific African
social-ordering principle of humwe, which may offer the key to resolving
the matter. This is because, as a tool of social construction, the law does
not possess an autonomous existence. Poole argues that the law often
relies on the ‘past as a storehouse of dramatic examples that can be drawn
upon to guide decision making and as a source of constitutive values’ for
combating justificatory narratives that may be deployed to ensure a
particular position.12 Watson’s distant social realities theory shows that
‘laws come from men reflecting on [their] ancient traditions… and not
from [their] … serious consideration of what rules would be most suitable
for the contemporary society’.13 According to Geertz, ‘law and
ethnography are crafts of place: they work by the light of local
knowledge’.14 Local knowledge itself, on any matter, is to be found in the
particular culture, defined in part as a storehouse of collective or pooled
learning.15 The past as context is critical to the comprehension of social
challenges such as Zimbabwe’s land issue. Majority-rule SADC States,
including Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, have adopted
humwecentric legislation as a means of addressing the legacies of apartheid
rule on their territories. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act16
and South Africa’s emergent Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2001
are examples of this approach. In South Africa, President Zuma himself
chairs South Africa’s Advisory Council on Black Economic
Empowerment. The declared purpose of South Africa’s Black Economic
Empowerment Act17 is to reverse economic inequality along racial lines,
previously championed and entrenched by successive apartheid
administrations until the advent of majority rule in 1994.18 Its dynamic
seeks to enhance the number of black people that manage, own and control
12 T Poole ‘Harnessing the power of the past? Lord Hoffmann and the Belmarsh detainees
case’ (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 534.
13 A Watson ‘From legal transplants to legal formants’ (1995) American Journal of
Comparative Law 469 470. 
14 C Geertz Local knowledge 167.
15 C Geertz The interpretation of cultures 4 - 5.
16 Act 17 of 2005.
17 Act 53 of 2000.
18 http://www.thedti.gov.za/bee/beehome.htm (accessed 4 June 2010.)
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and Industry’s work in this area by:
(1) Establishing a legislative framework for the promotion of Black
Economic Empowerment. 
(2) Empowering the Minister to issue Codes of Good Practice and
publishing Transformation Charters.
(3) Establishing the Black Economic Empowerment Advisory Council. 
(4) Making provision for matters connected therewith.19 
This emerging state practice on the significance of context to the
determination of social issues raises the question whether, and to what
extent, African states may invoke their ancient traditions in dealing with
and addressing present challenges. Kahn-Freund writes that the UK
refused to sign the Geneva Conventions of 1930 and 1931 on bills of
exchange and cheques precisely because it wished to keep intact its own
laws and preserve ‘that which was felt to express an ancient tradition’.20
We might ask whether there exists a link between the dominance of
African States on the list of failed States21 and their attachment to African
social-ordering ideas traceable to their own ancient traditions, rather than
transplants of little or no relevance at all to them. In his examination of the
uses and misuses of law-making, Kahn-Freund listed three purposes that
may recommend the borrowing of legal ideas or techniques from sources
external to one’s own. 
(a) With the object of preparing the international unification of the law.
(b) With the object of giving adequate legal effect to a social change that is
shared by the foreign country with one’s own country.
(c) With the object of promoting at home a social change which foreign law
is designed either to express or to produce.22
But, even when such borrowing occurs from a different system, what may
really be happening in transactions of that nature may be similar to what
Poole described as resort to the ‘storehouse of ideas’,23 or what Watson has
characterised as reflecting on distant social realities, albeit in relation to
another state’s experience.24 This is not the same as colonial imposition of
values that even international law opposed as racist. This calls into
question African governments’ awareness of the place in their social
ordering practices of African ideas and techniques that had evolved and
19 n 18 above.
20 O Kahn-Freund, ‘On uses and misuses of comparative law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law
Review 4.
21 www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index (accessed 15
September 2010).
22 Kahn-Freund (n 21 above) 2.
23 Poole (n 12 above).
24 Watson (n 13 above).
  The Humwe principle: A social-ordering grundnorm for Zimbabwe and Africa?    117successfully supported life and civilisations on the continent before the
disruptive intervention of colonialism. 
Economic arguments for a cost-based approach to resolution of land
issues in Southern Africa abound, and generally tend towards
maintenance of the status quo. Rule of law approaches being rehearsed in
dispute settlement bodies reject social justice arguments, of which the land
issue is one. Regional and international tribunals have assumed
questionable competence to pronounce on measures appropriate for the
resolution of the matter. 
On 18 November 2008 the Windhoek based Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Tribunal passed judgment in Mike
Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe. On 22 April 2009 the
Washington-based International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) pronounced its judgment in Bernardus Henricus
Funnekotter and Others (Claimants) v Republic of Zimbabwe (Respondent).25
This essay argues that these cases suggest that the Zimbabwe land-
redistribution issue has festered largely because of apparent intellectual
and cultural hostility, indeed epistemicide, against well established African
ideas and techniques for social-ordering that predate the phenomenon of
colonisation and later globalisation.26 It recommends the use of the
principle of humwe, an ancient social-ordering paradigm credited with the
establishment and management of pre-colonial African societies. Connah
writes that historical and archaeological evidence point to the existence of
well organised African states with high population densities and cities of
20,000 or more inhabitants from AD 1000 until the onslaught of Europe’s
mighty empire-building nations. Areas of urban development in tropical
Africa included West Africa, the Ethiopian mountains, the East African
coast, the middle Nile, the Zimbabwe Plateau, the lower Congo and
around Lake Victoria. For these cities and States to develop, particular
social ordering ideas and techniques must have been implemented, which
support the concept of humwe as one of Africa’s enduring values.27
1.1 Humwe principle
Humwe is probably one of Africa’s oldest, most practised and most
enduring ideas. Humwe is Shona for ‘in this together’ and ‘us all’. Table 1
below shows the equivalent terms in other African languages. 
25 ICSID Case No ARB/05/6 judgment of 22 April 2009.
26 K Bennett ‘Epistemicide! The tale of a predatory discourse’ (2007) The Translator 13(2)
151 - 169.
27 G Connah African civilizations: Pre-colonial cities and states in tropical Africa: an
archaeological perspective (2001) 18 - 21 & 228. 
118    Chapter 6Table 2: Humwe in a selection of African States
Source: Author’s research
As an ideal, humwe targets the promotion of individual welfare through the
communal preservation of the inherent dignity of a community. It pursues
this objective by focusing on the fundamentals of equity, social justice and
human security. In all matters pertaining to social-ordering, and in
particular the distribution of life advantages and disadvantages, humwe
requires that all agents of the community focus on the whole and not the
sum of its parts. It insists on a knowledge-based, human-rights-orientated
paradigm to social ordering – what South Africa’s post-apartheid
government has popularised as ubuntu, meaning ‘to be human’. In other
words you achieve your humanity by pursuing humane values. In dispute
settlement, humwe or ubuntu targets four things.
The first is that all stakeholders must first reach the point where they
realise and acknowledge that sustainable relations on the matter of
difficulty – in this case unequal land distribution on racial lines – will only
be reached when the need of every community member has been met. 
The second is to establish a common understanding of the local
significance of land and how the majority, and not the minority, are to be
included in both its subsistence and commercial enterprise. This is because
quite apart from the social status and power that we commonly associate
with land ownership, especially in the West, in Zimbabwe’s
predominantly agricultural economy land ownership is key to survival.
The implementation of robust constitutional land laws by successive
colonial administrations had resulted in a situation where, at Zimbabwe’s
independence from Britain in 1980, native Zimbabweans held less than
5 percent of the country’s best land even though they represented
Term Language Where used
‘kunyitanira’ Kikuyu Kenya
‘apapo’ Yoruba Nigeria
‘ubumwe’ Kinyarwanda Rwanda
‘ubumwe’ Kirundi Burundi
‘umoja’ Swahili East Africa: Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zanzibar
‘ubuntu’ Sindebele South Africa, Zimbabwe
‘ubwananyina’ Bemba Zambia
‘pamodzi’ Nyanja Malawi, Zambia
‘al takafol al egtma’ey’ Arabic North Africa: Egypt, Libya,
Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan,
Algeria, 
‘ku tchew’ Baleng Cameroon
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legislation had expropriated the native black population of its lands
without compensation, and forced them onto land in regions with the least
agricultural potential and least favourable rainfall.28
The third is that humwe premised land redistribution must take
cognisance of the universal significance of land as a commodity in light of
the international human rights norm around which civilised nations are
being organised today. Human rights law has confirmed that every
individual has a right to life. Among the commercial and peasant farming
communities of Zimbabwe the fulfilment of that right implies the right to
own and use a portion of land for agricultural purposes. 
Fourthly, efficient humwe-premised social-ordering practice should
combine the local and the universal significance of land, with a common
appreciation of the significance of land to all stakeholders. That
understanding should then become the matrix on which land allocation
proceeds, ensuring that the rights and minimum needs of all stakeholders
are provided for. 
This approach is what I call humwefficiency.29 It appears more suited
than other paradigms to resolve a wide range of social issues in African
States because: 
• It takes account of the past as significant context in the determination of
the solution to the question at issue. 
• It accommodates both the local and universal insights into the problem in
order to maximise the recommended solution’s chance of success. 
• It is inclined towards reason and sober-mindedness rather than emotional
tantrums in seeking a solution to the issue.
• It is inclusive in that it requires the collective responsibility of all
stakeholders in constructing both the knowledge base and the solution for,
in the case of Zimbabwe and the SADC, the land issue.
• It inspires legitimacy because it is premised upon equity, fairness,
openness, human security and realism. 
• It requires a common understanding of the society’s historical fortunes and
misfortunes, and challenges all stakeholders to show both courage and
humility in perceiving one another as equals in the search for a solution to
their common inherited problem.
•  It requires the recognition by all stakeholders that the dignity inherent in
them as human beings depends upon their recognition of the dignity of
other stake-holders as human beings. 
28 B Chigara ‘Land rights and human rights in transitional states’ (2007) 11 Mediterranean
Journal of Human Rights 101 - 132. B Chigara ‘The inherent dignity of mankind and the
contest for labels in the land issue’ 72 Nordic Journal of International Law (2003) 369 - 397
29 B Chigara Land reform policy: The challenge of international human rights law 198.
120    Chapter 6In the final analysis, humwefficiency is a strategy for peaceful
coexistence that depends upon dialogue even among fractured
communities. Often it takes courage and humility for all stakeholders to
engage in humwefficient dialogue. Independent public commissions of
enquiry and a responsible media are possible facilitators in this process.
Humwefficient practice seeks consensus on a matter, so that procedures and
processes can be instituted to resolve it. That consensus fuels support of the
whole community to ensure the success of the programme of action. 
This approach liberates all stakeholders from any myths that they
might have previously held about their fellow human beings, and
recognises all stakeholders as co-owners of the resolution strategy with an
interest in its success. In this sense humwefficient practice unifies the
community by committing them to a commonly shared purpose. Even the
British Pioneer Column that first reached Salisbury in 1890 had been
treated by the native Africans with ubuntu. Gazi writes that: 
The first private wagon to arrive at Salisbury carried whisky and nothing else.
… Indeed it was the local Africans that had saved the settlers from starvation
during the drought of 1892 by providing them with food. Africans were still
prepared to help the foreign settlers with food and other provisions two years
after their arrival. The settlers, for their part, were still coldly exploiting any
such humane lapses on the part of the African.30 
Humwe is a human right value that privileges the recognition, promotion
and protection of the inherent dignity of the entire community over
personal aggrandisement. It argues that an individual’s self-fulfilment lies
in his/her determination to ensure the fulfilment of others. To be African
should be to be humwe driven. Apartheid’s most salient legacy in
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia - unequal land distribution on racial
lines – has proved difficult to sustain because of its conflict with these
states’ new social-ordering grundnorm, namely, humwe. Failure to accept
humwe as the new social-ordering grundnorm in these three SADC States
will result in needless litigation and endless human suffering.
1.1.1 Mike Campbell Case31
In the Mike Campbell case, some 77 white farmers challenged the validity
and operation of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act.32
Section 16 of the Act authorises inter alia that:
30 D Gazi Zimbabwe: Racism and the land question (2004) 91.
31 SADC Case No 2/2007 (28 November 2008); B Chigara ‘Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Tribunal: Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v
Republic of Zimbabwe 48 ILM (2009) 534 - 548.
32 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 17 of 2005.
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President may appoint may acquire and transfer full title of agricultural land
targeted for resettlement or other purpose.
(ii) Expropriations of title to land shall not be accompanied with
compensation except for any improvements effected on such land before it
was acquired.
(iii) No court may entertain a challenge to the compulsory acquisition of land
by the State.
The SADC Tribunal ruled that the implementation of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe Amendment of 2005 contradicted Zimbabwe’s obligations
under the constitutive SADC Treaty. According to the Tribunal, the
contested legislation had discriminated against the applicants on the basis
of race, because it authorised the Zimbabwe government to confiscate
agricultural lands for agricultural or other purposes without regard to the
principle of the rule of law. 
Following an impressive recital of the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights on the rule of law (some of which had also been
previously cited in decisions of the African Commission on Human and
People’s Rights, and of South African courts), the Tribunal held that: 
the Applicants had been deprived of their agricultural lands without having
had the right of access to the courts and the right to a fair hearing, which are
essential elements of the rule of law, and we consequently hold that the
Respondent has acted in breach of article 4(c) of the [SADC] Treaty.33
If the law always operated in a vacuum, this decision would be intact and
elegant, especially because of its consistency with human rights theory,
traceable to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). However,
when the same decision is examined under the light of the underlying context
of Zimbabwe’s colonial constitutional land statutes, it transforms into
violation of the law because of the Tribunal’s resort to selective use and
rejection of context. 
That selectivity rejects humwe as a valid candidate for application in
the resolution of the land issue in spite of its manifest presence and
application before and during colonisation. It rejects and disqualifies the
post-independent Zimbabwe government from passing constitutional land
laws to undo the colonial legacy of unequal land distribution based on
race. The Zimbabwean authorities could not restore humwe to its former
glory as the cardinal principle for the determination of land use in the
country, which appears to be the purpose and effect of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 2005. Instead the decision privileges
33 B Chigara (n 31 above) 544. Article 4(c) provides that the SADC and its member states
parties shall act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy, and the
rule of law.
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its violation of post-independence land-ordering laws. This decision lacks
legitimacy - law’s pull of its addresses towards compliance.34 Zimbabwe’s
Minister of State for National Security, Lands, Land Reform and
Resettlement, denounced the decision, stating that the SADC Tribunal
was ‘day-dreaming ... we will take more farms. It is not discrimination
against farmers, but correcting land imbalances.’ President Mugabe
himself described the Tribunal’s ruling as ‘an exercise in futility!’35 The
SADC Tribunal’s choice to reject the significance of underlying context in
this case appears to perpetuate, maintain and reinforce epistemicide
against ancient ideas of social-ordering on the continent. 
The SADC Tribunal condemned the Constitution of Zimbabwe
Amendment Act 2005 for breaching the constitutive provisions of the
SADC Treaty, in that it denied the applicants’ right to equal treatment
before the law, their right to a fair hearing before an independent and
impartial court of law or tribunal, and their right not to be discriminated
against on the basis of race or place of origin regarding ownership of
land.36 It rejected considering the historical treatment of land allocation in
Zimbabwe, starting with the 1894 Matabeleland Order in Council of the
British Government, all the way through to the Act of 2005. It gives no
reasons for taking this position, thereby infusing indeterminacy rather than
clarity in its work. It makes it difficult to predict which way the Court may
go next, and the Tribunal must still answer the question that it avoided,
namely: What makes colonial, racist, constitutional land-ordering statutes
superior to social justice inspired post-independence land-ordering ones?
Why did the Tribunal imply that only the colonial land-ordering statutes
that had instituted racially divisive formal private titles were relevant, but
not the humwe-inspired statutes that the government of the day sought to
enforce? Evidence of humwe social-ordering was commonplace among
pre-colonial African civilisations, probably as ancient as life itself on that
continent. Should it not therefore be a natural first choice strategy in the
resolution of social issues linked to the unjust legacy of colonialism in
Africa? 
The Tribunal’s rejection of the humwe-inspired Act of 2005 is most
curious, because even the colonial land-ordering paradigm applied
between 1890 and 1980 had acknowledged the significance of humwe land-
ordering practice in the 2.2 million acres earmarked in 1895 for native
occupation ‘according to their tribal custom’.37 In nine decades of
colonial-rule humwe land-ordering had been subordinated to private
ownership on white farmlands, but still applied to the Tribal Trust Lands
34 TM Franck The power of legitimacy among nations (1990) 23.
35 B Chigara (n 31 above) 530.
36 B Chigara (n 31 above) 538.
37 J Platteau ‘The evolutionary theory of land rights as applied to sub-saharan Africa: A
critical assessment’ (1996) 27 Development and Change 29.
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acquisition of land in Zimbabwe has had a long history. 
However, for the purposes of the present case, we need to confine ourselves
only to acquisitions carried out under section 16B of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe Amendment Act 17 of 2005.38 
This may go down as the saddest day in the Tribunal’s troubled life,
because research shows that Zimbabwe’s land issue has always been, and
is likely to remain, a matter of constitutional control. Through successive
pieces of constitutional laws, starting with the Matabeleland Order in
Council (1894) through to the Land Tenure Act (1969), successive colonial
administrations expropriated native land without compensation, just as
the 2005 Act (complained about in this case) seeks to do. 
The Tribunal’s unexplained exclusion of this context shows its naivety
and inclination towards epistemicide against concepts with demonstrable
record of success in social-ordering on the continent. Post-independence
Southern African governments are restoring these ideas, hence the
difficulties that the SADC Tribunal’s decision has created for itself. On 28
July 2004 Namibia’s Prime Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab stated that Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE) had become SADC States’ foremost post-
apartheid reconstruction objective. South Africa’s Black Economic
Empowerment Act of 200339 legally initiated a process for undoing
economic inequality along racial lines – the biggest weakness in the
economies of post-apartheid SADC States. 
The SADC Tribunal should learn that jurisprudence ignoring relevant
African social-ordering concepts makes bad law because it is inconsistent
with the legitimate expectations of the society that the Court must serve.
Courts should arrive at outcomes that the parties will find acceptable
through the clarity, objectivity and reasonableness of their arguments.
Graham writes that: 
The intersection of morals, law and ethics is nowhere evident than in the daily
affairs of those who practice law. Every aspect of the practice of law tests the
moral mettle of those who purport to act as agents of the legal system.40
Every act of ‘lawyering’ is filled with ethical implications that test lawyers’
moral fibre.
The SADC Tribunal’s decision in the Mike Campbell Case has been
roundly condemned and rejected by SADC member states, who are
reviewing the Tribunal’s role, functions and terms of reference, and have
38 B Chigara (n 31 above) 536.
39 http://www.thedti.gov.za/bee/beehome.htm (accessed 15 September 2010).
40 RN Graham ‘Moral contexts’ (2001) 50 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 77.
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Campbell decision has added to the controversy and discord on the land
issue, instead of illuminating it, because the Zimbabwe land issue is
steeped with its pre-colonial land use paradigm, premised on the humwe
principle. 
By the Royal Charter granted in 1889, the British South Africa
Company (the Company) had obtained from the British Government
authority to settle and administer an unspecified area known as Southern
Rhodesia. New patterns of property rights began to emerge in 1895, when
the Company identified 2.2 million acres for native occupation ‘according
to their tribal custom’. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 reserved
thirty percent of agricultural land for the 1.1 million Africans and fifty-one
percent for the 50,000 whites; the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 enforced
private ownership of land, while the Land Tenure Act of 1969 reinforced
land classification into African and European areas.42 Thus natives were
expropriated of their lands without compensation, and forced mostly into
the wilderness of regions with the least agricultural potential and least
favourable rainfall, so that by 1960 more than 25,000 black families were
squatting in their own country of origin. The Advisory Committee of the
Southern Rhodesia Government reported in 1962 on the acute problems of
satisfactory re-settlement of the more than 3,000 people who had applied
for relief.43 
By 1976 four and a half million Africans were crowded in the infertile,
drought prone Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) reserved by the colonial
administration for them.44 Africans were forbidden to hold land in: 
… what was officially termed the European Area, the designation of the
several other classes of land then being Native Reserve, the Native, the
Undetermined, the Forest and the Unassigned Areas. He could purchase land
in the Native Area, under certain conditions. The Native Area was, indeed,
what is known today as the Native Purchase Area, a title not embodied in the
Legislation until the 1950 amendment to the Land Apportionment Act.45
This position was maintained and reinforced by successive colonial
administrations up to Zimbabwe’s independence from Britain in April
1980, and makes the SADC Tribunal’s decision an extension of the former
colonial administration’s will. Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia
urgently need to undo apartheid’s unequal land allocation legacy on their
41 Communiqué of the 30th Jubilee Summit of the SADC Heads of State and
Government, Windhoek, Namibia 16-17 August 2010 http://www.sadc.int/index/
browse/page/782 (accessed 16 September 2010).
42 B Chigara ‘From oral to recorded governance: Reconstructing title to real property in
21st century Zimbabwe’ (2001) 30 Common Law World Review 36.
43 Chigara (n 42 above) 16. 
44 ‘The Zimbabwe land question in perspective’, Zimbabwe High Commission, summary
of Commissioner’s discussion with Tim Sebastian, BBC News 24 April 2000.
45 Chigara (n 43 above) 16.
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presently constituted to attend land issues from Zimbabwe, South Africa
and Namibia. 
1.1.2 Zimbabwe’s humwe-inspired land reform paradigm 
The Zimbabwe land issue questions the extent to which extra-territorial
tribunals, however well-intentioned, can assist. Tribunals and Courts exist
to heal human conflict by producing an acceptable result in the shortest
possible time, with the least possible expense, and with the minimum of
stress on the participants,46 and should acknowledge context, both
underlying and current, with complete and not selective regard. Only such
an approach would satisfy the requirements of justice, and makes the Mike
Campbell decision unsustainable. It discarded underlying context and
privileged current context or the status quo without explanation, and still
hoped that its decision would settle the matter.
According to Miller, social justice, the idea from which humwe
proceeds, is a people-oriented idea because to describe it, ‘we must look at
what the people themselves think’. Social justice theory has always been,
and must always be, a critical idea – one that challenges us to reform our
institutions and practices in the name of greater fairness. 47 
The legitimacy of private property rights, instituted through colonial
laws for the benefit of the minority white community at the exclusion of
the black majority, is what the Mike Campbell case is about. The SADC
Tribunal’s challenge in the matter was to determine what constitutes
fairness in the allocation of land in present-day Zimbabwe. 
Dworkin indefines fairness as ‘… procedures and practices that give all
citizens more or less equal influence in the decisions that govern them’. He
contrasts fairness with justice, which ‘… is concerned with the decisions
that standing political institutions, whether or not they have been chosen
fairly, ought to make’.48  To the extent that it empowers them collectively
to influence decisions that govern them, fairness is people-oriented. 
The connection between laws and principles of morality or justice,
discoverable by human reason without the aid of revelation, becomes
relevant because where the former conflict with the latter, the former
should become invalid – ‘Lex inuiusta non est lex’. An analogous argument
is that SADC Tribunals have no business upholding claims of exclusive
legal titles to farms that had been created under apartheid rule, because all
46 Burger (n 2 above).
47 D Miller Principles of social justice (1999) ix.
48 R Dworkin Law’s empire 164 - 165. Discussing Dworkin’s triad of justice, fairness and
integrity, see J Rivers ‘The interpretation and invalidity of unjust laws’ in D Dyzenhaus
(ed) Recrafting the rule of law: The limits of legal order (1999) 58 - 65.
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requirement of fair distribution of all the advantages and disadvantages
accruing to the political community at issue. 
Rawls writes that the primary subject of justice is how the major social
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties, and determine the
division of advantages from social cooperation.49 Properly executed
humwe would seek to ensure justice by undoing the discriminatory effects
of the colonial structure that had fixed the social positions into which men
and women had been born, and from which their life expectations were
largely determined. Two arguments can be made in favour of restorative
post-independent humwe-inspired land legislation in Zimbabwe. 
The first is that colonial legislation on land allocation and land use
imposed upon the post-independence government of Zimbabwe a duty to
correct the situation. According to Rawls, such structures affect men’s
initial chances in life even if they cannot possibly be justified by any appeal
to the notions of merit or desert. This required the adoption of laws that
would override the colonial land allocation laws. The Constitution of
Zimbabwe Amendment Act 2005 is an example of that, characterised by
its supreme quality.50 The SADC Tribunal condemnation of the
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 2005 can be explained only by
the Tribunal’s failure to acknowledge underlying context in its
determination. 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 2005 appears to be
humwe-driven in that it returns ownership of agricultural land to the State
which holds it in trust for “all.” Individuals obtain from the designated
local government authority permission to use land for life for as long as it
is not already under someone else’s charge. In this sense humwe appears to
be consistent with laissez- faire redistributive theorists’ arguments, that the
initial appropriation of resources should be limited by some principle of
equality. Steiner writes that persons who appropriate more than an equal
share impose an unjust distribution on those with a less than equal
portion.51 
Humwe land-ordering seeks to equalise opportunity for allocation of a
minimum portion of land to everyone that requires land for their
subsistence. Where such a portion was unavailable a right to redress would
occur. This right to redress ‘carries over into a world in which there are no
more un-owned things: in a fully appropriated world, where each person’s
original right to an equal portion of initially un-owned things amounts to
49 J Rawls A theory of justice (revised ed 1999) 6.
50 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke (1978) 3 WLR 1229.
51 H Steiner An essay on rights (1994) 268.
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where that right has or cannot be satisfied.52
The State thus incurs a duty to establish a ‘redress fund’ to compensate
all those that may end up without. This may be achieved by requiring those
that hold more than their minimal equal portion to pay a fee proportionate
to their oversize share. Beitz observes that 
Because every living adult at any given time has a right to an equal share of
resources, the value of an equal share fluctuates with population size. So there
is a more or less continuous need for compensatory redistribution. Second, on
this view, there is no right of inheritance; when a person dies, that person’s
possessions become un-owned and revert to the redress fund.53 
Trusteeship titles to land would give holders:
(1) The exclusive right to use land that was not in another’s use.
(2) The duty to surrender through established channels, actual land that was
not under the holder’s use only if another had need of it.
(3) The right to seek more land provided that one had exhausted one’s initial
capacity and still had need for more.
(4) The right to be treated equally and like anyone else viz land claims and
land use.
That would guarantee that all concerned would not be impeded but
assisted in their effort to live off the finite resources of their geographically
fixed political community and ensure the dignity of subsistence
agricultural communities. It would ensure that minimum standards of
equity necessary in a civilised community are realised, and that
enterprising members can exercise their talents. In this sense humwe
appears to be consistent with aspects of the liberal tradition of distributive
justice, according to which distributive responsibility for resources that
belong to all lies with the State.54 Distributive justice theory seeks to
inform: 
... a range of choices whose outcomes bear on the well-being of
individuals located in societies other than our own. These include, for
example, choices about individual conduct such as whether to donate
to Oxfam; the policies of our own government concerning for
example, foreign aid or immigration; the policies of international
institutions and regimes (rules of international trade, international
monetary policy, environmental controls, labour standards,
conditions on multilateral aid and structural assistance); the
constitutions of international institutions, as distinct from their
52 Steiner (n 51 above) 271.
53 CR Beitz ‘International liberalism and distributive justice: A survey of recent thought’
(1999) 51 World Politics, 282.
54 Beitz (n 53 above) 269 - 96.
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Recognising the potential consequences of these choices, it is natural
to wonder what moral considerations should guide our judgment.55 
Laissez-faire liberalism is clear that distributions are not just if they have
been arrived at from a previous distribution that itself was not just. ‘A
distribution is just when it has been arrived at from a previous distribution
that itself was just, through a series of transactions that have not violated
anyone’s rights.’56 A preceding distribution must be tested as to whether it
had resulted from a process that had respected everyone’s rights, and the
one before it, back to the beginning, when resources occurring in nature
were initially appropriated. This is what the SADC Tribunal missed in the
Mike Campbell case by its privileging of current context over underlying context.
The Tribunal’s decision favours the status-quo theory that insists that:
… whatever injustices may have occurred in the first appropriation will have
been rectified subsequently, perhaps as a result of many generations of
economic growth and innovation. There is therefore no argument for
redistribution to rectify inequalities in benefits derived from resources. Laissez-
faire redistributivists, argue that it may be necessary for the state to intervene to
rectify the effects of injustices in earlier appropriations of un-owned things,
either by redistributing control over resources or by compensating those who
have less with transfer payments from those who have more.57
The hope that social evolutionary processes will adjust the initial and
successive distributive injustices is not borne out by the legacy of apartheid
rule in Zimbabwe and other SADC States. Their hope appears illusory,
unless they argue for revolution rather than reformation. Literature on the
topic suggests that redistributive arguments are regarded as being the more
plausible form of laissez-faire theory, and the more pertinent to questions of
global economic and environmental justice.58 In this sense the
justiciability of a distribution depends on how it came about. Historical
perspectives of justice typically hold that ‘considerations of liberty argue
against most political forms of intervention in market processes except
when required to remedy the effects of prior violations of liberty.
(Therefore) ... laissez-faire liberalism involves the definition and
justification of the rights that market transactions should respect’.59 
The Zimbabwe government has a strong case for reforming its
agricultural sector because of the gross unfairness inherent in the status
quo when it achieved political independence from Britain in 1980. Table 1
below illustrates the racial prioritisation of land allocation in colonial
55 Beitz (n 53 above) 270 - 271.
56 Beitz (n 53 above) 279.
57 Beitz (n 53 above) 281.
58 Beitz (n 53 above) 281.
59 Beitz (n 53 above) 279.
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while zones V and above are unsuitable for agriculture.
Table 3: Type of farming in relation to the European and African zones 
(1962)
Source: Adapted from ‘The development of the economic resources of Southern 
Rhodesia with particular reference to the role of African agriculture’, 
Report of the Advisory Committee of 1962.
Beitz writes that, because individuals are entitled to benefit equally from
the opportunities open to other agents of a political community,
inequalities should be compensated for ‘in ways that encourage or at least
do not obstruct the processes of economic and social transformation
through which a society must pass in order to develop the capacity to
satisfy its people’s material needs.’60 This has implications for Zimbabwe’s
application of humwe-inspired land allocation reforms.
1.1.3 Concerns with humwe principle
Humwe is consistent with Dworkin’s idea of a solution that is ‘… so
obviously fair and sensible that only someone with an immediate contrary
interest could disagree with it’.61 Because any one population has only a
finite amount of land at its disposal, its allocation to members of the
community ought not to prejudice even the weakest that need it for their
subsistence.
But theories idealise. Humwe presupposes certain qualities about
human nature that may not be easy to justify. Do human beings always act
altruistically? If communal existence is a co-operative venture for mutual
advantage, and the community is a theatre marked by conflicts as well as
Farming Region European Area
% of Southern 
Rhodesia
% of total 
European Area
Based on livestock production (Natural
Regions IV and V
28.95 50.98
Based on crop production (Natural Regions I
and II)
15.67 27.59
Based on livestock and cash crops (Natural
Region III)
11.11 19.56
Unsuitable for farming 1.06 1.87
Totals 59.79 100.00
60 n 53 above, 286.
61 R Dworkin Taking rights seriously (1991) 151.
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principle could be limited. Care needs to be taken to ensure against
potential un-altruistic abuse of the humwe paradigm in Zimbabwe’s
pursuit of a fairer non-racially based land allocation programme.
Transparency of the process is needed in order to maintain the claim to
altruism based humwe practice.
Those united in their basic need for land (both peasants and career
farmers) need to ensure that none among their membership is
disadvantaged, and may have to reduce their own allocation so that
everyone that has need of it has a proportional share. In this sense humwe
appears to target protection of the inherent dignity of all. The theory of
social justice on which humwe is premised requires that the institutions
that serve a particular political community cooperate with the agency (the
government) in its effort to achieve the declared will of the people. Miller
writes that social justice views society as 
… an organism in which the flourishing of each element requires the
cooperation of all the other members and the aim of social justice is to specify
the institutional arrangements that will allow each person to contribute fully
to social well-being.63 
This requirement of humwe is consistent with both principles of Rawls’64
theory of justice which provide that:
(1) Every person must have the largest political liberty compatible with a like
liberty for all – equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties.
(2) Inequalities in power, wealth, income, and other resources must not exist
except as they work to compensate the worst-off members of society.
Rawls writes:
These principles rule out justifying institutions on the grounds that the
hardships of some are offset by a greater good in the aggregate. It may be
expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order that others may
prosper.65
Rawls’ insistence on equality is opposed by some sections of the libertarian
school of thought, who argue instead that individuals’ freedom to enjoy
62 Hill et al writes that ‘There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes
possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to try to live solely by his
own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since people are not indifferent as to how the
greater benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue
their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share’. RP Hill et al. ‘Global consumption
and distributive justice: A Rawlsian Perspective’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 171.
63 Discussing Hobhouse’s elements of social justice see also Miller (n 55 above) 4. 
64 n 49 above, 13.
65 n 49 above, 6.
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social justice. 
Nonetheless, humwe rejects any attempt to justify unequal access and
distribution of a community’s finite life-enabling natural resources. Thus,
the argument often made to justify the status-quo, that land redistribution
should not ignore the skills base and capacities of different communities to
use the land to maximum advantage for the country’s economy, is
unsustainable. What both humwe and Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness
suppose is that the preservation of the inherent dignity of individuals,
insurable only through equal access to land, is more basic than the need to
enhance the country’s foreign income. 
To insist that social progress be measured by agriculture’s financial
contribution to the national economy against the nation’ potential is
problematic, because it ignores the fact that a liberated self-respecting
person is more capable of attaining self-actualisation than others.
Motivational theorists cite Mahatma Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jr
as good examples of self-actualised individuals (the goal to which rational
beings should aspire to) because of their passion for equity, justice and
peace.66 Foreign currency cannot purchase the relative peace and security
required for other human endeavours - equity, justice, and freedom. The
lack of profound practice regarding these values in Africa threatens
progress towards achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals
and the fight against corruption.67 Moreover, agriculture’s contribution to
the national economy must take into consideration the skill base of those
that must get land, not those that had land on the basis of apartheid’s
previous unfair distribution.
Humwe applies to the SADC land issue, not only because of its
theoretical consistency with the social justice agenda, but also for natural
progression reasons. Because it regulated property rights to the general
satisfaction of all concerned until the intervention of colonial
administrations, it could be said that humwe itself had been hijacked. The
private property agenda that substituted humwe ironically served also to
emphasise humwe’s relevance to the emerging new property rights. 
Sallis writes that all major philosophical concepts – being, essence, the
good, the One, truth, logos, etc. are values of unbreachable plenitude and
presence. 
Concepts are not point-like simplicities, because in order to be what they are,
they must be demarcated from other concepts to which they thus incessantly
66 RL Atkinson et al Introduction to psychology (1990) 524 - 526.
67 B Chigara ‘Social justice: the link between trade liberalisation and Sub-Saharan Africa’s
potential to achieve the United Nations millennium development goals by 2015’ (2008)
26 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 9-42.
132    Chapter 6refer. In addition to such referentiality to other concepts with which they form
binary oppositions, they are, moreover, caught in systems and conceptual
chains.68
Theneuissen argues that ‘communicative freedom’ is when an idea
experiences its opposite not as boundary but as the condition for its own
generalisation.69 Instead of perceiving ‘A’ and ‘B’ as a pair of independent
determinant ideas it is possible to show that the pair are internally related,
first negatively, in their contrastive relationship with that which yields their
self-definition, and then positively, as the belonging together in that which
makes them what they are.70 
The contention that humwe applies to the land issue is now being
determined against international standards that did not exist when colonial
territories were carved out; standards that would have perhaps proscribed
colonial conquest of other territories, slavery, apartheid, etc. The land
issue manifests a constitutional deficit in that it was colonial legal titles that
placed most of the best land with a small white elite, and reduced the native
majority population to squatters in the worst lands. This context is
significant to the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 2005
because of the apparent change in context, from a power-based
international order that facilitated evil practices such as colonialism and
slavery, to a human-rights-based world order opposed to State
arbitrariness. The question is how African States should handle the
challenge this change in context raises. 
2 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the significance of context in resolving issues
around social-ordering that transcend the colonial and post-independence
divide. The period of colonisation of African States served as incubators
for structures and practices that demonstrated the evil of colonialism, and
ensured the servitude of the native black population to the white master
class. This is the underlying context of the challenges for African States to
deliver sustainable solutions. In Zimbabwe the burning issue is how to
dismantle the colonial legacy of racially unfair land allocation.
The chapter considered the SADC’s tribunal’s application of the rule
of law principle to Zimbabwe’s counter claims of title to agricultural land,
between white farmers expropriated of their lands without compensation
for resettling landless black people under the Constitution of Zimbabwe
Amendment Act 2005. The Tribunal’s decision has attracted scorn and
resulted in the suspension of the Tribunal itself by the member states. The
68 J Sallis Deconstruction and philosophy, the texts of Jacques Derrida (1987) 4.
69 Quoted in D Cornell The philosophy of the limit (1992) 15. 
70 B Chigara Legitimacy deficit in custom: Towards a deconstructionist critique (2001) 118.
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context to Zimbabwe’s land issue, but chooses to favour the status quo
sought to be upheld by the white farmers. To be acceptable, and therefore
hold out a chance of success, social reform and social-ordering paradigms
must engage both the underlying and the current contexts.
The Tribunal’s approach failed because it borrowed and applied ideas
that the ACHPR and the South African Courts had cited from Europe’s
Human Rights and Constitutional Courts at the expense of ideas and
insights that had evolved in Africa, only to be supplanted upon
colonisation. The Tribunal would have been better served by application
of humwe principle, which is referenced across Africa as a basic norm. The
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 2005 and South Africa’s Black
Economic Empowerment Act 2001 are examples of this application. 
Humwefficient practice requires regard to be had to the underlying and
the current contexts, and the local and universal values attached to land.
Humwe as a paradigm of social-ordering aspires towards fairness, social
justice and human security, and the recognition, promotion and protection
of the inherent human dignity of all individuals in a particular political
community. It rejects the un-African values of egocentricism and false
sense of superiority. The Applicants in the Mike Campbell Case had insisted,
and the SADC Tribunal’s decision found in their favour, that their current
context/status quo argument trump underlying context arguments. But the
Government of Zimbabwe had insisted that could inaugurate
constitutional land laws capable of instituting new land allocation
structures in order to reverse colonial land legislation that had
expropriated native lands without compensation. 
Support for humwe principle is explicit in emerging legislation in
Zimbabwe and South Africa – a nascent norm of customary international
law. The sooner national, regional and international tribunals realise this,
the sooner they can fulfil their role as healers of conflict. Rejection by
SADC of the Tribunal’s approach privileging current over underlying context
in the Mike Campbell case is resounding. The Tribunal has been suspended,
but hopefully it will not be for long or forever. 
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1 Introduction
Land tenure in Kenya today is largely the result of the country’s colonial
history which established two sets of laws, thus creating a plural legal
system: one set to govern land occupied by the natives and another for land
occupied by the European settlers. The laws governing the native areas
accommodated the customs of the people many of which were not written
but were generally known, accepted and practiced. Laws governing land in
the European settlement areas on the other hand were formal, written and
borrowed heavily from British law. The customary system focused on
communal rights (access for all), while the statutory system places
emphasis on individual rights. This chapter explores gender perspectives to
property rights in rural Kenya where both customary and statutory laws
are applied. It examines women’s access to property in the light of customs
which often relegate them to a subordinate position to men, and links
access to land closely to the institution of marriage and the four related life
stages: before marriage, during marriage, on divorce and widowhood. As
women change their marital status, their property rights change. This
chapter examines the effect of statute law upon women’s access to land in
each changing circumstance, and the implications of proposed changes in
the Land Policy and new Constitution on women’s access to property in
rural Kenya. Thus the chapter describes women’s property rights today in
the face of legal pluralism.
The chapter draws examples from research carried out in the Nyando
river basin of Western Kenya under the Safeguard Project,1 and upon the
authors’ experience working as lawyers and land administrators in the
area. The Safeguard study sampled 14 communities across the basin to
1 This is a collaborative project between the World Agro Forestry Centre, Maseno
University and IFPRI on safeguarding the rights of the poor to critical water, land and
tree resources in the Nyando River basin in Western Kenya. . 135
136    Chapter 7establish how property rights vary from one management system to
another, and how they have changed since independence. The research is
limited to sedentary communities, since pastoralism is not found within
the region, but the implications of legal pluralism on gender and property
rights apply more widely in Kenya because of the common history. 
2 Property rights and legal pluralism
Property means a right of action for things that can be exchanged.
Important types of property include real, personal and intellectual. A right
of ownership assures the owner the right to dispense with the property how
he or she deems fit, whether to use or not use, exclude others from using,
or to transfer ownership. Public property is any property that is controlled
by a state or by a whole community, while private property may be under
the control of a single individual or by a group of individuals collectively.
Property rights may be formal or informal, but both are often referred to as
bundles of rights, each representing a different aspect of property
ownership. Poorly defined property rights lead to conflict and must be
enforced by strong institutions to be effective. This often gives formal
property rights advantage over informal property rights.2
The concept of legal pluralism proposes that property rights are
affected by multiple sources of legal, social and political authority,
including customary and religious law, local norms, and even project
regulations. All can be the basis for claims over resources, which reflect the
negotiation processes and relative bargaining power of different claimants.
Legal pluralism recognises multiple legal orders, which are more flexible,
dynamic and responsive to the uncertainties and changes than a single,
fixed legal system with a static property regime. Individuals may choose
one or several of these legal frameworks for their claims on a resource.
Legal pluralism can cause uncertainty, especially in times of conflict, and
statutory law seeks to provide security of tenure and enhance efficiency,
but may not be able to adapt to the uncertainties of environment,
livelihood, society and politics. 
In this chapter statutory claims will sometimes be referred to as formal
claims, the non-statutory as informal or customary. The study assumes
that the flexibility in informal sources of authority may serve the
vulnerable better than rigid formal ones, but that informal systems are
subject to manipulation. Local communities in Kenya are patrilineal and
therefore customary systems are controlled by the male members of the
community, who may manipulate them to their advantage, and the
disadvantage of women and children. The chapter explores instances
where informal systems favour the vulnerable, and argues for the need to
2 R Meinzen-Dick & R Pradhan Legal pluralism and dynamic property rights (2002).
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security of tenure. Insecure and conflicting property rights are associated
with management problems and non-sustainable resource use.3 Property
rights shape the incentives people have for investing in sustaining the
resource base over time. 
The importance of security of land tenure is widely recognised. A
public framework that allows households or individuals to obtain and
possess secure rights to the land they use or occupy has obvious benefits,
in terms of enhanced investment incentives, reduced potential for conflict,
the employment of land as collateral, and improvements in equity through
increased bargaining power amongst social groups. The establishment of
such a framework requires legal recognition.4 
3 Land tenure in Kenya
The land management systems in Kenya today are the product of three
periods: the pre-colonial era dominated by customary land rights; the
colonial era in which large areas of land were alienated for specific users
and the majority of the Kenyan population confined to native reserve
areas; and the post-colonial era that has encouraged large-scale private
ownership of land.5 
In pre-colonial Kenya all natural resources were owned communally
and claims were determined by clans. In the colonial era, the Crown Lands
Ordinance of 1902 gave authority to the Crown to alienate land. Any land
not physically occupied by local people was considered wasteland (free
land) and free for alienation to the European settlers. Local people’s rights
to land were defined by occupancy, while settlers were given freehold titles
by the Crown. Two parallel land-holding systems thus developed. The
settlers advocated grouping the Africans in separate reserves away from any
lands deemed suitable for European settlement. The Crown Lands
Ordinance of 1915 allowed the Governor to create Native Reserves and
provided for the settlers to be given agricultural leases of 999 years.
Following the Kenya Land Commission (Carter Commission) of 1934, the
Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1938 re-designated Native Reserves as
Native Land and removed them from the Crown Lands Ordinance. Thus
were created one set of laws for native lands and another for Crown land.
Even after independence both sets of laws remained in force, which in part
3 L Onyango et al ‘Coping with history and hydrology: how Kenya’s settlement and land
tenure patterns shape contemporary water rights and gender relations in water’ in Van
Koppen et al (eds) Community based water law and water resource management reform in
developing countries (2007) 189.
4 World Bank Reaching the rural poor: A renewed strategy for rural development. A summary
(2002). 
5 LA Onyango ‘Poverty, livelihoods and property rights in the Nyando basin, Kenya’
unpublished PhD Thesis, Maseno University, 2008, 118.
138    Chapter 7explains the current state of confusion in land administration in Kenya. The
Native Land Trust Board under the Chief Native Commissioner held native
land in trust for the communities, and local people lost all rights to lands
outside the native lands. The Crown Lands Ordinance was amended to
define the White Highlands, which were administered by a separate
Highlands Board; both boards and their boundaries were set up by 1939 and
remained until independence.6
After independence the Native Lands became Trust Land, and Crown
land became Government land. This paper will refer to the native land as
ancestral land and the government land as the newly settled areas. Local
communities within the ancestral lands were given freehold titles for their
land through the process of Land Adjudication which started in 1956, but
before independence Crown Lands were not available for occupation by
the local communities. In the Nyando basin 43% of the land was crown
land. After independence, the government embarked on land
redistribution programme through the Settlement Fund Trustee (SFT),7
Land Buying Companies, Land Buying Cooperatives and outright
purchase of European farms. 
The SFT acquired land for Settlement Schemes, planned and
subdivided it, then allocated it to African farmers on loan and registered a
charge with the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands. When a
farmer paid off the cost of the land, the property was discharged and a free
hold interest registered in his/her favor. By 1994 109,000 families had been
settled on 910,000 ha of agricultural land through the SFT. More than
three-quarters of allottees of SFT land were male heads of household,
following tradition. SFT was open to allocate land to both men and
women. The policy did not discriminate against women, but
implementation did disadvantage them. 
Land Buying Companies emerged after independence to facilitate
transferring former Crown Lands to African farmers. Few Africans were
in a position to make outright purchases, so individuals came together to
form Land Buying Companies or Cooperatives. Members contributed
money and were allocated land worth the value of their share contribution
on subdivision. There were no rules restricting membership, and shares
were determined by the amount of money a person paid. Women had as
much access as men, but in practice, their limited access to money
disadvantaged them. Women had few opportunities to raise money in
colonial Kenya, few were educated enough to hold regular jobs and few
were engaged in commercial agriculture. 
6 C Juma & JB Ojwang (eds) In land we trust: Environment, private property and constitutional
change (1996) 123.
7 This is a corporate body established under section 167 of the Agriculture Act chapter
318 of the laws of Kenya. 
  Gender perspectives of property rights in rural Kenya    139Forest Lands were established by the Crown Lands Ordinance that
established the native reserves. Once land has been gazetted as forestland,
then it cannot be put to any other use unless de-gazetted through another
gazette notice. Gazetted forest land (Tinderet forest, Londiani forests and
West Mau forest) covers 19% of the Nyando river basin. Communities
bordering the forest were allowed to grow crops in the forest as non-
resident cultivators under the shamba system, but this was abused and
subsequently abolished by the government. Gazetting of forest land did not
consider the fate of communities living in the forest like the Ogiek/
Dorobom. Men, women and children were legally locked out from forest
land and any resources found within, yet forest-dwellers continued to
access the forests for the necessities of life, making their livelihoods illegal
(hunting and gathering in the forest). The new forest policy advocates co-
management of forest resources by the Kenya Forest Services and
neighboring communities, which will once more allow the community to
access resources within the forest lands.
Colonial Kenya had many Large-Scale Commercial Farms within the
Crown Lands, operated as commercial enterprises on 999-year leases from
the government. Some large scale farms were transferred and subdivided
for smallholder farming but some still operate as large scale farms to date.
In the Nyando river basin these large scale farms include tea, coffee and
sugar plantations and they covered 43% of the basin at independence, but
by 2004 they had been subdivided and only 9% of the land in the basin was
under large scale farms.8 This implies that 34% of the land within the basin
had been converted from large to small scale farming.
Today, land in Kenya is managed under the following systems:
(1) Trust land – unalienated; (2) Government land – unalienated;
(3) Adjudicated land – freehold titles on completion of adjudication;
(4) Settlement schemes – freehold titles on discharge from the Settlement
Fund Trustee (SFT); (5) Large-scale farms with lease hold titles; (6) Land
buying companies – freehold title on subdivision to small units; (7) Forest
land – reserved on gazettement; (8) Group ranches-with group titles.9
Figure 1 is an illustration of the range of systems under which land is
managed in Kenya. As each land holding system emerged there was a
corresponding need to create legislation to control management of each. 
Independent Kenya inherited British land laws which were applied
alongside African customary laws. African customary land laws express
communal or family ownership, whereas the statutory laws express
individual/private ownership of land. Post-independence legislation on
land has also emphasised private ownership. Land is defined in law to
8 Onyango (n 5 above) 122.
9 Group Ranches are fond amongst the pastoral communities such as the Maasai. There
are no group ranches in the Nyando basin. They are included in the diagram because
the diagram covers land management systems in the whole of Kenya.
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it up to the sky including any thing that is permanently fixed to the soil.
This concept of land differs from that of most customary systems of law
where land is perceived to be the soil, and there is a clear distinction
between the soil and what is on the land.10 In such systems the land may
be yours, but the vegetation on it may not necessarily be, hence the
potential for conflict under conditions of legal pluralism. 
Land in Kenya can be held as freehold where there are no development
conditions; the land is for agricultural use and belongs to the owner
forever. It can also be held as leasehold, where the use and time period for
which it is held is specified on the lease document. Leases are obtained
from the government for government land (crown land), the local
authority for trust land and the registered proprietor for private land. The
central government is the custodian of un-alienated government land,
while the local authority is the custodian of un-alienated trust land. 
The land administrative system in Kenya today is based on outdated
legal frameworks. There are many pieces of legislation applied variously to
different parts of the country, creating confusion and complicating the
process of land administration.11 Table 1 illustrates some of the land
legislation and the land management systems to which they are applied.
The Njonjo Commission12 identified the lack of an overall land policy for
Kenya as the basic cause of current problems in the administration of land.
The process of formulating a land policy began in 2004 to address the land
question, which is very sensitive and explosive. A land policy is a set of
socio-economic, legal, technical and political measures that dictate the
manner in which land and benefits accruing from land are allocated,
distributed and utilised,13 and gives direction for future land reform. The
Land Policy Secretariat in Kenya identified ‘Poor land administration’ and
‘different land tenure regimes with limited harmonisation’ as problems
associated with the management of land, which leads to confusion and
many grey areas in the application of the law, and creates room for
corruption which favors the rich and influential. Women and children are
often the victims of this corruption. The National Land Policy indicates
that the unsatisfactory state of the land rights delivery system (sec 3.5.1)
has been caused in part by multiple registration regimes.14 In order to
establish an efficient system, the government needs to consolidate,
harmonise and streamline all land registration statutes to ensure clarity and
reduce bureaucratic bottlenecks.
10 The Institution of Surveyors of Kenya (ISK) Land reforms of Kenya (2000) 9.
11 O Ogendo Tenants of the crown; evolution of agrarian law and institutions on Kenya (1991)
147.
12 Commission of Enquiry into the land law system of Kenya on Principles of Land Policy
Framework.
13 ISK (n 10 above).
14 Kenya Land Policy 2007.
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Source: Swallow, Onyango and Meinzen-Dick 2003.
142    Chapter 7Table 4: Land Laws applied to different land management systems in 
Kenya Land Statutes
Source: The author
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Government Lands Act 
Cap 280 (Revised 1984)
O X O X X X X
Trust Lands Cap 288 
(Revised 1970)
X O X O O O X
Local Government Act, 
Cap265 (Revised 1986)
X X X X X X X X
Land Adjudication Act, 
Cap 284 Of 1968 (Revised 
1977)
X O X O O O O O
Land Acquisition Act Cap 
295
X X X X X X X X
Land (Group 
Representatives) Act Cap 
287 of 1968 (Revised 1970) 
X O X O O O O O
Registered Lands Act Cap 
300 of 1963 (Revised 1989)
X X X X O X O
Registration of  Titles Act  
Cap 281
O O O O X X O
Physical Planning Act  Cap 
286
X X X X X X X X
Land Control Act  Cap 302 O O X X X X O X
Survey Act Cap 286 X X X X X X X X
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Land in Kenya is acquired through purchase, inheritance or by way of gift.
In the Nyando basin the most important way of acquisition in the ancestral
lands is inheritance from fathers to sons, while in the newly settled areas it
is through purchase (as in other parts of Kenya). Respondents in the
research (see figure 2) confirmed that most land is owned by the head of
the household (59%) or the father of the household (19%). Land is a male-
dominated resource with 78% of the respondents’ land owned by male
members of household, inherited under customary laws or purchased
under statutory laws. 
The number of landless people in ancestral lands is small compared
with other lands: only 10 % of respondents in the ancestral lands knew of
a landless person. In the ancestral land every man - but not a woman - has
a customary right to inherit land from his father. Land inherited from
parents is occupied and put to use with or without formal documentation
and the boundaries shown by the fathers who are bequeathing the land,
publicly in the presence of the family members, and marked by live fences
or other natural land marks. Nothing is put in writing, and security of
tenure is guaranteed by the community, who respect the source of
authority used to make the allocation. Family members and clan leaders
are important witnesses to such allocations, and are called upon from time
to time to verify boundaries and allottees. These rights are formalised on
registration. 
Customary rights to land can be transferred within the community
before formalisation, with formal documentation sought subsequently to
strengthen security of tenure, especially if the new owner is not part of the
family. Fathers show their adult sons their land inheritance, but most will
wait for many years before formally subdividing the family holding to
provide each individual son with land in their individual name. This can
be a bone of contention between fathers and sons, with the fathers feeling
their sons are not responsible enough to be held totally accountable, so
Valuation for Ratings Act  
Cap 266
X X O O O O O X
Ratings Act Cap 267 X X O O O O O X
Sectional properties Act 
(20 of 1987)
O X O O O O O X
Indian Transfer of 
Properties Act (ITPA)
O O O O O O O X
Key: O=does not apply     X=applies
144    Chapter 7want to retain the final say for as long as possible. When a man dies while
his children are still minors, the wife can hold his land on behalf of his
children. When both parents die while their children are still minors, their
land can be used/held by other relatives, and when they are old enough
they can claim it back. This is increasingly endangered by the statutory
system when the custodian transfers the land to his name and later refuses
to transfer it back to the children, making the children very vulnerable on
the death of both parents.
All land within the Nyando basin has been adjudicated, but most is
still registered in the names of fathers and grandfathers. In other cases the
land has been purchased but the procedures are not complete, the urgency
to complete being absent where customary rights are strong and processing
by governments is slow. Where customary rights are weak, there is an
urgency to complete the procedures because statutory rights are the source
of legitimacy.
Share-cropping arrangements between farmers are not documented
but based on customary norms. Farmers who need more land for
cultivation can use land belonging to others. Customary land rights do not
provide for women to inherit land from their fathers, but women can
access land for cultivation from their husbands, each married man being
obligated to provide his wife with a piece of land to cultivate, which she
can cultivate but not transfer. Thus women can participate in agricultural
production, but not use the land as collateral, a disincentive for
development which places the woman in a disadvantaged position. The
customary rights of inheritance, which stipulate that each son has a right
to inherit land from his father, has worked to fragment the ancestral lands
and created uneconomical parcels. This fragmentation does not improve
access to land for women since it is done in favor of the male members of
the household. 
Customary rights do not offer exclusive ownership over natural
resources. Fencing of property is done in a manner that does not deter
access to the property, since it is expected that everyone allows other
community members to obtain resources such as water, wood fuel and
pasture. This is, however, changing as resources become scarce, live fences
(rarely barbed wire) being the commonest form of fencing. 
The most important function of ancestral land is the provision of a
place called home, a social function perceived as more important than the
productive functions. Ancestral land acts as a social base, and its sale is not
traditionally encouraged because it infringes on a basic right – the right to
have a place called home. Selling ancestral land is seen as denying the next
generation their inheritance, and children can appeal to community elders
to prevail upon parents who want to sell all their ancestral land. Every man
is expected to marry and provide a home for his wife and unmarried
women have no place in the traditional setting, being considered social
  Gender perspectives of property rights in rural Kenya    145misfits and not allowed to build a house in their father’s homestead (only
live in their mother’s house). The increasing number of unmarried women
is creating a social dilemma: 3% of women over 40 years of age in the study
were unmarried. Young men are expected to build a house within their
father’s homestead, but when they grow old, are expected to establish their
own homestead on land provided by the father. Section 3(1) of the
National Land Policy recognises that land represents multiple values,
being ’a significant resource to which members of society should have
equitable access for livelihoods’ and a cultural heritage to be conserved for
future generations, which should be protected by policy and law. 
3.2 Statutory rights to land in the newly settled areas 
In the newly settled areas (government settlement schemes, Land buying
companies/cooperative farms), the incidence of landlessness is higher. All
the people living in these areas moved from elsewhere, and their rights to
land are determined by the written law: one is either allocated the land by
the government or one purchased the land. Statutory land rights require
that a piece of land be surveyed to ascertain boundaries and area before
registration and there are many statutes under which land is registered
(Table 1), each with its terms and conditions. The registered owner of the
land has exclusive rights over the land and all the resources on it. 
The registered proprietor can transfer the land to whoever he wishes
and is not under any legal obligation to consult the rest of the community.
There are legal procedures for effecting transfers and all stages are
documented. Statutory rights allow women to buy and sell land, but not
minors. Land belonging to minors is protected from abuse by restricting
the titles with cautions and caveats, aimed to prevent transfers by
custodians. 
Statutory rights to land indicate the use to which the land may be put
(agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial etc), and the proprietor is
expected to adhere to the conditions. Any other person who wishes to use
the land must seek consent from the registered owner. Natural resources
found on the land belong to the owner unless stipulated by the law. Barbed
wire fences are common to keep away trespassers. Statutory rights
entrench individual ownership and are enforced by the courts of law.
Formal rights in the upper reaches of the basin have also encouraged
land fragmentation. Land-buying company farms were subdivided over
the past forty years and titles issued for small parcels, converting the land
from large-scale farming to intense smallholder cultivation. In the same
time period the population of the area has increased as people move in to
occupy the subdivided farms. Nyaribari, a village in Bartera sub-location,
for example, was formerly Lelu farm (land registry parcel LR.1442/2), one
farm holding owned and managed by one person. It was purchased by a
146    Chapter 7land-buying company (Nyagacho) that subdivided it and settled its
members. Today, Lelu farm makes up Bartera sub location with a
population of 2810 people, 526 households and a density of 273 people per
km,15 contributing to land degradation in the basin. This fragmentation,
however, can benefit women because those with capital have equal
opportunity with the men to purchase and own land in the area. The Land
Policy Secretariat identified land fragmentation, and the National Land
Policy proposes to control the minimum size of land based on economic
viability. It recognises the values of land as ‘an economic resource that
should be managed productively’ and the value of land as ‘a finite resource
that should be utilised sustainably’; both values that should be protected by
policy and law.
The Land policy therefore ‘adopts a plural approach in which different
systems of tenure co exist and benefit from equal guarantees of tenure of
security. The rationale for this plural approach is that the equal recognition
and protection of all modes of tenure will facilitate the reconciliation and
realisation of the critical values which land represents’.
4 Women’s access to land 
In the traditional Kenyan context the men own land, and wives use the
land to produce food for the household. In the Nyando river basin the
dominant ethnic groups are the Kalenjin in the upper reaches and the Luo
in the lower. In Luo culture the land that a woman cultivates will
eventually be allocated to her sons, and, although the woman is allocated
the land, the man decides which portion goes to which son. She works the
land but never owns it, and is a custodian of the land on behalf of her sons
while they are young. As each son gets married he is shown his piece of
land. In her lifetime she continues to cultivate land which belongs to her
son or her husband. The Luo community is polygamous and as the man
distributes land to his wife/wives, he retains a portion for himself, which
any wife may cultivate, but it will not be allocated to any son until he is
dead. In the study area it was found that 65% of the women are married,
so have access to land through their husbands as long as the husbands are
not landless.
15 Onyango (n 5 above) 143.
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Many respondents (76%) in the study indicated that women own land in
the Nyando river basin. Seventy percent of respondents indicated that
women inherit land from their husbands after their death. Six percent of
the respondents indicated that women were allocated land by their living
husbands and 11% that women got land by purchase (figure 4). This
implies that most women will get to own land when they are widowed, yet
widows are vulnerable and often face challenges in exercising their rights.
A woman inheriting ancestral land on death of husband is not free to do
with it as she wishes. She may obtain the statutory rights and
documentation, but she is expected to conform with an unwritten code of
behavior dictated by society. 
Under statute the wife can enjoy all household items, but only a life
interest in land when the husband dies, and on remarriage loses this right.
Many widows in Kenya are excluded from inheriting from their husbands,
and in-laws frequently evict widows from their lands and homes and take
other property, such as livestock and household goods. Women, especially
unmarried ones, can acquire land by purchase, but few do so. A small
number have acquired land through inheritance, and they can also rent
land. The written law does not bar women from inheriting land from their
fathers but in practice few do. A few inherited from their parents on an
equal basis with brothers but women are expected to marry and be
absorbed by their husbands’ families. 
19%
59%
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household head
Household head
Mother of
household head
others
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Source: The Safeguard Study
The Succession Act16 provides that all children have equal rights of
inheritance but discrimination has not been cured. For example, in the
case of Mary Rono v Jane Rono,17 the trial judge held that the girls could not
inherit their father’s property in equal share because that would give them
a higher advantage when they get married. They challenged this decision
on appeal, and the court of appeal held that there was no basis for such
position, and shared the deceased properties equally among all the
children. 
Divorce and separation do not appear to be common in the study area
(see table 2), reflecting the local cultural values which stigmatises divorce
and separation. Upon divorce, case law established that family property
would be evenly divided if the woman could prove contribution, but in
practice women rarely get property upon separation or divorce without
court intervention. In Kivuitu v Kivuitu,18 Essa v Essa,19 Nderitu v Nderitu,20
Kamore v Kamore,21 Muthembwa v Muthembwa,22 Mereka v Mereka,23 the
16 The Succession Act Cap 160 of the laws of Kenya of 1984 (revised 2008). See sec
section 3.
17 Mary Rono v Jane Rono (2002), unreported.
18 Kivuitu v Kivuitu (1991) 2 KAR 241.
19 Essa v Essa (1995), unreported.
20 Nderitu v Nderitu (1997), unreported.
21 Kamore v Kamore (1980) 1 KLR 389.
22 Muthembwa v Muthembwa (2001), unreported.
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  Gender perspectives of property rights in rural Kenya    149court of appeal gave the wife an equal share, primarily because the
properties were registered in joint names . Justice Omolo in Kivuitu &
Kivuitu stated that non-financial contribution ought to be valued when
apportioning the property. However, the court of appeal rejected this in
Echaria v Echaria.24 It stated that where the property was registered in the
name of only one spouse, then it had to be apportioned after considering
the respective financial contributions of each, but non-financial
contribution (including domestic labour) would not be considered.
Table 5: Marital status of women in the Nyando river basin
Source: The Safeguard Study
The study results indicate that women have far less access to land
compared to men. Many respondents (90%) indicated that access and
control of land are critical in the movement of people in or out of poverty,
placing those without land at grave disadvantage. Table 2 indicates the
proportion of women in the study who are vulnerable (in terms of access
to land) due to their marital status and age. The widows, the separated and
the single over 18 years old have no guarantee of access to land and are
considered vulnerable. In terms of youths, the major cause of vulnerability
in relation to access to land for women is the unmarried state. Most
women (65%) in western Kenya eventually get married because it is
socially unacceptable for a woman to remain unmarried all her life. From
age 40 (see table 2) and above the major cause of vulnerability is
widowhood (86%). The customary practice of ensuring that each married
woman has access to land for cultivation is a positive practice, because it
ensures most women can participate in agricultural production. However,
the benefits can be enhanced by making these rights more secure.
The National Land Policy (Sec 3.6.10.4) on Matrimonial Property
notes that ‘existing laws and practices governing matrimonial property
discriminate against spouses whose contribution to the acquisition of such
property is indirect and not capable of valuation in monitory terms.
Further, the courts have been inconsistent in determining what amounts to
23 Mereka v Mereka (2001). 
24 Echaria v Echaria (2007) eKLR.
Age group Single Married Widow Separated The 
Vulnerable
Above 18 20% 65% 11% 1% 32%
Above 30  5% 75% 18% 1% 24%
Above 40 3% 70% 25% 1% 29%
150    Chapter 7such contributions, with the result that some spouses have unfairly been
denied of their right to land’. The Policy is committed to:
(a) Review succession, matrimonial property and other related laws to
ensure that they conform to the principle of gender equity.
(b) Enact specific legislation governing division of matrimonial property to
replace the ‘Married Women’s Property Act of 1882 of England’.
(c) Protect the rights of widows, widowers and divorcees through enactment
of a law on co ownership of matrimonial property.
(d) Establish appropriate legal measures to ensure that men and women are
entitled to equal rights to matrimonial property
(e) Establish mechanisms to curb selling and mortgaging of family land
without the involvement of spouses.
4.1 Gender and security of tenure
Customary rights are guaranteed by the community, so do not offer
exclusive ownership of land. The family members and the clan leaders are
important witnesses to the transactions. Customary rights are formalised
on registration but can be transferred even before registration. Sharing is
strongly encouraged, weakening the potential for wealth accumulation
and infrastructure investment, and farmers who need more land for
cultivation are able to use land belonging to others through customary crop
sharing arrangements. Customary rights offer stronger security of tenure
for men than women because women’s access to land is linked to the
institution of marriage. While ancestral land is subject to statutory law, the
urgency to complete formal transaction is absent where customary rights
are strong. Where customary rights are weak, there is an urgency to
complete the procedures because statutory rights are the source of
legitimacy. 
Statutory land rights give exclusive rights over the land and all the
resources on it to the registered owner: he can transfer, lease, subdivide,
charge and develop the land. Where there are no common customary
norms among the residents of an area, statutory sources of authority tend
to be more important entrenching individualisation of property and
weakening access for others to key sources located on private land. Men
are typically the registered landowners holding title deeds, and there is no
legal bar against selling family land without their wives’ consent, so that
married women can seldom stop their husbands from selling valuable
family property. 
A constitutional amendment in 1997 provided that all Kenyans were
entitled to fundamental rights and freedoms, whatever their sex, and
prohibited laws that discriminate on the basis of sex. However, section
82(4) exempted certain laws from the prohibition against discrimination.
It permitted discrimination:
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death or other matters of personal law and with respect to the application in
the case of members of a particular race or tribe of customary law with respect
to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is
applicable in the case of other persons 
Therefore, in spheres such as marriage, inheritance, and the application of
customary law, discrimination was tolerated. Additionally, under section
82(6), if a Land Control Board gave or withheld consent to a transaction,
this decision could not be challenged as discriminatory. 
The National Land Policy Secretariat identified insecure land tenure
as a problem associated with the management of land. The land policy
(section 3.3) defines land tenure as ‘the terms and conditions under which
rights to land and land based resources are acquired, retained, used,
disposed of or transmitted’. It acknowledges that existing policies and laws
on land have not provided equal protection to all categories of land rights,
and the colonial and post colonial land administration has undermined
traditional resource management institutions, and created uncertainty in
access, exploitation, and control of land and land based resources. The
National Land Policy25 provides for the protection of the rights of children
and wives to private land. It also provides for protection from
discrimination in alienation, holding and transmission of land based on
sex, ethnicity or geographical origin, which is expected to improve security
of tenure for women and children.
The former constitution of Kenya provided for enforcement of
women’s property rights, but there is little record of women ever
proceeding to institute suits to enforce their rights. Under The New
Constitution26 Parliament is committed to enact legislation to regulate the
recognition and protection of matrimonial home during and on
termination of marriage, and to protect the interest in land of dependants
of deceased persons, including spouses in actual occupation of land. 
5 Legal pluralism and land dispute resolution 
Legal pluralism recognises multiple legal orders, which are supposed to be
more flexible, dynamic and responsive to uncertainty and change than a
single, fixed legal system with a static property regime. Individuals may
choose between these legal frameworks as the basis for their claims on a
resource. The flexibility in informal sources of authority is sometimes seen
to serve the interests of the poor better than the rigid formal sources of
authority. However the legitimacy of informal sources of authority is not
25 Section 3.3.1.3.
26 Article 68(c)(iii).
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formal system.
The institutions of the chief and village elders is a point where
customary law and statutory law merge, and are often used to solve land
disputes. The chief in the rural setting is always a local person and well
versed with the customs of the people, and works with village elders who
not only know the customs but also the families. Many issues are resolved
at this level, drawing upon customary norms. Where conflicts go beyond
them to the courts of law, then customary rights are explained by the chief,
and thus non-statutory laws blend with the statutory. In the research 45%
of respondents questioned about land conflict resolution indicated that
they preferred statutory sources of authority, while 55% preferred
customary sources. This is an indication that customary sources of
authority serve the needs of rural communities slightly better. The
relatively high cost of litigation disadvantages the poor from seeking
redress through statutory mechanisms such as the courts of law, which are
sometimes slow and corrupt, with judicial officers impatient and
dismissive of women’s issues. Rural women, who most need court
protection, have limited access. Customary systems, however, tend to
favour men over women, especially in matters of land and property
because of the patrilineal nature of the society. Most customary conflict
resolution mechanisms are dominated by men with minimal or no female
representation. There are a few women chiefs in Kenya but they work with
village elders who are men. 
Claims are as strong as the institutions that support them. When
customary claims are pitted against statutory claims, the claim supported
by stronger institutions win. In the Matter of the Estate of Ruenji27 and Re
Ogolla’s Estate,28 for example, the High Court held that where a man has
undergone a Christian or civil marriage, a subsequent wife and her
children could not claim property.
6 Conclusions
Property rights in the Nyando basin vary over the different land tenure
systems. In the ancestral lands the community is more tightly connected by
customary norms, and statutory laws are applied less frequently.
Customary norms link woman’s property rights to the institution of
marriage, thus compromising their access, making them vulnerable, and
providing poor security of tenure. In the newly settled areas the people are
socially disconnected and have no common customary norms amongst
them, and statutory sources of authority tend to be more important. Both
men and women can purchase land, and their rights are protected by the
27 Estate of Ruenji (1977) KLR 21.
28 Re Ogolla’s Estate (1977) KLR 18. 
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ownership to marriage still apply at individual level. Women who have
money can purchase their own land and are free of these encumbrances.
Inheritance is the most common way through which people acquire
land in rural Kenya, and contributes to women’s disadvantage. Their male
counterparts are provided with a head start because they inherit land and
can lease or transfer for money to invest in alternative livelihoods, whereas
the women can only cultivate the land unless they purchase it. 
The new constitution is expected to reduce this vulnerability through
relevant provisions in the Bill of Rights. Part (2) on ‘Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms’ spells out the specifics on ‘equity and freedom
from discrimination’. Article 27(1) states that ‘every person is equal before
the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit from the
law’; article 27(3) provides that ‘women and men have the right to equal
treatment including the right to equal opportunities in the political,
economic, cultural and social spheres’; article 27(4) further provides that
‘the state shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on
any ground including race ,sex, pregnancy, marital status, health, ethnic or
racial origins, color, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
dress, language or birth’. Article 40, on the protection of the right to
property also offers some gain for women. Article 40(1) states that ‘subject
to article 65, every person has a right either individually or in association
with others, to acquire and own property of any description in any part of
Kenya’. According to article 40(2), parliament shall not enact a law that
permits the state or any other person to limit or in any way restrict the
enjoyment of any right under this article on the basis of any of the grounds
specified or contemplated in article 27(4). Women’s access to matrimonial
property is also improved by the new constitution. Article 45(3) states that
‘parties to marriage are entitled to equal rights at the time of the marriage,
during the marriage and at the dissolution of the marriage’. Their security
of tenure is also strengthened by article 45(4) which states that ‘Parliament
shall enact legislation that recognises marriages concluded under any
tradition or system of religious, personal or family law’.
The National Land Policy establishes three key land institutions: the
National Land Commission, District Land Boards and Community Land
Boards. The platform at the community level will allow the incorporation
of customary systems and could be used to improve customary rights
affecting women’s access to property and to counter customary rights that
compromise that access. It is supported by the proposed constitution
(chapter 5) which encourages communities to settle disputes through
recognised local community initiatives consistent with the constitution
and eliminates gender discrimination in law, customs and practices related
to land and property in land. Civil society groups should follow keenly the
bills to be drawn up by parliament to ensure that they do not take away the
gains given in the constitution.
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1 Introduction
Between 1990 and 2000 the number of orphans in Africa rose from 30.9
million to 41.5 million of which about 7 million were orphaned by HIV/
AIDS. Other causes of parental deaths include poverty, malnutrition and
hunger, violence and wars, and diseases such as malaria and measles. UN
agencies projected that by the end of 2010 some 53 million children under
the age of 18 years could have been orphaned in Sub-Saharan Africa.1
Apart from the emotional trauma and associated social stigmatisation
relating to orphanhood, the children suffer discrimination, conflicts, grief,
depression and separation from siblings, often leading to loss of family
bond with the surviving family members. One of the biggest challenges
facing this group, however, is the conundrum of laws that dis-allows and
dis-empowers the children of the right to inherit their parents’ properties.
Children’s insecure rights to property and inheritance in many sub-
Saharan countries is not new, but a rapidly growing issue, as the extended
family support systems which served as social safety nets for widows and
orphaned children weaken as a result of social change. 
In Kenya, the numbers of orphans was expected to stand at two
million by 2010 with HIV/AIDS contributing up to 60% of the total cases.2
With the high rate of population growth in Kenya (a ten million rise within
a span of ten years, according to the 2009 census),3 pressure on land has
increased, and the otherwise sound tradition of land inheritance has
become monetarised, and land commodified. In Kenya, land is viewed as
a life-long property, a basis of livelihood, and to the different ethnic groups
its greatest importance is that it provides identity and cultural belonging.
People greatly value their ancestral roots which they call ‘home’, while
1 ‘Children and youth in history’ http://chnm.gmu.edu/cyh/primary-sources/293
(accessed 27 September 2010).
2 Kenya ‘National Policy on Orphans and Vulnerable Children 2007-2010’ (2008) 9.
3 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Population and Household Census highlights (2009) 3.155
156    Chapter 8town residences are considered temporary and often referred to merely as
‘houses’. Most communities in Kenya have always lived and worked on
the land, and land uses vary from crop and animal farming, land being
rented or leased out, and land for homesteads, while others are left fallow.
Land policy can be categorised into land use, land rights and land
administration. Land, property and housing rights are generally asserted
within every socio-economic and political system, yet practice may take
different forms. Ownership of land in Kenya may be by individuals (locals
or foreigners), communal or by government. Most land in Kenya is still
communal (65.4%), and only 18.3 percent has been adjudicated and
registered under individual tenure, mainly in the medium to high potential
areas.4 Kenya’s dual legal system recognises both customary and common
law depending upon circumstances. The administration of land at local
level is handled by the land tribunals and their resolutions are then adopted
as a court order.5 Land tenure reform has tended to emphasise the
replacement of customary land tenure with individual tenure, linked to a
liberalised land market anchored on the principle of ‘willing buyer, willing
seller’, but customary law means that holding a title deed may not make
the tenure secure.6
In Kenya, a country of over 42 ethnic groups, diverse tradition and
cultures have affected the inheritance rules upon the death of a parent or
both parents. As recently as 2009, legislation recognised the rights of
women to inherit their parents’ property, a condition that in the past only
applied to male siblings. But, while there is increasing recognition of the
rights of both genders with regards to property inheritance, the laws still
restrict ownership of property to those over 18 years old, the universally
accepted lower age of adulthood. This presents its own dilemma, as
millions of orphans are under 18.
Under customary law, after the death of a parent, the closest family
members assume the role of guardian to the orphans, including the
protection and ownership of any assets that belong to the deceased. This
goodwill arrangement, however, does not include any process for
returning ownership back to the children at the age of 18. Most orphans
often stay with distant relatives or in orphanages, their absence creating a
vacuum with time and opportunity for land-grabbing.
In most instances, where the trustees are entrusted with care of
property and land on behalf of orphans, the children lose their rights.7
Women and children are often both disadvantaged.8 The guardians,
4 Kenya Land Alliance ‘The National Land Policy in Kenya’ (2004) 4. 
5 S Coldham ‘Land-tenure reform in Kenya’ (1979) African Studies Journal 615-627.
6 A Knox & R Giovarelli ‘Land tenure, property rights, and HIV/AIDS’ (2010) 4; T
Yamano & K Deininger ‘Land Conflicts in Kenya’ (2005) 5.
7 Kenya Land Alliance (n 4 above). 
8 Human Rights Watch ‘Rights at risk: Issues of concern for Kenyan children’ (2001) 14.
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orphans, but with growing numbers of orphans in the AIDS epidemic, this
approach is inadequate, with the emphasis now on nuclear families due to
economic hardship, and pressure for industrialisation and urbanisation.
Many potential guardians may not take due care, in the past a role
obediently undertaken. With increased population and more intense land
use, orphans stand a greater chance of losing their rights of land
inheritance, due to formal or informal sale of land by the guardians.9 It is
difficult to ascertain when children’s property and property rights have
been violated. Members of the extended families usually have rights to the
property of their deceased relatives, and they decide how to apportion that
property, often denying vulnerable children their rights. 
Lack of social protection leads to land being taken by the guardians,
relatives or fellow villagers. Customary laws block minors from making
decisions over land, and land disinheritance and dispossession by relatives
and guardians lead to many land disputes as a result of misunderstanding
of property rights, with the children being usually the losers. Such disputes
can result in family break-up and at national level even civil strife and
political movements. OVCs are stigmatised if HIV/AIDS caused the
parents’ death, or if the children are themselves infected with HIV/AIDS.
Some OVCs end up on the streets with no home, and get into prostitution
and drug abuse. 
Gross disparities in land ownership occur with regard to gender and
inter-generational discrimination in succession and transfer of land.10
Women usually access land through men (parents, husbands, brothers,
sons or male cousins), because it is the men who pay dowry upon
marriage. Title to family land has always been registered in the husband’s
name, even if both spouses contributed to the purchase, and the one with
the title deed in his/her name is deemed the rightful owner.11 A registered
title deed in the name of a male head of household gives him the right to
dispose of the land by any means without recourse to other family
members. Women suffer when their spouses alienate family land, and
have little say in how money from the sale is used. There should be rights
to land inheritance and use, but traditional land management institutions
affect ability to enjoy the rights, leading to numerous challenges from
OVCs. Cultural beliefs in many African societies hinder full acceptance of
the institution of property rights.
9 L Rose ‘Children’s property and inheritance rights and their livelihoods’ (2006) 6.
10 P Syagga ‘Land ownership and use in Kenya: Policy prescriptions from an inequality
perspective’ in Readings on inequality in Kenya: Sectoral dynamics and Perspectives
(2006) 10.
11 T Yamano & K Deininger ‘Land conflicts in Kenya: Causes, Impacts, and Resolutions’
FASID discussion paper (2005) 5 available at http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~yamanota/
Land%20Conflicts%20in%20Kenya%20(FASID%20DP).pdf (accessed 26 August
2011).
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With the AIDS crisis there is the likelihood of violation of land rights of
orphaned children.12 Orphans’ ability to own, control and have access to
land and other properties is increasingly threatened. They face inhibitive
cultural practices such as access to land and other productive assets,
exclusion from decision-making and restrictions on family inheritance.
Some orphans, due to haphazard documentation and storage of
information, are simply unaware of the size and location of their parents’
land, hindering their capacity to negotiate for land inheritance. Deaths
associated with HIV/AIDS reportedly create serious tenurial insecurity for
OVCs,13 although other studies argue that there is insufficient evidence of
distress sale of land due to HIV/AIDS.14 
In Kenya, children have access to land by virtue of their relationships
to lineage ties to the kin group, and most communities are patrilineal in
descent, favouring access to land by males rather than females.
Vulnerability of orphans is worsened by factors (including the colonial
legacy) which extend male ownership of land, and male preference in land
inheritance. Land left in trust for orphans is often sold by the adult carers
to raise funds for the children’s needs, such as medical needs and funeral
expenses, without taking account of long-term secure livelihood. Also
incomes from such sales are not communicated to the OVCs, or to a
neutral observer or representative. 
OVCs also face eviction by relatives from their parental land,
sometimes by violence. Many orphans are dispossessed because of the
stigma of HIV/AIDS deaths, lack of clear legal rights for them, secretive
land transactions, the powerlessness of children, and overburdening of the
extended family network by HIV/AIDS.15 In most African societies,
orphaned children would migrate at a tender age to live with more affluent
relatives, where their basic needs are provided for, and this facilitates
dispossession. OVCs are often compelled to support themselves upon the
demise of one or both parents, and that they also have to defend themselves
from usurpation of their properties by relatives neighbours and relative.16
A significant cultural factor allowing guardians to deny children their
12 D Mullin ‘Land reforms, poverty reduction and HIV/AIDS’ Paper presented at the
SARPN conference on Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation in Southern Africa,
Pretoria (2001) 20. 
13 K Wambui et al ‘The impact of HIV/AIDS on land issues in Kenya’ SARPN paper
(2002) 14 available at http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0000162/P148_Kenya_
Report.pdf (accessed 26 August 2011).
14 M Aliber et al (2004) The impact of HIV/AIDS on land rights (2004) 5.
15 SO Okuro ‘Spoiling property’ (2002) 11(2) African Sociological Review 108.
16 L Rose ‘Children’s property and inheritance rights and their livelihoods: The context of
HIV and AIDS in Southern and East Africa’ LSP Working Paper 39 (2006) 2, available
at http://www.fao.org/es/esw/lsp/cd/img/docs/LSPWP39.pdf (accessed 26 August
2011). 
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actions towards children. Drimie found that orphan-headed households
(defined as children under 16 years of age who have lost both their parents
or their mother) are most affected through dispossession by ‘guardians’.17
Most informants in his study knew of the practice of dispossessing orphans
under the pretext of acting as custodians or guardians (in most cases men).
Inheritance issues are seen as a private, family matter, so that, despite
strong condemnation of individual cases of property-grabbing, there is
little active opposition from community members or leaders, who are
reluctant to interfere unless asked.
In some communities in Kenya, children have not only lost their
parents but all siblings and cousins in the parents’ generation, and have no-
one to turn to except relatives who may have more interest in the property
than caring for them. Even women, because of the gender role attributed
to them, often feel they are not in a position to oppose (male) relatives, or
to ask outsiders for help, when their rights are abused after the death of
their husband. Despite steps by the government to mitigate these issues,
poverty, lack of knowledge and implementation capacity, coupled with
bureaucratic processes within government institutions, hinder the success
of these statutes meant to protect children’s rights. 
3 Laws influencing OVCs inheritance rights
Kenya is a multi ethnic community with diverse religious groupings,
which in effect means that many laws and rules may govern inheritance.
These groups recognise inheritance for passing on or acquiring property,
but there may not be consensus on how. 
3.1 Customary Laws
Traditions and beliefs of ethnic groups form the backbone of the customary
laws, usually based on precedence passed from generation to generation
often verbally, but largely acceptable to the society. These laws are
informed by societal norms that differ from community to community, but
are largely similar. For instance, until recently, Gusii women had no right
of inheritance because traditional society was (and remains) patrilineal.
Thus inheritance of property, children, wives, power etc came from the
male side, and was passed from father to son. Traditionally, the elders are
the sole decision-makers, as power generally has been taken by the older
people, especially men. They are believed to remember as far back as
possible the issue at hand, being the repository of societal knowledge on
who owned what and who the customary legal custodians of land and
17 Human Sciences Research Council ‘The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Land: Case Studies
From Kenya, Lesotho and South Africa’ (2002) 11.
160    Chapter 8property are. Often they would have knowledge passed to them by the
deceased, and can identify children who might not have been known to
exist. Customary laws on land and property inheritance are based on these
tenets; decision-makers, gender, age, legitimacy, religious background and
availability of land. There are many gaps, making customary laws
inadequate in amicably handling the children’s land inheritance issues. 
Customary laws are prone to misinterpretation, especially on issues
that are divisive. A community with fewer elders experiences difficulty in
decision-making pertaining to land inheritance, since the available elders
may lack full knowledge in given instances. The elders’ ‘know-it-all’
attitude, compounded by a ‘must respect’ kind of attitude from the younger
members, can become intimidation of the disadvantaged and vulnerable,
particularly orphans. If land is to be appropriately shared amongst
children, it should presumably be upon attaining the age of majority, on
the basis of first come, first served. Usually people of legal age can easily
inherit and/or acquire land. In the application of traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms, children because of their age always do not have a
good hand, because of how the traditional society still views them. First-
borns are given first priority before those who follow in any distribution.
Orphans away from the sight of the homestead can be forgotten,
assumed gone and never to return, although they may have been driven
out by conditions and malicious innuendos directed at them. Where the
living relatives and elders believed orphans had been favoured by their
father, disputes between siblings can occur, and elders may decide in
favour of those siblings that they have a liking for, perhaps motivated by
money or the belief that the favoured sibling can be manipulated in future. 
Children born out of wedlock have no right to inheritance, and custom
discriminates against them since they are generally considered unwanted.
Such a child may be first-born, but has no right to inheritance without prior
consideration of the so-called legitimate children of the family. When they
become of age they tend to buy their own pieces of land other than
inheriting their father’s, though they may have lived in the family from
childhood and use the family name, and may have invested much in
supporting their family and siblings. In family traditions such as building
new homes, illegitimate children are excluded with feeble excuses, such as
they bring ‘bad omen’, resulting in bad blood amongst siblings and
inhibiting a joint approach to land matters.
Gender consideration has been an important aspect in land inheritance
in Kenya. A common belief is that only male children inherit land, not
females. Men are usually favoured over women, and the girl child may not
inherit land at all, as they are assumed to be soon getting married and
leaving the property and land behind. Women and girls face destitution
after the death of their husbands, partners or parents, and are frequently
relegated to the status of second-class citizens, in that their rights depend
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be accorded access to productive resources, such as land. For a long time
wives and younger children remained at risk of being landless should the
marriage fail, as the customs favour inheritance of the property/land by
sons rather than daughters of the deceased. Even though a parent may
wish to leave land and property to the daughter, it is still subject to the
wider community’s say, which often disfavours the girl child. 
Too often global reviews of land tenure are undertaken without taking
Islamic laws sufficiently into account.18 About 8% of Kenyans are
Muslims, for whom Islamic law recognises women's rights of inheritance,
although her share is usually smaller than that of a male relative.
According to Islamic wills (wasaya), only up to one-third of an individual's
estate can be bequeathed in this manner, with the remaining two-thirds
determined under compulsory rules. Women's inheritance share is
considered as part of a wider property system. Female relatives and
spouses are accorded shares, but half that of a male in a similar position,
so that male relatives are likely to inherit a greater share of the estate. The
law does provide a starting point for women to assert the full range of their
property rights. A child in the womb is competent to inherit under Islamic
law, being deemed to exist from the point of conception. An illegitimate
child whose paternity was contested may not inherit from the wife's
husband, although that child may inherit from its mother and its mother's
family. 
Islamic land law is evolving through a struggle between conservatives
and liberals. Since Islamic inheritance rules conflict with international
human rights, NGOs and liberal personalities in Muslim countries have
called for equal inheritance rights, but the general position, even among
many Muslim women, is that what God has ordained for shares cannot be
changed. Some Muslims with an aim of avoiding costs and inheritance
rules fail to register land, and so avoid giving women their allotted shares
under the Islamic inheritance rules. The development of Islamic land tools
can support fuller land rights for various sections of Muslim societies,
including women, but the various stakeholders need to review the
normative and methodological Islamic frameworks, and their relationship
with other systems of formal and informal land tenure. 
3.2 Land policies
Before the referendum vote on the new Kenyan constitution in 2010, there
were several land reform proposals on land systems and the principle of
18 S Sait & H Lim ‘Islamic inheritance laws and systems’ Islam, Land & Properties
Researchers series Islam, Land and Property series research 6 (2010) 13.
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daughters are to be secured with practices of respective communities.19
The successful implementation of the National Land Policy will have
far-reaching implications, and change the institutional, normative and
policy frameworks of land ownership, use and management. It is being
developed at a time when the country has adopted a new constitution, and
aims to ensure that men and women are entitled to equal rights to land and
other land-based resources during marriage, dissolution and death of a
spouse. The policy approves women’s inheritance of family property and
land, and seeks to empower minors with some control of family property.
Family land and matrimonial homes are to be protected by the
presumption of co-ownership in favour of both spouses. The same will
apply to polygamous unions where each wife shall commonly own (with
the husband) family land and matrimonial property. 
Securing inheritance rights of unmarried daughters with the different
communities in Kenya is a leading controversial issue. The effort to ensure
unmarried daughters inherit a portion of their parents' land, while already
happening in some communities, was one divisive issue that led to the
defeat of the proposed new constitution in the previous 2005 referendum,
and children may be denied the chance to raise complaints on present and
previous land injustices. The 2010 constitution charges Parliament to enact
legislation to protect the dependants of deceased persons holding interests
in any land, including the interests of spouses in actual occupation of land,
but there is no specific mention of children. Equal rights for women in
inheritance of family property and land face resistance by cultures and
traditions which had confined women within the fence of family property.
While the new national land policy marks a significant step forward, it still
needs to be translated into effective protection on the ground for Kenya's
most marginalised.20 
3.3 National laws 
The Succession Act takes care of inheritance. An owner can freely give
property or land to anyone prior to his/her death, with few legal
restrictions. Property can be inherited by minors, but a guardian should be
appointed in the will to manage their affairs. If only children are left, with
no surviving spouse, then the estate devolves upon the children equally.21
If there are no children and no surviving spouse, the estate devolves upon
the kindred, in the following order of priority: the father; or if dead, the
mother; or if no parents, then brothers and sisters, and their children, in
19 Kenya Land Alliance ‘The National Land Policy in Kenya: Critical gender issues and
policy statements’ issues paper No 1/ 2004 (2004). 
20 Human Rights Watch (note 8 above) 14.
21 Catholic Information Service for Africa. See www.cisanewafrica.org (accessed 9
February 2010).
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shares; or if none, the relatives who are in the nearest degree of
consanguinity up to and including the sixth degree, in equal shares. Failing
survival of any kindred, the estate devolves upon the State. Where there is
no will, children are at risk of being short-changed by the so-called
guardians.
The Law of Succession Act 1981 provides for the inheritance of
property by surviving children with or without the presence of a surviving
parent. Section 26 provides for dependent children (or someone acting on
their behalf) to apply to the court for redress in cases where ‘reasonable
provision’ has not been made.22 It also outlines the need to ensure
trusteeship of property of a surviving child until he or she reaches the age
of 18 years, the trustee to be appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction
(subsidiary rules, section 32). 
Decisions on the inheritance of property owned by non-resident
foreigners (not of the Islamic faith) are normally made by the Family and
Probate Division of the High Court of Kenya. Making a will is advisable
since a person who is not a Kenyan can only hold land as leasehold, which
makes it is easier for the High Court to deal with the disposal of property.23
Any decisions made by a foreign court must be registered with the High
Court of Kenya for them to be enforceable in Kenya. The Kenyan
Constitution guarantees that foreigners of different nationalities or
religions are not treated differently to Kenyan citizens, and foreigners can
legally inherit, buy, and sell property in Kenya. Normally the applicable
law is no different for spouses with different nationalities and/or religions,
and the court in the locality where the immovable property is situated
usually has jurisdiction to hear and determine proceedings regarding
property rights. If the parties are of the Islamic faith, then Islamic law is
likely to apply through the Kadhis courts, which have jurisdiction in
matters of status, marriage, divorce and inheritance.
Before the new constitution was promulgated, there was no legislation
governing property of a married couple, with most matrimonial property
being registered in the name of the male spouse; problems can arise upon
death, divorce or separation. 
3.4 Kenya’s New Constitution 2010
While the New Constitution encompasses land and inheri-
22 Kenya’s New Constitution 2010 Chapter 4 (The Bill of Rights), Part 1 art 21(1), (3) &
(4), Part 3 art 43 & Part 5.
23 ‘Global Property Guide 2004-2010, Kenyan Law Determines Ownership’. See (http://
www.globalpropertyguide.com/Africa/Kenya/Inheritance website (accessed 20 April
2010). 
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child has a right to be protected from abuse, neglect, harmful cultural
practices, all forms of violence, inhuman treatment and punishment, and
hazardous or exploitative labour. A child’s best interests are of paramount
importance in every matter concerning the child. Part 3, however, fails to
specify areas of interest and rights of children to inheritance of property. 
In Part 5 of the Bill of Rights, the functions of a new Human Rights
and Equality Commission include receiving and investigating complaints
about alleged abuses of human rights, and taking steps to secure
appropriate redress.25 Every person has the right to complain to the
Commission that a right has been denied, violated or infringed, or is
threatened. However, this guarantee over-looks the fact that OVCs may
lack capacity to raise a complaint to the Commission. The question
therefore arises as to what happens in the event that the child lacks a voice?
Clause 60 of the Constitution states that land customs and practices
should not discriminate on gender, but Clause 67 encourages traditional
dispute mechanisms in land matters, although these routinely leave
daughters out of land inheritance, and generally children are discriminated
against. Traditional dispute mechanisms are encouraged, but shall not
violate the Bill of Rights, but where that is deficient, a gap remains.
Parliament has the discretion to set rules under article 68 of the
Constitution on land investment, minimum and maximum land holding,
foreign ownership of land, matrimonial sharing and inheritance. Under
article 65, land-holding by non-citizens is restricted to 99-year leases and
by virtue of article 62, land without an heir reverts to the state.
The Law of Succession Act26 has harmonised the succession and
matrimonial property laws to conform with the principle of equality
between women and men, since it provides for wives and all children
(including daughters) the right to inherit property and titles. Family land
and matrilineal property are not specifically defined, however, and aspects
of customary law which ensure women’s rights of access to land and
enhance security of tenure over family or community land are not
recognised by statutory land law. 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)27
and the Africa Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child28 recognise
24 The proposed constitution of Kenya, 6th May, 2010, published by the Attorney-
General in accordance with Section 34 of the constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008
(No. 9 of 2008).
25 The Kenya’s new Constitution (2010). Chapter 4: The Bill of rights Part 1, art 21
Number 1,3 &4. Part 3 Article 43/ part5 5.
26 Law of Succession Act Cap 160 of 1984.
27 Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989.
28 Adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 11 July 1990 and entered into force on 29
November 1999.
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mandate and activities of UN-Habitat in promoting access to land and
security of tenure, derived from a range of international human rights and
development standards. In the implementation of these international laws,
however, the challenge is costs and lack of awareness of their availability.
Human Rights Watch in Kenya found that persons orphaned or widowed
by AIDS are more likely than others to experience property-grabbing,
reflecting a gap in the international laws. There are few explicit provisions
in Kenyan law for protection of orphans, possibly because the current law
was written before the explosive increase in their numbers over the last
decade.
3.5 Institutions
OVCs do not enjoy equal protection of the law, as their voices are not
being heard in existing state institutions meant to deal with property and
land questions. Ignorance and lack of awareness on their rights, and lack
of financial resources are not recognised.
Legal aid services are provided by a few NGOs, setting up hotlines and
crisis centres, but the problem affects hundreds of thousands of children.
Communities have a responsibility to protecting children from property-
grabbing, but it is still seen as a problem for the state.29 The draft Children
Bill does not adequately address this problem, nor do the government’s
proposed changes in the structure of children’s services at the district level.
The director of the Children’s Department is proposing a new cadre of
volunteer children’s officers to help strengthen the care and protection role
of the state’s services for children but the proposal does not ensure that
these volunteers will in fact be steered to child protection activities. 
The newly created Family Division of the High Court of Kenya, a civil
court for family disputes, holds some promise but currently is only a pilot
effort in Nairobi. The children’s court deals with inheritance and general
issues pertaining to children, so is inadequate for land dispute cases.
Human Rights Watch observes that the atmosphere of the court room is
intimidating and frightening for children, the court proceedings are rushed
(a few minutes per case), and children may get frightened and break down
into tears or respond inaudibly to the stern questioning of the presiding
magistrate. None of the 94 children processed on the days observed by
Human Rights Watch were represented by legal or other counsel, and only
a few had family members present in the court room. Children processed
in regular adult courts told Human Rights Watch that they were not
informed of the status or time-tabling of their cases.30 There was no clear
29 Human Rights Watch (note 8 above). 
30 Human Rights Watch (n 8 above).
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assigned advocates to represent them.
Orphanages and children’s homes, which might be able to help, are
few relative to need. Except in the few state-run children’s homes, the
government does not provide inspection or support. The state institutions,
particularly the district-level public trustees to which children can in theory
turn to represent their interests, are sparse, do not favour the representation
of children’s interests, and are open to bribery and abuse due to low pay.
District children’s officers and the Children’s Department remain too
focused on the punitive aspect of their work.31 Due to high legal fees, legal
assistance for children in these matters is most often unavailable or
unaffordable.32 
4 Some short case studies 
4.1 Gender dimensions of loss33
Angeline, on losing her husband Billie, came up against traditions and
customs that she had never anticipated and court battles, intimidation and
harassment went on for more than a year. Eventually, she won through the
courts what rightfully belongs to her and her children. Angelina wrote of
the case: 
Through this experience of losing Billie, I have learnt some things about the
gendered experience of loss. Within the Kenyan community – and this is
regardless of whether you are Luo, Luhya, Maasai or Kamba – as a woman
you own nothing and have no right to property. If and when the woman is
economically empowered, this is then used as an excuse that she does not
deserve anything more and she can make her own money. I have learnt the
difference between having laws in books and enforcement of these laws.34
4.2 Court delays35
Ochieng’ stated that a land case begun when he was in primary school is
still unsettled and he is in his late thirties, because of court delays in land
cases in Kenya. The disputed land has seen little economic activity
31 As above.
32 Attributed to D Otieno, a member of Kenya Legal and Ethical Network on HIV/Aids
in Kisumu.
33 The well-known succession case of Angeline Siparo v Billie’s Family. Interagency gender
work group on Inheritance Rights (e-mail from Advocate Anne Omollo on 20
November 2010).
34 As above.
35 Interview with George Ochieng of Kandaria, Kisumu, Kenya on 10 August 2010.
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own parcels from neighbours have gone ahead with their developments.
4.3 Disinheritance by guardians36
Before her death, Beatrice Amwoyo worked for the Kenya Post Office, and
was survived by three children (minors) and a husband. The husband
applied for estate administration, but paternal relatives of Beatrice felt that
he was a drunkard who could not take care of the property, which was
shared out. Monies were then to be put in the accounts of Victor (the
husband) and Dorothy until the children reached their majority, but all the
money went to aunt Josephine’s account. The children have since suffered
from lack of money, and one of them, upon joining University of Nairobi
(Kisumu campus), has no fees. After summons by a lawyer, the aunt paid
up Ksh. 30,000 into the college account.
4.4 Children of locals37
‘My dad passed away in 2008, he left two wives and 8 children. Although
he didn’t have a will, he left property and shares worth 3 million Kenya
shillings. All his properties are in my late mum's name, and now my step-
mums want to divide the 3 million among themselves. Although we are all
above 18 yrs, is there a way us the children can receive part of the
inheritance?’ 
4.5 Children of foreigners38
Caz is the only child of a father who died leaving a wife with whom he
stayed with only for one year and who has a history of nine marriages. He
bought property in Kenya and died with no will. Caz, wondering whether
her case was salvageable, posted a comment in the internet, asking about
Kenyan laws on intestacy in relation to a daughter’s rights to property. 
4.6 Children in orphanages lose land 
Oluoch, from Ahero (Nyanza Province), lost both parents in 2007, and
was taken up by a maternal uncle in Nyabondo. The paternal uncle sold
the father’s land, and in 2010 Oluoch returned home only to find the land
fenced off, having been sold to a stranger. He was told they thought he had
died since they did not hear from him for long. He had to find his way to
36 Government of Kenya and Others v Dorothy Wasike and Others (2006) 23 KHCK. 
37 E-mail from Sheila on 19 May 2010. 
38 See ‘Global Property Guide’ (2007).
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most orphanages in Kenya have developed a rule to close during holidays,
to ensure that all OVCs go to their homes to be seen as present, besides
getting the feel of home.
4.7 Orphans’ uncles sell their parental land39 
The boy’s father was formally employed before his death. Upon the death
of the father and the boy still a minor, the paternal uncle processed letters
of administration. Upon the boy reaching secondary level of education,
there was no money to pay fees, the uncle alleging that he used the money
to purchase a plot and that the boy should wait until the plot is sold. The
land was actually ancestral land, and should be the boy’s land after family
sub-division. If the land is sold the boy is excluded from any inheritance.
The boy’s father had build rental houses, from which the uncle has been
collecting rent, but the uncle claims that he was the developer. So the boy
has no fees and no property to inherit. The case is now voluntarily being
handled by CLEAR (Christian Legal Education Aids and Research)
programme.
4.8 Orphans formerly together separated
Witty is a 12 year old girl, the first born and only girl in a family of three
children. The father died in 2005 after a long period suffering from HIV/
AIDS, and his wife died soon after, while his mother (the children’s grand-
mother) also had HIV/AIDS. On the burial day, no close relative from
their father’s side was ready to take them, so the maternal grandmother left
for Nyabondo (Kisumu) with the children at least to give them a roof over
their heads. Two weeks later, word was sent to Nyabondo that the paternal
grand-mother had also died, and they attended the burial but returned to
the maternal grand mother’s place. The neighbours then took advantage
and grabbed the land, each now claiming it, leaving the three children with
no place to call home and land to call theirs. Back at the grand-mother’s
place, a step-son took two into his house, leaving the grandmother with
one, resulting in disintegration of the family of children.
4.9 Polygamous marriage effect upon inheritance40
Stephen Rono (of the Keiyo sub-tribe of the Kalenjin community) died
without a will in 1988 at the age of 64, survived by two wives (Jane and
Mary), with three sons and two daughters from Jane, and four daughters
39 Information from Anne Omollo, advocate in Kisumu (Conversation between the
author and Anne Omollo at Anne Omollo Advocate Offices, Oginga Odinga Road,
Kisumu on 20 August 2010).
40 Mary Rono v Jane Rono & another (2005) 29 eKLR.
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bone of contention related to the distribution of 192 acres of land. Jane
proposed that the first house would share 108 acres, 22 acres going to each
of the three sons, and 14 acres each to her and her two daughters. The
second house would share 70 acres, all five getting 14 acres each. The
remaining 14 acres would be used communally for the benefit of all family
members. The reason for giving a larger share to the first house and to the
male children was that the land was bought and improved before the
second house came into existence, and the girls had an option of getting
married and leaving the home (under Keiyo tradition, girls had no right to
inheritance of father s property).
The second house demanded an equal share of the land, maintaining
that the first house had not worked harder on the land than the second
house, and the deceased treated and educated all equally, not
discriminating between boys and girls, and had even given one son of the
first house to the second where there were no sons. 
On a first hearing, the High Court awarded the daughters a lesser share
of the property, because of the possibility that they would marry and get
further property from their new families. Mary challenged the decision,
alleging that it was wrong to consider customary law, as the matter was
regulated by the Law of Succession Act. 
5 Conclusions
The Government of Kenya should recognise the scale of these issues, and
formulate a strategic plan to address the legal challenges of land
supposedly held in trust for OVCs. The law should seek to empower
minors and other vulnerable groups with some amount of control of family
property, reviewing the existing laws, differentiating the rights of OVCs
from those of their widowed mothers or fathers. Kenya has signed the
relevant international conventions, and should translate them into
practical legal obligations to protect children’s rights. Human Rights
Watch researchers in Kenya have proposed inter alia that: NGOs should
have standing to act as guardians for children; children should be helped
with legal assistance; succession laws be simplified to improve access;
better information be available; and a properly resourced public trustee
office created, not open to abuse. Malawi was the first country in sub-
Saharan Africa to develop National Orphan Care guidelines in 1992, and
deserves to be emulated by others. The work of NGOs with OVCs should
be incorporated within the government structure and processes, since
NGOs are temporary and accountable to their donors, rendering their
work necessarily short-term.
The Bill of Rights in the new Kenyan Constitution creates an
opportunity for legislation that incorporates the rights of children,
170    Chapter 8especially on land property inheritance, and the proposed National Land
Commission may be able to ensure a better voice for OVCs. National law
bodies, such as the Law Society of Kenya and the Federation of Women
Lawyers, can help with child-friendly paralegal structures to support
OVCs, perhaps through a percentage of their professional time as pro bono
services to children. Groups should lobby for child-friendly courts with
magistrates and judges appropriately trained to handle cases involving
OVCs.
9CHAPTE
R COMPENSATION FOR
COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF
LAND FOR MINING ACTIVITIES
IN NIGERIA: THE SEARCH FOR A
VIABLE SOLUTION
 Oludayo Gabriel Amokaye
1 Introduction
Nigeria is blessed with abundant mineral resources, particularly oil and
gas1 located in the Niger Delta region. Under the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, the right of every Nigerian to own land is
guaranteed2 but the ownership of mineral resources found in, or over land
in the federation is vested in the Federal Government.3 However, the
requirement of land for mining purposes and the constitutionally
recognised property right for individuals or communities necessarily
involve the compulsory acquisition of resource-rich land from the owners,
and subsequent reallocation to the licensed mineral-prospecting
companies.4 Compulsory acquisition of land necessarily implies the
constitutional and statutory obligation to pay compensation to the
landowner, whether an individual, family or community. The issue of
what constitutes adequate and fair compensation remains controversial,
and has provoked tensions between the host communities and mineral
licensees. While officials of mining companies maintain that the
compensation paid so far to deprived landowners is fair, adequate and
consistent with the extant compensatory laws, landowners often reject
such compensation as paltry and unreasonable, and have resorted to
1 Nigeria’s geology comprises two broad categories, the Basement Complex and the
Sedimentary Series. Although there are seven sedimentary basins in Nigeria, only the
Niger Delta is actively explored because it contains most of the Nigeria’s hydrocarbon
deposits. It is one of the world’s largest delta formations, with an average area of
300,000 square km and a sediment volume exceeding 500,000 cu km. The major
petroleum bearing structure in the delta is the Akata/Agbada formation, with an
estimated reserve of 20 billion barrels of oil and 120 trillion cu ft of gas. See New
Democratic Nigeria Official publication of the Nigeria High Commission, London, oil and gas
(2001) 28.
2 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1999 sec 43. 
3 Sec 44 of the Constitution.
4 Mineral and Mining Act of 2007, Cap 162 of Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004;
Petroleum Act of 1969, Cap 10 of Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004; and Oil
Pipeline Act of 1956, Cap O7 of Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.171
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properties to press home their demands for just compensation.5
Against this background, this chapter discusses the various
compensatory regimes for compulsory acquisition of land for mining
purposes under the Nigerian law. Section 2 revisits and reviews the
established doctrinal bases for compensation and compulsory acquisition.
Section 3 assesses these theories within the legal regime in Nigeria, and
highlights imperfections in the Nigerian compensatory regime, and how
these imperfections explain the incessant conflicts and insecurity within
the region. The conclusion calls for reform of the law on compensation in
Nigeria.
2 Doctrinal bases for property compensation in 
Nigeria
Compensatory issues emanating from mining and extractive activities in
Nigeria have two major aspects. The first arises where communal or
individual land is compulsorily acquired for mineral extractive purposes.
The second arises where land is not directly acquired but condemned or
disturbed as a result of mining activities. Undoubtedly, prompt settlement
of claims for compensation in any of these circumstances is in everyone’s
interest, mainly for purposes of efficiency and distributive justice. 
2.1 Efficiency
In law and economics, efficiency relates to the rational allocation of
resources among alternative uses in ways that maximise value. In its purest
form, economic efficiency is defined by the Pareto principle. One state of
affairs is a ‘Pareto improvement’ over another if it would result in at least
one person being better off and no one being worse off.6 A situation is
‘Pareto efficient’ if there is no alternative state of affairs that would be a
‘Pareto improvement’. Under the laws of welfare economics, Pareto
efficiency is produced by a perfectly functioning market.7 The efficiency
criterion dictates that a choice between two or more equally effective
means should be decided in favour of the least expensive one. The
problem, however, is that any attempt to use Pareto efficiency as the
standard for evaluating the efficiency of any action is impractical for two
5 C Obi ‘Globalisation and local resistance: The case of the Ogoni versus Shell’ (1997)
New Political Economy 137 - 148. Local and international newspapers have numerous
reports of attacks on foreign oil workers in the Niger-Delta. For example ‘Two
Germans kidnapped in Niger Delta released unharmed’. Available online at http://
www.thelocal.de/national/20100425-26765.html. (Accessed on 4 February 2010).
6 G Debreu ‘Valuation equilibrium and Pareto optimum’ (1954) 40 Proceedings of the
National Academy of Science 588.
7 See AE Boardman et al Cost-benefit analysis: Concepts and practice (1996) 53.
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assumes a perfect market. Market failure often arises as a result of
misbehaviour of the market actors.8 Where market fails for one reason or
the other, economists turn to government to intervene through regulatory
law to cure the failure. Second, it is impossible for the action of one not to
harm another, almost all action harms at least one person; virtually all
activities would fail a Pareto-efficiency test. Accordingly, for these
purposes, economists turn to a slightly less appealing but more practical
standard known as ‘potential Pareto’ or ‘Kaldor-Hicks’ efficiency.9 An
activity is ‘efficient’ in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if those who would benefit
from the regulation could fully compensate those who would lose and still
be better off. Efficiency, then, is a measure of aggregate social welfare.
Economic analysis of compensatory law, however, focuses on the
incentive effect of different compensatory rules on the decision of private
individuals in business analysis.10 In discussing compensatory doctrine
within the tort liability context, economists point to two conflicting
considerations. The first is the incentive effect of a full-compensation rule
on a landowner’s investment. Here, where the law guarantees a private
landowner’s full value on any investment (where full compensation is paid
when government compulsorily acquires the property of the owner), the
individual landowner can make huge investment without bearing any risk
that a conflicting public use will arise. In contrast, in the absence of a non-
compensatory regime, it will be discouraging to invest in private property
that may also generate inefficiency. 
The second consideration, and the one more relevant for our current
purposes, is the incentives influencing an individual (whether a
businessman or government), who actually make the crucial production
and compensatory decisions. Economists argue that for resources to be
rationally allocated and value maximised, every cost (external or internal)
associated with the production process must be internalised as a
disincentive to mismanage scare resources.11 
8 For a discussion of market failure which is intelligible to lawyers, see FM Bator ‘The
anatomy of market failure’ (1958) 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics 351.
9 Named after the theorists who developed the analysis. See N Kaldor ‘Welfare
propositions of economics and interpersonal comparisons of utility’ (1939) 49 Economic
Journal 549; JR Hicks ‘The foundations of welfare economics’ (1939) 49 Economic
Journal 696. See also DM Driesen ‘The societal cost of environmental regulation:
Beyond administrative cost-benefit analysis’ (1997) 24 Ecology Law Quarterly 579 - 580. 
10 For an excellent introduction to law and economics in compulsory acquisition of land,
see WA Fischel ‘Introduction: Utilitarian balancing and formalism in taking’ (1988) 88
Columbia Law Review 1581; WA Fischel & P Shapiro ‘Takings, insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on economics interpretations of “just compensation” law’
(1988) 17 Journal Legal Studies 269; L Blume & DL Rubinfeld ‘Compensation for
takings: An economic analysis’ (1984) 72 California Law Review 569. 
These costs are borne by the public in such forms as damage to forests and streams,
increased respiratory ailments, and reduced pleasure in clear vistas and safe beaches.
See MA Heller & JE Krier ‘Deterrence and distribution in the law of compulsory
acquisition’ (1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 998 -999. F Michelman ‘Property, utility,
11
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expanded by Coase.12 Both argue that an individual whose activities have
harmful effects on others must undertake a cost-benefit analysis, to include
both benefits to him and costs to others. So long as such individual does
not bear the cost of the harmful activities, he has no incentive to prevent it.
Where the cost of pollution is not internalised, it may produce an
inefficiently high level of good production and low level of pollution
control. The most economical way to measure accurately the costs and
benefits of a given use of property is to internalise externalities, and insist
upon the right to prior compensation for accepting a harmful effect on the
part of the landowner. Thus, if the cost of land compulsorily acquired is
internalised by the payment of the market value of the acquired property
as compensation, accurate price signals are given to the consumers, and
compensation provides the appropriate incentive for decision-makers.13
When the acquiring authority does not need to pay compensation or an
inadequate sum is paid, it disregards the costs its decision imposes upon
such land. Compensation ensures that the acquiring authority pays for the
land compulsorily acquired and compensates the landowner for the loss of
a property or injury suffered. In this case, where compensation is paid to
the landowner, the owner is left no worse off than he was initially
(assuming money perfectly compensates for the loss of land or injury
suffered). Economists would call this a Kaldor-Hicks optimal result: no
one is made worse off because the landowner receives a suitable set of cash
transfers or monetary equivalent of his property to induce such change;
and, at least, the acquiring authority is made better off by not abandoning
its business. 
2.2  Distributive justice
Distributive justice is concerned with the equitable distribution of the costs
and benefits resulting from resource allocation amongst members of a
society (‘giving each person his or her due’).14 The theory of distributive
justice, which seeks to ensure that no private individual alone is forced to
bear public burden, which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole, is well illustrated in compulsory acquisition and
compensation cases.15 Distributive justice theories relating to compulsory
11 and fairness: Comments on the ethical foundation of “just compensation” law’ (1967)
80 Harvard Law Review 1165.
12 AC Pigou Wealth and Welfare (1920); RH Coase ‘Problem of social cost’ (1960) Journal of
Law & Policy 1.
13 D Hunter et al (eds) International environmental law and policy (2002) 129. See MJ Radin
Reinterpreting Property (1993) 158; S Levmore ‘Just compensation and just politics’
(1990) 22 Connecticut Law Review 306 - 308; S Levmore ‘Compulsory acquisition, torts,
and special interests’ (1991) 77 Virginia Law Review 1344 - 1348; MR Porier
‘Compulsory acquisition and natural hazards policy: Public choice on the beachfront’
(1993) 46 Rutgers Law Review 260 - 283.
14 Aristotle Nicomachean ethics Book v 3:113a - 4:1132h in The complete work of Aristotle,
Vol. 2, 1785-1787.
15 Per Justice Hugo Black in Armstrong v United States 364 US 40 (1960).
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Difference Principle, the libertarian approach and the progressive
approach.
2.2.1 The difference principle
The Difference Principle was popularised by Rawls, who proposed that
social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) attached to positions and offices open to all the under the condition of
the equality of opportunity; and (b) for the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of the society. According to him, in the distribution
of natural resources in terms of powers, opportunities and wealth, justice
demands that preference be accorded to areas where the resources are
derived as long as the unequal distributions benefits the worst-off group by
maximising their shares, provided there is equal access to various offices
and positions in the society.16 Michelman further provides the most
famous and theoretical insight into the need for fairness in compensatory
issues, conceptualising the issues of compensation in distributive terms:
when a social decision to redirect economic resources entails painful obvious
costs, how shall these costs ultimately be distributed among the members of
society? Shall they be permitted to remain where they fall initially or shall the
government, by paying compensation, make explicit attempt to distribute
them in accordance with decisions made by whatever processes fashion the
tax structure, or perhaps according to some other principles. Shall the losses
be left with the individuals on whom they happen first to fall, or shall they be
“socialised”?17
Michelman’s answers to these questions are found in his utilitarian
calculus, according to which a landowner injured by a legitimate public
action should be compensated if (only if) rendering compensation is cost
beneficial. The benefit from rendering compensation is the avoidance of
‘demoralisation cost’ which is the total of (1) the monetary value necessary
to offset disutilities which accrue to a loser and his sympathisers
specifically from the realisation that no compensation is offered; and (2)
present capitalised monetary value of the lost future production (reflecting
either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by demoralisation of an
uncompensated loser, his sympathiser and observers disturbed by the
thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on
some other occasion. The cost of rendering compensation is the
‘settlement cost’, that is, the naira value of time, efforts and resources
which would be required in order to reach compensation settlement that
will be adequate to avoid demoralisation cost. In deciding whether to
acquire private land, the acquiring authority contemplating such decision
16 J Rawls Theory of justice and political liberalism (1971).
17 FI Michelman ‘Property, utility and fairness: Comments on the ethical foundations of
“just compensation” law’ (1967) 80 Harvard Law Review 1165.
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an act are greater than either the demoralisation cost or settlement cost; if
not, he must reject the measure as inefficient. Second, he must compare the
demoralisation cost to the settlement cost, and choose to pay the lower
amount. In the event that the settlement cost is the lower amount,
compulsory acquisition of land is desirable and compensation is necessary.
Otherwise, there is no compulsory acquisition. 
2.2.2 The libertarian approach 
The libertarian conception of property focuses on shielding an individual
from the claims of other persons and the power of the public authority,18
and preserving an untouchable private sphere, which is a prerequisite to
personal development and autonomy.19 Private property and the
constitutionalisation of its protection from governmental interference seek,
according to this conception, to decentralise the ownership of resources in
order to diminish the power of governments or any single private entity:
they endow individuals, rather than any collective bureaucracy, with
control over resources and thus preserve personal freedom, security and
independence.20 
For the libertarian, compensation should be required every time a
compulsory acquisition’s impact on one owner is disproportionate to the
burden (if any) carried by other beneficiaries of the public use.21 This rule
of proportionality dictates that a claimant cannot sustain a burden that is
disproportionately heavy in comparison to that sustained by other
beneficiaries of the public action, taking into account the respective
benefits to all parties involved. It bars any public action that would make
some owner worse off by transferring some of his economic interest to the
public or other individuals.
2.2.3 The progressive approach 
Dagan and White aptly summarise diverse views on the progressive
approach to distributive justice.22 According to them, these theories start
with the premise that ownership is not merely a bundle of rights, but also
a social institution that creates bonds of commitment and responsibility
18 BA Ackerman, Private property and the Constitution (1977) 71 - 74.
19 I Berlin ‘Two concepts of liberty’ in Four essays on liberty (1970) 118, 122 & 124; J Rawls
Political Liberalism (1993) 298.
20 RE Barnett The structure of liberty (1998) 139 - 142, 238; M Friedman Capitalism and
freedom (1962) 7 - 21; BH Siegan Property and freedom: The constitution, the courts, and land-
use regulation (1997)10; CA Reich ‘The new property’ (1964) 73 Yale Law Journal 771;
CR Sunstein On property and constitutionalism (1993) 14 Cardozo Law Review 914-15.
21 See RA Epstein Compulsory acquisition: Private property and the power of eminent domain
(1985) 207.
22 H Dagan & JJ White ‘Governments, citizens, and injurious industries’ (2000) 75 New
York University Law Review 411 - 414. 
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the owner’s properties.23 John Locke first articulates the idea that it is part
of every person’s natural right to own property and enjoy the fruits of their
labour, and one might reasonably infer that any attempt by an individual
or State to interfere with such a right should be heavily restricted.24
Furthermore, property is an expression of a cluster of values (primarily
privacy, security and independence) that always involve the distribution as
well as the retention of wealth.25 Property must entail distribution since
ownership is a source of economic resources, and also social, political, and
cultural, rights and powers; the correlative of which are other people’s
duties and liabilities.26 A progressive compulsory acquisition doctrine,
committed to social responsibility and ‘the ongoing normative
commitment to dispersal of access’,27 must not be contrary to some
conventional wisdom,28 or oblivious to the imposition of disproportionate
burdens in the pursuit of public actions. The progressives opine that a
liberal compulsory acquisition doctrine, one that gives compensation only
in extreme cases, harms property holders of all sorts, rich and poor. A no
compensation regime might lead to systematic exploitation of small and
relatively less well-off owners, who by hypothesis have no other way to
protect themselves.29 This does not mean that the progressives subscribe to
the libertarian rule of proportionality. Strict proportionality would bar any
reconfiguration of the distribution of the aggregate of resources, wealth
and legal rules.30 Strict proportionality would also undermine social
responsibility, by insisting that our mutual obligations as citizens should be
derived solely from either consent or self-advantage, thus underplaying the
significance of belonging, membership and citizenship.31 A compulsory
acquisition doctrine attuned to the virtues of social responsibility and
23 See H Dagan ‘Compulsory acquisition and distributive justice’ (1999) 85 Virginia Law
Review 772 - 773.
24 J Locke Second treatise on government (2004)17. 
25 FI Michelman ‘Tutelary jurisprudence and constitutional property’ in Liberty, property
and the future of constitutional development (1990)127, 149 - 150, 154; FI Michelman
‘Possession vs. distribution in the constitutional idea of property’ (1987) 72 Iowa Law
Review 1319; M Radin ‘Property and personhood (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957.
Kant explored the personhold argument in ‘Of the injustice of counterfeiting books’ in
Essays and treaties on moral, political, and various philosophical subjects 225, 229 - 230 trans
W Richardson (1798). 
26 MR Cohen ‘Property and sovereignty’ (1927)13 Cornell Law Quarterly 11-14; RL Hale
‘Coercion and distribution in a supposedly non-coercive state’ (1923) 38 Political Science
Quarterly 470 - 79; WN Hohfeld ‘Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in
judicial reasoning’ (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16.
27 JW Singer & JM Beerman ‘The social origins of property’ (1993) 6 Canadian Journal of
Law & Jurisprudence 245.
28 See CE Baker ‘Property and its relation to constitutionally protected liberty’ (1986) 134
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 764 - 765; F Michelman ‘The common law
baseline and restitution for the lost commons: A reply to professor Epstein’ (1997) 64
University of Chicago Law Review 69.
29 BH Thompson Jr ‘The endangered species act: A case study in compulsory acquisition
and incentives’ (1997) 49 Stanford Law Review 361 & 367.
30 J Rubenfeld ‘Using’ (1993) 102 Yale Law Journal 1077.
31 C Taylor ‘Atomism’ in Philosophy and the human sciences: Philosophical papers (1985) 187-
188. See also R Nozick Anarchy, state, and utopia (1974) 171 - 172.
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start with a rule of long-term reciprocity of advantages. This approach
prescribes that a public action imposing a disproportionate burden is not
an acquisition as long as two conditions are met: if the immediate burden
on the claimant is not extreme; and if the claimant stands to enjoy benefits
of similar magnitude from some other acquisition, even if such benefits are
not contemporaneous.32 This conception of reciprocity of advantages
attempts to recognise, preserve and foster the significance of membership
and citizenship, while recognising our non-ideal world and, thus, requiring
long-term rough equivalence of burdens and advantages.33 
3 Compulsory acquisition and compensation under 
Nigerian law
Having considered theories on compensation, the legal regime available
under Nigerian law to compensate a landowner for land acquired for
mining shall be examined. Now, the applicability of efficiency and
distributive justice theories under the Nigerian legal system shall be
examined, and the judicial interpretation of statutes to resolve
compensatory issues arising from compulsory acquisition under the 1999
Constitution and the Land Use Act of 1978. 
3.1 Procedure for the acquisition of land for mining purpose
The right of every Nigerian to own, use and enjoy land in Nigeria is
guaranteed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
Section 43 thereof provides that every citizen of Nigeria shall have the right
to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria. Absolute
right of ownership over land is limited by the Land Use Act which vests the
absolute ownership of land in the Governor of a State, who holds the land
of a State in trust for the benefit of all Nigerians.34 The greatest proprietary
interest any person can have over land under the Act is the right of
occupancy, which the Governor has the power to grant. Compulsory
acquisition of land by the Federal, State or Local Government is for
overriding public interest, defined to include, inter alia, the requirement of
land for mining purposes, oil pipelines or public purposes.35 Where land
has been validly acquired for mining purposes, a mineral prospecting
32 RC Ellickson Order without law: How neighbors settle disputes (1991) 56, 234 - 36,
274 - 275.
33 MJ Radin Contested commodities (1996) 5 & 118.
34 Sec 1 of the Land Use Act of 1978.
Secs 28 & 29 (n 34 above). Secs 28(2)(c) and 3(b) provides for the ‘requirement of the
land for mining purposes or oil pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith’.
Mining operations include ‘prospecting for and getting of minerals or petroleum and
any activities preparatory to or incidental thereto’. See statues cited in note 4 above. Sec
22(1) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act of 1977 define mining
35
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the land specified in its licence to construct, maintain and operate pipelines
and ancillary installations. The acquisition of land for public purpose
under sections 28 and 51(1) of the Land Use Act does not admit of
revocation of right of occupancy for the benefit of another private interest 
The liberal interpretation of the statutory power of revocation of the
Governor by the judiciary reinforces and protects the proprietary land
rights of Nigerians in many respects. Firstly, the right of every Nigerian to
own property is constitutional and can only be divested under the legally
permissible circumstances. Secondly, revocatory power has far reaching
implication on the property right of the holder - it is expropriatory.
Consequently, the person being deprived of his property has the right to
know why his property is being taken over by the government. Thirdly, a
statute that seeks to deprive an individual of his property should be strictly
construed against the acquiring authority.
3.2 Compensation for land acquisition 
The right of a landowner to be compensated for land compulsorily
acquired for mining purposes is fixed in the Nigerian Constitution, the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and
Enforcement Act),36 Land Use Act, Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act
2007, Petroleum Act and the Oil Pipeline Act. Compensation for
compulsory acquisition of land means the sum of money to be paid by a
public body carrying out some authorised undertaking, and includes loss
of land, loss of farming rights, disturbance and injurious affection suffered
by the landowner.37 
3.2.1 The Nigerian Constitution and African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights
Under section 44(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, an acquiring authority
must pay compensation promptly to an affected landowner. Article 14 of
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights further provides that
the right of every Nigerian to own property shall be guaranteed, and may
only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general
35 operation to include ‘prospecting for and getting of minerals or petroleum and any
activities preparatory or incidental thereto’. Sec 51 of the Act defines ‘Public purpose’
to include land acquired for exclusive Government use or for general public use, for use
by any body corporate directly established by law or any body corporate registered
under the Companies and Allied Matters as respects which Governments owns shares,
stocks or debentures; for or in connection with sanitary improvement of any kind,
telecommunication, mining, economic, industrial or agricultural development,
education and other social services.
36 Cap A10 of Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
37 JPH Soper ‘Arbitrations and analysis’ in DM Lawrence & JM Williams (eds) The estate
gazette (1965) 132 -133.
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appropriate laws. Article 21 further provides that all peoples shall freely
dispose of their wealth and natural resources, and in the event of
compulsory acquisition, those dispossessed shall have the right to lawful
recovery of its property and adequate compensation.
Opinions differ as to the scope and nature of compensation under the
1999 Constitution. The first view expressed by Nwabueze is that the 1999
Constitution does not guarantee ‘fair and adequate compensation’ (since
the phrase is deliberately omitted from the Constitution), only ‘prompt’
compensation.38 This view fails to take cognisance of the fact that
constitutional provisions are given purposeful interpretation, as opposed to
plain grammatical expression, to ensure that the ends of justice is best
served. It is trite law under Nigerian jurisprudence that, in the interest of
justice and fair play, a statute that seeks to touch and concern the
proprietary right should not be construed to deny a landowner of
compensation. This view negates the principle of distributive justice which
the Constitution seeks to achieve.
Judicial construction of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions appears to
support the latter view. In Attorney-General of Bendel State & Anor v
Aideyan,39 the court held that: 
In Nigeria, one’s right to one’s property was an entrenched constitutional
right under section 31 of the 1963 Constitution as indeed, it is under section
40 of the 1979 Constitution. That right is inviolate. In the ipssimis verbis of the
Constitution itself, such a property or any right attendant thereto can only be
taken possession of or compulsorily acquired by or under the provisions of a
law. Furthermore, such a law must provide for the payment of adequate
compensation thereof to him and must give the owner the right to access a
High Court for the determination of his interest in the property and amount
of compensation due to him. It follows therefore that any purported
acquisition which is not according to a law containing the above provisions is
no acquisition at all in the eyes of the Constitution.40
3.2.2 Land Use Act
The method of valuation for compensation after compulsory acquisition is
fixed in Section 29(3) of the Act. Unlike the common law approach,
whereby compensation is based on open market value of the acquired land,
the compensation under the Act is the unexhausted improvement on land
38 BO Nwabueze Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa (1974) 361. Sec 44(1)(a) of the
Nigerian Constitution of 1999 reproduces sec 40(1) of the 1979 Constitution, but
contrasts with the 1963 Constitution which expressly provided for the payment of ‘fair
and adequate’ compensation.
39 Attorney-General of Bendel State & Anor v Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt 118) 646; Ferguson v
Commissioner for Works and Planning Lagos State (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt 638) 315, 328;
Kukoyi & Anor v Aina (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt 624) 633.
40 Per Nnaemeka-Agu JSC in Attorney-General of Bendel State (n 39 above) 667. 
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occupier in the year of revocation of the right of occupancy for overriding
public purposes. The test for determining whether an improvement is
exhausted is expenditure of capital or labour; where there is no pecuniary
improvement or physical effort on the land, the land owner is not entitled
to any compensation. Thus compensation is not paid for loss of land but
only payable to any noticeable improvement permanently attached to the
land; or the utility or amenity thereof, and includes building, plantation of
long-lived crops or trees, fencing, well, road and irrigation or reclamation,
but does not include the result of ordinary cultivation other than growing
produce.41 Although the Act prescribes that replacement cost method of
valuation should be used in assessing compensation for land and building,
the valuation methodology for the crops and economic trees is not spelt
out, but left to the acquiring authority. The result is that Land Officers of
the acquiring authority usually fix prices for crops and economic trees
arbitrarily, making compensation paid to the landowners meagre and
inadequate. The nature and quantum of compensation payable under the
Act for mining purposes is fixed in section 29(2) of the Act, which provides
that it shall be under the appropriate Mineral Act or Mineral Oil Act or any
legislation replacing them.
3.2.3 Nigerian Mineral and Mining Act
This Act applies to land acquired for the extraction of mineral resources42
other than oil and gas, and identifies three recognisable compensable
items: loss of land, disturbance, and damages to crops and building.
Compensation for loss of land right is payable to the holder of right of
occupancy recognised by the Governor, whose responsibility is it to pay
the displaced landowners. The valuation method is similar to that in
Section 29(3) of the Land Use Act. The only liability imposed on the
licensee is to reimburse the Governor with the compensation money paid
by the Governor on its behalf to the landowners.43 In addition to this, a
licensee must pay adequate compensation to a landowner for disturbance
and damage to land or any crop, economic tree, building or work
damaged, or removed by the holder of the mining license.44 What
constitutes reasonable compensation is not defined in the Act, but the
general principle should be the fair market value of the land in question.45
41 Sec 51 of the Land Use Act; Upper Benue River Basin Authority v Aika (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt
537) paras 328, 337, 339. 
42 Mineral resources refers to any substance whether in solid, liquid or gaseous form
occurring in or on the earth, formed by or subjected to geological processes including
occurrences or deposits of rocks, coal, bed gases, bituminous shales, tar sands, any
substances that may be extracted from coal, shales, tar sands, mineral water and
mineral components in tailings and waste piles including petroleum. 
43 Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act (n 4 above) secs 164 & 104.
44 n 4 above, secs 164 & 107.
Commissioner of Lands v Adeleye (1938) 14 NLR 111; Chairman L.E.D.B v Joye (1939) 15
NLR 50; Chairman L.E.D.B v Olopinkwu (1958) LLR 25, 26 - 27; Eugene Nzekwu & Anor v
45
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determining the fair market value of a land compulsorily acquired. They
have held that the market value of a compulsorily acquired land could be
the price within a reasonable time of ownership; or the price at which the
owner has sold a piece of land of the same size forming part of the area
compulsorily acquired;46 or the price at which a piece of land of the same
size has been sold generally at the locality; or capital value of rent payable
in respect of the land;47 or average return per hectare of the land.48 In
practice, it is doubtful if a reasonable compensation along the market value
would be paid to a deprived landowner, because the valuation is to be done
by the officials of the acquiring authority, after consultation with the State
Minerals Resource and Environmental Management Committee and a
Government licensed- valuer. 
3.2.4 Oil Pipeline Act
Compulsory acquisition of land for laying oil pipelines necessarily requires
the payment of compensation for land acquired, injurious affection and
disturbance suffered by the landowner as a result of the acquisition.
Unfortunately, the Act is silent on the payment of compensation for the
bare land acquired but it recognises compensation for ‘injurious
affection’49 suffered by a deprived landowner as a result of the exercise of
the rights statutorily conferred on the licencee. In addition, compensation
is payable for any damage done to any buildings, crops or profitable trees
by the licensee. 
It is pertinent to note that the Act does not offer much by way of
analysis and interpretation of the phrase ‘injurious affection’. Injurious
affection at common law relates to the depreciatory effect of the
acquisition on the other land retained by the owner.50 Therefore, unless a
landowner retains the other land depreciated by injurious affection, he
may not be entitled to any compensation under this Act. It is settled law
that the only compensation which can be obtained under this statute is the
one based on injurious affection in respect of lands, that is, in respect of
some loss of value of land, or in respect of some damage to lands; and that
compensation cannot be obtained for any loss which is personal to the
owner, or which is related to some particular user of the land.51 Both in
45 The Attorney-General East Central State & Anor (1972) 5 SC 224, 242 - 243.
46 Commissioner of Land v Efifa Stool (1955) WACA 712.
47 Nzekwu (n 45 above).
48 Minister of Lands & Housing v Ayonishan Family (1968) NMLR 483, 486.
49 Secs 11(5)(a) & 20(2) of Oil Pipeline Act (n 4 above). This should be contrasted with
section 29(1) of the Land Use Act which expressly prohibits compensation for injurious
affection of land acquired for non-mining purposes. See sec 20(5) of the Oil Pipeline
Act.
50 Edmunds v Minister of Transport (1964) 2 QB 134; Cowper Essex v Acton Local Board (1889)
14 AC 153.
51 Metropolitan Board of Works v McCarthy (1874) LR 7 HL 253 per Lord Cranworth;
Wildtree Hotels Ltd v Harrow London Borough Council (1998) 3 All ER 638.
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purview of this statute unless some damage has been occasioned to the
land itself, in respect of which, but for the statute, the complainant might
have maintained an action. The injury must be actual injury to the land
itself such as by loosening the foundation of a building thereon, obstructing
its light or its drains, making it inaccessible by lowering or raising the
ground immediately in front of it, or by some such physical deterioration.
Any other construction of ‘injurious affection’ would open the door to
claims of so wide and indefinite a character as could not have been in the
contemplation of the legislature. 
In assessing compensation for injurious affection, the measure of
compensation should be the diminution in the value of the land caused by
that interference and a claimant had to establish his loss on ordinary
principle of causation.52 However, assessment of compensation under the
Oil Pipeline Act is based on the residual value of the land injuriously
affected. This is arrived at by initially assessing both the value of the land
or the interest injuriously affected at the date immediately before the grant
of the licence and the residual value of the same land or interest consequent
upon at the date of the grant of the licence. 
Notwithstanding the statutory stricture, in practice, assessment of
compensation payable to the land-owner under the Oil Pipeline Act is
generally complex and unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, compensation
is not paid for the land alone, since ownership of land is vested in the State
held in trust by the Governor. Compensation is payable for the
improvement made on the land.53 Second, in many mineral-prospecting
areas most of the landowners are either farmers or fishermen; thus the only
noticeable improvements on the land are the economic crops planted on
the land or fish in their ponds. In the assessment of compensation, mining
companies generally rely on the approved government rates or
predetermined rates by the Shell Petroleum Development Company of
Nigeria Limited Lands Department Procedure Guide (commonly called
the Land Procedure Guide)54 and the Oil Producers Trade Section of the
Lagos Chamber of Commerce, an organisation in which the oil producing
companies have influence, as opposed to the appropriate market value in
the compensatory calculus. The Land Procedure Guide and OPTS rates
mostly disregard items such as claim for disturbance and injurious affected
covered by the Petroleum Act and Oil Pipeline Act. In the valuation of
crops in compulsory acquisition cases, the practice is that the estate
surveyor employed by the oil company quantified the damage and the soil
52 This is based on the principle of equivalence espoused by Scott LJ in Horn v Sunderland
(1941) 2 KB 42 to the effect that a landowner is entitled to receive compensation
commensurate in monetary terms to the value of expropriated land. 
53 Sec 29 of the Land Use Act; sec 20(4) of the Oil Pipeline Act. 
54 Issued by Shell in 1987 and updated from time to time. This manual has been used by
other oil companies notably Total, Chevron in assessment of compensation paid to
communities.
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crops or trees on the farm are then enumerated, and given a value.
Although that value is approved by the State Government; it can vary
according to a number of factors, such as the age of the crop, the size of the
crop, whether it is young, medium or mature, amount of money used to
care for or nurture the crop (fertilisers, insecticide, etc). If there is inter-
cropping on the farm, the full rate recommended is paid for the main crop,
while compensation for subsidiary crops is a quarter of the full rate
recommended for that main crop. The value of the product on the farm is
multiplied by the number of years that the farm will be unproductive; for
instance, if the value of the product is N300 and the soil will be
unproductive for the next four years, the victim will be paid N1,200(that
is, 300 x 4). In addition to this, the victim is paid some amount for loss of
the farming rights. It should be noted that it is the farm gate price55 and not
the market value that is paid for these crops. The consequence is that the
oil communities generally reject this paltry sum and engage in litigation to
press further their claims.
In Umudje v Shell BP Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria Limited,56 the
learned trial Judge awarded the plaintiffs compensation on the basis of
injurious affections without reference to the common law remedy, even
though the claim was anchored in the rule of Rylands v Fletcher.57 It is
curious to note that despite the statutory provisions for compensation in
respect of injurious affection, the Supreme Court, on appeal, set the trial
court’s award aside. But in National Electric Power Authority v Amusa,58
where the land of the plaintiff/respondent was rendered useless by the
defendant/appellant’s transmission lines, the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff/respondent’s land was injuriously affected, and compensation
payable. Following this decision, the courts have applied this principle in
many oil-pollution related cases.59 
Fekumo has argued that in addition to the payment for injurious
affection in cases involving compulsory acquisition of land for mining
purposes, the court may award compensation for disturbance and general
inconvenience based on the provisions of section 20(2)(b) and (e) of the
Act.60 While this section authorises the court to award compensation for
disturbance, it is, however, procedural and directory, and should not be
interpreted as authorising the payment of other compensations not
envisaged nor specifically provided for in section 11(5) of the Act. 
55 Farm gate price is the cost of the crop on the farm.
56 Umudje v Shell BP Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria Limited (1975) 9 -11 SC 155. This
case was followed by the Court of Appeal in Ojo Ogbemudia Eholor v Idemudia Idahosa
(1992) 2 NWLR (Pt 223) 336.
57 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
58 National Electric Power Authority v Amusa (1976) 12 SC 99.
59 Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria v Farrah (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt 382) 148; Shell
Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria v Chief Graham Otoko & Others (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt
159) 693.
60 JI Fekumo, Oil pollution and the problems of compensation in Nigeria (2001) 9.
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The only recognisable compensation under the Petroleum Act is adequate
and fair compensation for ‘disturbance’.61 The Act is silent on the
compensation payable for land acquired for oil prospecting and mining
purposes, and indeed what constitutes compensable ‘disturbance’ is not
defined in the Act. 
Generally, compensation for disturbance upon compulsory
acquisition of land62 relates to loss of business or trade, such as loss of
goodwill, increased rental or other outgoings, cost of alternative property,
cost of relocation, forced sale or diminution of value, and loss of profit
during the period of re-establishment; it does not relate to the cost of the
land acquired. Such loss of business or trade must be in respect of a going
concern, not where the undertaking is unprofitable or abandoned.63 In
Williams v Kamson,64 it was held that compensation for disturbance arises
where a claimant could establish loss owing to the disturbance from the
action of the defendant, and such disturbance would arise where there is
alteration of something that would otherwise have continued.
Government in this case compulsorily acquired under the Public Land
Acquisition Act the respondent’s residential property and factory
buildings, at the time the factory being a going concern and the residential
building occupied. The acquisition necessitated relocation at great cost to
the respondent, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s award of
compensation for disturbance. 
In assessing compensation for disturbance, the principle of
equivalence applies, under which a displaced landowner has the right to be
put, so far as money can do, in the same position as if his land had not been
taken from him; in other words, monetary compensation should be neither
less nor more than the loss imposed on him in the public interest.65
A closely related issue is how the courts should treat various heads of
claim: independently or concurrently? Fekumo66 suggests that claims for
compensation for disturbance and injurious affection should be
independently assessed. In the case of ‘injurious affection’, there is usually
a need to prove loss of use of the subject matter of the claim alleged to be
affected; in the case of disturbance, the subject-matter of the claim is
usually loss of business or trade, with (he argues) no basis for concurrent
61 Para 36 of the First Schedule to the Petroleum Act of 1969.
62 Williams v Kamson (1968) NSCC 318; Attorney-General of the Mid-Western State v Chief
Sam Warri Essi (1977) 4 SC 71.
63 Maja v Chief Secretary to Government (1952) 12 WACA 392.
64 William v Kamson (n 62 above).
65 Horn v Sunderland Corporation (1941) 2 KB 26.
66 Fekumo (n 6o above).
186    Chapter 9assessment of the claims.67 In practice Nigerian courts, following the
reasoning in Horn v Sunderland Corporation,68 have consistently treated
claims for disturbance and injurious affection separately, and refused to
make independent assessment of each in determining the compensatory
sum. Except in the isolated case of Farrah v. SPDC,69 the courts often insist
that, though disturbance is an element to be considered in the assessment
of compensation, like injurious affection claims, it is the only element to be
considered in the total computation of compensation. My argument is that
it is wrong to treat compensation for disturbance differently and
independently of the compensation for the value of the land; they must be
considered simultaneously in arriving at the appropriate compensation.70
4 Conclusions
This paper has shown the different compensatory regimes for compulsory
acquisition of land for mining purposes in Nigeria, which are found to be
complex, flexible, inefficient and unsatisfactory. Although the
Constitution and extant law examined appear to recognise the normative
efficiency and distributive principles of compensation, by providing for
reasonable compensation for compulsory acquisition of land for mining
purposes, the criteria for assessment of compensation are unfairly skewed
in favour of the acquiring authorities, thereby undermining the fairness
and efficient compensatory principles. The poor compensatory regime is
further accentuated by the arbitrary valuation of structural or economic
crop improvements on the land by government officials, without
involvement of the landowners or the community. When paid at all, the
payment of compensation is usually delayed, with no serious effort made
to address or assuage the feelings of indigenous communities or
landowners, who may have profound cultural and social-political values
and spiritual attachments to land holdings. Although the Constitution
states that compensation should be paid promptly, the period within which
payment is to be made is often left undefined in the statutes.
While one must acknowledge the need for government acquisition of
land and control of resources for social and development purposes, the
inadequate compensation or non-payment to land-owners affected has left
many Nigerians landless, helpless and agitated; hence the need for a
thorough reform of the compensatory regime in Nigeria, and for more
activism on the part of the judiciary. Special legislation is needed to deal
with compensation, particularly the valuation criteria, if the rights of
landowners and lives and properties of the mineral licensees and their
67 JA Omotola ‘The Quantum of Compensation for Oil Pollution’ in JA Omotola (ed)
Environmental Laws in Nigeria including Compensation for Pollution (1990) 292.
68 Horn v Sunderland Corporation (1941) 1 All ER 480.
69 Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria (n 59 above).
70 Horn v Sunderland (n 65 above); M’Ardle v Glasgow Corp (1972) SC 41.
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assessment of compensation on acquisition of land in materially similar
cases, whether or not the statutory provisions apply. 

CONCLUSION
African land law is a rich tapestry, for which the term ‘legal pluralism’
might have been invented. This book and its companion volume try to
reflect some of that richness, and these conclusions cover both books
(Essays and Local case studies). Africa’s sheer size and diversity underlays its
land law – a human population of about a billion, speaking hundreds of
languages, on a land mass of some 30 million square kilometres. The
continent has experienced over the last century unprecedented changes.
European colonisation was succeeded after only a few decades by
decolonisation and the creation of new nation states, with over fifty
members in the African Union. Violent upheavals are being caused by
pressures of population growth, environmental change, urbanisation and
competition for natural resources. The rule of law may be an urgent
aspiration, but whose law? The very structures of law can be seen as
colonial imports, as discussed in Home’s chapter (Essays book) on the
prospects for a pro-poor land law, while the boundaries of national
jurisdictions are largely colonial demarcations upheld through the Cairo
Declaration, as discussed in Donaldson’s chapter. 
Pre-colonial or indigenous legal cultures mostly evolved over centuries
in hundreds of tribal and clan communities, and were rarely codified in
written form until the 20th century. The religion of Islam did provide
something of a legal code over much of the continent, spreading from the
north over centuries, as discussed in Sait’s chapter (Essays book) through
specific country case studies. Customary law, developed by and for local
communities rather than imposed by the state, was acknowledged but
marginalised by the dual mandate or trusteeship ideology of colonial
administrations. It has shown lasting resilience, but remains in continuing
tension with imported concepts of private property and state intervention,
while the colonial powers confiscated the best land for white settlement
and economic development (or exploitation, depending upon one’s
viewpoint). How to deal with these conflicts and contradictions is the great
challenge facing African land law, as explored by Kangwa’s chapter on
Namibian land reform (Local case studies book) and Amokaye’s two
chapters on Nigeria (respectively on the Land Use Act and land
expropriation for mineral exploitation). 
The emergence of an international human rights movement since the
Second World War is having a growing impact upon African land law. It
has exposed the failure of customary law to respond adequately to social
and economic change, as shown in two chapters on Kenya (Essays book) –
on the disadvantage faced by women in rural areas (Onyango and others),
and by orphans and vulnerable children (Anang’a and others). It has
revived indigenous land rights claims in Africa as in other continents, as
explored by two chapters in the Essays book: Gilbert and Couillard’s, and189
190    ConclusionNjoh’s chapter. Such emerging human rights law potentially challenges
the legal centralism of the postcolonial nation-state, and Chigara’s chapter
(Essays book) on the humwe principle raises the possibility of a new African
jurisprudence, recognising and applying legal principles that have roots in
African society and history. 
The Local case studies book further explores national and local situations.
Western concepts of trusteeship (formerly the ‘civilising’ mission) still
permeate the liberal development and peace agenda, as discussed in
McAuslan’s chapter on post-conflict land policies in several African
countries. The case presented by Hernando de Soto for the legal
empowerment of the poor through formalising their property rights also
exercises strong influence upon land and property law in Africa: Payne’s
chapter discusses one example, the ambitious Rwandan land tenure
reform programme, which is seeking to formalise millions of land holdings
as state-registered titles. Abdulai’s chapter questions de Soto’s assumed
link between land titling and mortgage credit through empirical work on
bank lending practices in urban Ghana. Kufuor’s chapter discusses another
form of property imported to Africa – the gated community for high-
income residents – and links it to new institutional economics theory. 
Postcolonial nation states have undertaken many land law initiatives,
sometimes resulting in confusion and conflicts of laws. Molebatsi’s chapter
discusses the problems arising for Botswana’s traditional settlements (its
so-called ‘urban villages’) by the co-existence of a much-acclaimed Tribal
Land Act and a Town and Country Planning Act imported from Britain.
Van Asperen’s chapter presents field research on the Namibian town of
Oshakati, on an experiment with a flexible land tenure alternative to past
land tenure practices. The result of legislative hyper-activity may simply be
too many laws, exceeding local implementation capacity. The chapter by
Home and Onyango on Kisumu (Kenya) explores the impact upon urban
governance of multiple land tenure systems, while Kalabamu’s chapter on
Botswana warns of the danger of too much law and too many institutions
concerned with land, creating opportunities for corruption and confusion. 
African land law is, therefore, dynamic, and the prospects are of
continuing challenge and change in many arenas: national constitutions,
policy-making, statute law, administrative and executive capacity, and
local and community involvement. 
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